Winter 2009 Review by War College, The U.S. Naval
Naval War College Review
Volume 62
Number 1 Winter Article 23
2009
Winter 2009 Review
The U.S. Naval War College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
War College, The U.S. Naval (2009) "Winter 2009 Review," Naval War College Review: Vol. 62 : No. 1 , Article 23.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss1/23
N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Winter 2009








































IBUS M RI VIC
TORIA
1
War College: Winter 2009 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
Cover
The United States Fleet in the Strait of
Magellan on 5 February 1908, by Henry
Reuterdahl (1871–1925), oil-on-canvas
painting, courtesy of the Hope Club ar-
chives, reproduced with permission from
the Hope Club, Providence, Rhode Island.
This cover image completes our centen-
nial observance of the world cruise of the
U.S. Navy’s “Great White Fleet,” which
ended in early 1909. We marked the hun-
dredth anniversary of its December 1907
departure with Professor James R.
Holmes’s “‘A Striking Thing’: Leadership,
Strategic Communications, and Roose-
velt’s Great White Fleet,” in our Winter
2008 issue (which actually appeared in
late 2007).
Henry Reuterdahl, born in Sweden, was a
war correspondent and artist with Col-
lier’s magazine during the Spanish-
American War. Chosen to accompany the
Great White Fleet as correspondent, he
sailed in the battleship USS Minnesota
from Hampton Roads to San Francisco.
Reuterdahl painted this view in 1910 for
Truman H. Newberry, who had served
under President Theodore Roosevelt as
Secretary of the Navy in 1908–1909.
Newberry’s grandson presented the
painting to the Hope Club, which loaned
it to the Naval War College Museum for
its “Great White Fleet” exhibit between
January and April 2008.
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FROM THE EDITORS
Senator Barack Obama’s election in November as the next president of the
United States raises many questions about the future direction of American for-
eign and national security policy. None is more important than the question
whether the Obama presidency will bring about a significant course correction
in the grand strategy of the United States. Will an Obama administration cut de-
fense spending dramatically while recapitalizing America’s instruments of “soft
power”? Will it rethink America’s alliance system, in particular its relationship
with NATO and the Europeans? Will it usher in a new era of multilateral diplo-
macy centering on the United Nations and other international organizations?
Will it adopt a less proactive strategy in the global war on terrorism and scale
down or even phase out American military involvement in the Greater Middle
East? Will it place new emphasis on humanitarian intervention by U.S. military
forces in places like Darfur? It is impossible to answer these and similar ques-
tions at the moment, but the broader national security community as well as the
new administration itself will need to face up to them soon enough. In the lead
article of this issue, Michael J. Green, a Japan specialist and former staff member
of the National Security Council, looks at recent thinking on U.S. grand strategy
in Asia by prominent foreign-policy intellectuals that may influence the admin-
istration’s approach to this critical region.
That Africa has featured more prominently in American strategic calcula-
tions over the last several years is hardly a secret. Africa’s endemic security prob-
lems, stemming from a combination of fragmented national identities, weak
state structures, inadequate resources and capacities, and poor governance, have
increasingly become a concern for the international community as a whole. The
alarming rise of piracy off the Horn of Africa, as well as the ability of Islamist ter-
rorists to operate freely throughout much of the region, has particularly helped
fan such concern. In response, the United States has established a limited mili-
tary presence in strategically located Djibouti in West Africa and has taken steps
to stand up a new regional combatant command for the continent. The decision
to create Africa Command (AFRICOM), as sensible as it seems in terms of ratio-
nalizing the organizational framework of American military engagement in Af-
rica and sharpening the focus of its efforts there, has proved controversial, as
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many African countries have voiced concerns over a heightened U.S. military
presence in their region and resisted our efforts to locate the command’s new
headquarters there (it remains for the time being in Stuttgart, Germany; Italy
has recently announced its willingness to host its Army and Navy headquarters).
It should be added that the U.S. Navy has been actively involved in strengthening
American military and diplomatic engagement with the Africans. In particular,
the Global Fleet Station is an innovative operational concept—aligned with the
new maritime strategy—that the Navy has been testing first in Africa with con-
siderable success. Three of our authors analyze the current state of play in this
arena. General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., USMC (Ret.), provides a valuable over-
view of the strategic issues involved in American military engagement in Africa
and the establishment of AFRICOM. Jonathan Stevenson and Kathi A. Sohn
look more specifically at the role and contributions of the Navy to this endeavor.
This issue’s focus on Africa is completed by Stephen A. Emerson’s review essay of
eleven books that should be on the reading list of every professional military of-
ficer interested in the region.
Our other contributors may be briefly acknowledged. Naval operational art
in World War II is the subject of Trent Hone’s illuminating account of the inter-
play of doctrine and tactical combat experience in the U.S. Navy’s epic march
across the Pacific. Lieutenant Commander John Callaway, USN, provides a
timely look at the pattern of learning (and failure to learn) in the U.S. military’s
approach to force protection since the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in
Lebanon. Finally, Richard J. Norton offers a fascinating account of the genre of
“future military history”and its possible impact on real-world strategic analysis.
This issue also includes what will be a new regular feature: a message from
Professor John Jackson, the Naval War College’s project manager for the Chief of
Naval Operations’ Navy Professional Reading Program. Professor Jackson gives
a brief overview of the origins and character of this innovative program; in the
future, he will update readers on changes in the reading list and related develop-
ments. (Look for our own reviews of new books appearing on the list.)
ERRATUM
In our Autumn 2008 issue, Paul Smith’s The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting
Transnational Violence in the Twenty-first Century was reviewed by Professor
Christopher Jasparro, not “Jasper,” as printed (page 150). We regret this editorial
error.
STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION
Statement of ownership, management, and circulation (required by 39 USC. 3685) of the Naval War Col-
lege Review, Publication Number 401390, published four times a year at 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I.,
02841-1207. General business offices of the publisher are located at the Naval War College, 686 Cushing
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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, U.S. Navy, became the
fifty-first President of the Naval War College on 12 Au-
gust 2004. He was succeeded on 6 November 2008 in a
change-of-command ceremony on the College’s Dewey
Field by Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup, U.S. Navy.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
The Naval War College at 125: Un Tour d’Horizon
BY THE TIME THIS ISSUE of the Naval War College Review is distrib-
uted, my old friend and one of the nation’s most brilliant and capa-
ble naval officers will be at the desk where I have written commentaries for
sixteen previous issues. I am sure that the Naval War College Press will have great
hopes that his submissions are timelier than those of his predecessor. This is only
one of the many challenges Admiral Wisecup will face. Some of them will carry
strategic consequence for the College and the Navy.
I have used these pages in the “President’s Forum” to convey to the Review’s
diverse audiences—internal and external to the College—the objectives and
scheme of advance of this institution over the past fifty-one months. The ideas
the Forum has incorporated, while often argued, framed, and edited at the Presi-
dent’s desk, were actually gathered from across the institution. The Forum has
thus been, I believe, purposeful in capturing and developing vision as it emerged
from the genius of this place. Further, the articles, taken together, represent the
College’s “PIM”—its “planned intended movement.” The advance along track,
while it has been very encouraging, has brought new challenges and opportuni-
ties into view—new external factors into the calculus of the track. The College’s
horizon presents now a decidedly different set of features from those appearing
on that horizon four years ago.
As the nation confronts a dramatically altered strategic and political environ-
ment, the Naval War College has been thrust into a position of increased promi-
nence on the Navy’s agenda. The College is now operating in four major lanes to
meet the challenges of today’s global security environment:
• Developing strategic and operational leaders
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• Bolstering the ability of the Navy and its maritime partners to lead and
support at the operational and strategic levels of war
• Marrying theory and practice to advance the art and science of decision
making and command and control in globally networked, self-organizing
environments
• Building and sustaining global maritime partnerships.
These four initiatives align to the expanded mission set for the College, and they
should drive Navy resourcing priorities consistent with the strategic leverage
that Navy leadership expects from this institution.
The faculty and staff of the Naval War College have accomplished much in
just the past few years to advance and substantiate this expanded mission set,
first and foremost through restructuring the previous model of a single core
curriculum to create instead two distinct curricula for the senior and intermedi-
ate academic programs. Additionally, the curricula have been expanded and
electives restructured along functional and regional lines to better support com-
batant and component commanders’ regional security strategies. The research,
analysis, and gaming mission has also expanded and realigned its activities with
senior operational commanders facing critical operational challenges in our
forward theaters.
The Naval War College first proposed, and was then directed to take the coordi-
nating and implementing lead in developing, the core of enlisted and officer Profes-
sional Military Education (PME) across a career continuum, from sailor to admiral.
The continuum that the College developed reflects joint career-development policy
and Navy policy to align PME requirements with career progression milestones. It
has also provided a means to impose coherence on the Navy’s education strategy.
More important, this has had the effect of driving the very best and most prom-
ising leaders into the College’s main programs. In short, the curricula offered at
the Naval War College have moved from “nice to have” to “essential” for ad-
vancement to positions of senior leadership. The total throughput demand has
roughly doubled. To meet the additional audiences required by these new policy
objectives, the College’s distance-learning program alone has risen from
roughly 1,500 in 2002 to over fourteen thousand in 2008, and it will grow to
what we estimate will exceed twenty-five thousand in 2010. Residential pro-
grams reflect similar growth, placing huge new demands on faculty, staff, and
infrastructure.
Leveraging another key, unique strength of this institution and recognizing
the need for a more robust Navy contribution to joint command and control, the
College has conceived and funded a series of ambitious new programs to
strengthen Navy combat readiness at the operational level of war. These
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initiatives—the flag-level Commanders’ Course, the Assess and Assist teams, the
Senior Mentor program, Halsey war-fighting analyses, the Maritime Staff Oper-
ators Course, the rechartered Naval Operational Planner Course, clustered elec-
tives, the restructured basic curricula, and a range of gaming activity focused on
major operational challenges and operational-level command and con-
trol—were carefully designed to be interdependent and mutually reinforcing, to
work across functional and organizational lines. Through this “fabric” of work,
the Naval War College has been thrust squarely into the main line of advance for
our Navy. External to the College, routine bureaucratic processes preoccupied
with some of its individual threads could easily unravel this fabric. Keeping it all
stitched together will require great skill and forceful argument.
The Naval War College’s role in coordinating the procedural approach for,
and developing the analytic underpinnings of, the sea services’ unified maritime
strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, continues for the ma-
turing and refinement of the strategy and its supporting concepts, principally
through Title X war-gaming. The revived “Global” gaming series is just one of
the events the College routinely plans and executes here to help align service
plans and programming with strategy. The extensive collaborative relationships
that have been so carefully built among credentialed experts in national security
and among researchers and operational practitioners—across the nation and
the world—cannot be replicated or “faked.” Keeping this fact before key Navy
leadership will be essential to ensure that this irreplicable source of intellectual
capital and engine for concept generation and development continues to inform
the Navy’s strategic resourcing decision process.
Along with the restructuring of its electives program along regional axes, the
College has made clear advances with its international programs and has estab-
lished initiatives for more effective collaboration. Among them is the approach
the College adopted for its analytic work in support of the new maritime strat-
egy—an approach that emphasized inclusion and international collaboration.
The International Seapower Symposium has taken on new life and significance,
and it is becoming much better linked into the regional symposiums around the
world. Our Naval Command College/Naval Staff College (our senior and junior
international programs, respectively) seminars and symposiums are now be-
coming well established (we just finished our fourth one, in Bahrain, with our
Middle Eastern graduates). Leveraging this international goodwill and reach will
require extraordinary effort and increased support from regional commanders.
We are in our third year of conducting Flag and General Officer Command-
ers’ courses, which we have established on roughly a biennial basis, rotating
through the various regions. The College is also restructuring internally to focus
its teaching and research faculty on regional, cultural, and diplomatic history, on
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economic, military, and political issues, as we evolve our regional studies con-
cept (which will be the basis for the Naval War College Foundation’s next “capi-
tal campaign”). Also, our Chief of Naval Operations, with full support from our
state congressional delegation, has made the construction of the College’s new
“International Forum for Operational and Strategic Leadership” a near-term
priority. Turning promises into brick and mortar, however, will be no easy task.
We have also finally got resources and authority to move the Naval War Col-
lege’s information systems to the “.edu” domain, which will greatly expand our
ability to stay connected to academic and policy institutions and to all our
alumni around the world (very good news, indeed!) and to share ideas and ex-
change perspectives more easily. In a similar vein, the Naval War College Review
seeks articles from the best minds and most authoritative perspectives from
around the globe on issues of significance to the maritime world. Means are be-
ing explored to begin to translate the Review into several of the world’s major
languages and to distribute it globally. Again—a resource challenge that will re-
quire persistence and creative approaches.
A “Rediscovered” War College. A host of opportunities create this new horizon
for the fifty-second President. But he has a prominent platform from which to
survey and pursue them and a group of senior naval leaders who recognize the
role the College can play. In short, it is difficult to find an area of priority interest
for the Navy where this institution is not somehow contributing—if not leading
or playing a catalytic role. I am very encouraged by what I describe as a “redis-
covery” of the Naval War College by the Navy’s leadership. Three successive
Chiefs of Naval Operations have clearly recognized and relied—increasingly—on
the unique strengths of this institution. There is a growing awareness as well that
this is where the DNA of the Navy is evolved and transmitted—the roots of our
service ethos, providing a shared conception of what it means to be in the Navy
above and beyond the diverse communities that comprise it.
External to the College, the nation and the Navy are in the midst of a careful as-
sessment of the future international security environment. The unique role of the
Navy within that environment and the densely interconnected nature of the inter-
national arena play directly to the College’s unique ability to strengthen maritime
security cooperation and sustain combat readiness. Likewise, the direct linkage to
the highest levels of the Navy keeps the academic leadership, faculty, and staff
fully engaged and current in the service’s internal debates over the future’s key
challenges. This in turn positively influences the College’s curriculum, keeping
it relevant and current. Also, new missions, such as developing operational-level
expertise with the Navy’s operating forces, promise to increase the College’s
value and relevance. Finally, the emerging vision of Naval Station Newport as
1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Winter 2009\NWCR Winter 09\NWCR W09.vp
Thursday, December 18, 2008 11:12:10 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
18
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 1, Art. 23
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss1/23
the developmental hub for Navy leaders offers potential for even greater na-
tional and international reach and impact. The College has become a formal
part of the Navy Strategic Planning Process and thereby has gained another ave-
nue of influence directly affecting Navy strategy, operational concepts, and pro-
grams. Moreover, research, analysis, and gaming activities provide critical
support to national security investment decisions. Likewise, the College’s direct
involvement with fleet operations and processes within our maritime headquar-
ters, via our assessment and assistance teams, our flag-level operational com-
manders’ courses, and our competency requirements analyses, is clearly on the
critical path for the Navy as it moves toward its objective of robust capability at
the operational level of war. Full implementation of the Navy’s PME Continuum
will further support this objective: sailors and officers will be introduced to pro-
fessional military education much earlier in their careers and will undergo pro-
fessional military education on an ongoing, cyclical basis, passing repeatedly
through the programs provided here. Ultimately, the College will be engaged, di-
rectly or indirectly, with about 350,000 sailors and officers and, potentially,
thousands of Department of the Navy civilian employees.
As the presidency of the Naval War College passes from one officer to another
for the fifty-first time, the College faces a historic opportunity to increase its
value to the Navy, the nation, and the international community. The strategic
environment has become more complex and unpredictable, increasing the value
of education and research and creating an imperative for both responsive mari-
time command and control and enhanced international cooperation. The Col-
lege is well positioned to exploit this opportunity and to secure the minimal
additional investment required to meet the ambitious expectations the Navy has
set for it. Success will ensure a highly leverageable institution for Navy and na-
tional strategic objectives—but will demand the concert and focus of the Col-
lege’s vast intellectual resources, relationships, and reputation for integrity. On
the eve of its 125th year, as the College’s fifty-second President takes his fix and
lays out its PIM, I have great faith that the institution is headed fair and that he
will “keep her so.”
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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ASIA IN THE DEBATE ON AMERICAN
GRAND STRATEGY
Michael J. Green
The United States faces multiple national security challenges, but in thelonger sweep of history it is our response to the rise of Chinese power
that may have the greatest significance. Over the previous two centuries the
Anglo-American-led neoliberal order faced three rising powers. Great Brit-
ain managed the rise of American power at the end of the nineteenth century,
through a deft strategy of accommodation and co-option. However, the
United States and Britain failed to prevent the rise of Japanese and German
power from leading to a calamitous global conflict. In those cases both deter-
rence and accommodation failed. We thus face the prospect of rising Chinese
power with a one-for-three record, and the one case of success was one in
which the rising power shared the values of the preeminent power.
Americans do not seem disheartened by this prospect, however. The Chicago
Council on Global Affairs found in a June 2008 survey that 64 percent of Ameri-
cans favor a policy of engagement and cooperation with Beijing and that 67 per-
cent oppose U.S. efforts to contain Chinese power.1 In the 2008 presidential
election, Senators John McCain and Barack Obama largely reflected this cau-
tious optimism about the future of U.S.-China relations, despite significant dis-
agreements they had with each other on Iraq and the war on terror. Obama
emphasized distrust of China in terms of trade, even while reiterating the need
for engagement:
U.S. and Chinese cooperation in the Six-Party Talks on the North Korea nuclear is-
sue makes clear that we can work together constructively bilaterally and with others
to reduce tensions on even extraordinarily sensitive issues. . . . America and the world
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can benefit from trade with China but only if China agrees to play by the rules and
act as a positive force for balanced world growth.
Meanwhile, McCain emphasized distrust of China on the security side, but he
too stayed within the overall theme of expanding cooperation with China:
The U.S. shares common interests with China that can form the basis of a strong
partnership on issues of global concern, including climate change, trade, and prolif-
eration. But China’s rapid military modernization, mercantilist economic practices,
lack of political freedom and close relations with regimes like Sudan and Burma un-
dermine the international system on which its rise depends.2
This broad consensus on China policy stands in contrast to the “Japan bash-
ing” that characterized the American presidential elections of 1988 and 1992, as
Japan was rapidly increasing in power. The differences with Japan are all the
more striking when one considers that Japan is an ally and a democracy that
poses no military threat to the United States. There are probably several reasons
why China is not dominating the American political debate the way Japan did
earlier, including the immediacy of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
shared international challenge of the financial crisis, and reassuring examples of
U.S.-China cooperation on the North Korean nuclear problem.
Yet the longer-term strategic challenge remains. Goldman Sachs predicts that
China’s gross domestic product (GDP) will surpass that of the United States by
2027. Even allowing for China’s demographic “speed bump” and a slowdown in
the global economy, there is no doubt that relative power will continue to shift in
China’s direction over the coming decades.3 China’s defense increases have sur-
passed its already impressive GDP growth for a decade, and the People’s Libera-
tion Army (PLA) continues to build niche asymmetrical strengths in cyberspace,
access denial, and antisatellite capabilities. China has expanded cooperation with
the United States on the North Korean nuclear program but continues to under-
cut U.S. efforts to bring pressure on Iran, Burma, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and other
states that undermine international stability because of their proliferation or fail-
ure to protect human rights.
The United States and the West as a whole made a bet that integrating China
into the world economy would change China for the better before China
changed the international system for the worse. The odds for that bet do not
look much better or worse today than they did a decade ago, but if the bet fails,
the consequences for American interests and the international order will be no
less dire. Given those stakes, one would expect America’s great strategic thinkers
to reflect fully on the future of China and Asia, even though the presidential can-
didates themselves focused on more immediate foreign-policy challenges in the
2008 election debate.
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However, surveying the big “strategic” books on foreign policy that have come
out this year to guide President-elect Obama, it is difficult to discern a clear con-
sensus on strategy for managing order in East Asia. In fact, beneath a broad veneer
of continuity and consensus on U.S. Asia policy during this election cycle, there
are dramatically different assumptions about China’s rise that appear under the
surface in major writings on overall American strategy. Some authors argue that
the world has moved beyond traditional balance-of-power considerations alto-
gether; others worry that rivalry in Asia means the United States must avoid pro-
vocative actions toward China; and yet others see the emergence of a new bipolar
competition with China that requires more active balancing.
Perhaps it is unfair to parse the writings of broad strategic thinkers on the
specific question of Asia policy. Certainly, there is a vibrant debate among Asia
scholars about the nature of China’s rising power and the proper strategies for
securing a stable regional order.4 But given the enormous pressures the next ad-
ministration will face, it matters whether the larger strategic context of Ameri-
can foreign policy fits with the realities in Asia. The William Clinton and George
W. Bush administrations both wavered in their Asia policies when other interna-
tional pressures took precedence. For Clinton, economic priorities made Japan
an adversary, then an ally to balance China, and then a secondary player in the
pursuit of a new “strategic partnership” with Beijing. For Bush, Asia policy cen-
tered on Japan, and relations with both Tokyo and Beijing improved. But then
the single-minded pursuit of an agreement with North Korea lost the confi-
dence of the Japanese and led to drift in the overall American position in the re-
gion. The debate of Asia experts matters, but so does the big picture, and it matters
to the U.S. Navy in particular. But before addressing the implications for the Navy,
we will review how Asia fits in three broad and contrasting visions of American
strategy reflected in Strobe Talbott’s The Great Experiment, Madeleine Albright’s
Memo to the President Elect, and Robert Kagan’s The Return of History.5
THE UTOPIAN VISION
One of the most ambitious foreign-policy visions for the next administra-
tion comes in The Great Experiment, written by Strobe Talbott, President
Clinton’s former deputy secretary of state and current president of the
Brookings Institution. Most of The Great Experiment is a fascinating and ele-
gantly written history of humankind’s failed efforts to move beyond tribal
instincts and state competition toward global governance. It is clear where
this dialectical history is going from page 1, and that is an appeal for a new
multilateral and United Nations–centered approach to U.S. foreign policy.
Talbott argues that the United States may finally be at the point where it has
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no choice but to work through global institutions, because the challenges we
face today transcend borders:
These mega-threats can be held at bay in the crucial years immediately ahead only
through multilateralism on a scale far beyond anything the world has achieved to
date. That challenge puts a unique onus on the United States as the most heavily
armed nuclear-weapons state and as the leading producer of greenhouse gases. (p.
395)
Ultimately, Talbott sees the megathreats of climate change and proliferation
trumping the dangers created by shifting distribution of power in the interna-
tional system. In fact, he sees these threats as opportunities to build the kind of
global governance that might have prevented war in the past as rising and falling
powers collided.
The few areas where Talbott touches on Asia strategy reflect his broader
Lockean assumptions about the intentions of states within the system and his
focus on the United States as implicitly one of the greatest sources of instability
in recent history. For example, his vision of a future order assumes that con-
straining American and allied military capabilities through multilateral treaties,
such as a fissile-material cutoff and the Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, will
reduce the dangers of confrontation with rising powers such as China. Thus,
failure to negotiate a new ABM treaty will likely mean that “Russia and China re-
spond by building up their number of offensive missiles and taking a variety of
countermeasures, including antisatellite capabilities, in order to overwhelm,
penetrate, and blind a U.S. missile defense system” (p. 397). With North Korea,
he assumes that a fair deal can be achieved, arguing that “the United States will
need to establish diplomatic relations with the governments in Tehran and
Pyongyang in exchange for their willingness to get rid of existing weapons in the
North Korean case and stop a development program in the Iranian one”(p. 398).
For Talbott, the Hobbesian forces in international relations are fissile materi-
als, greenhouse gases, and other impersonal elements, and the major obstacle to
states’ working in concert at this critical moment of history is ideology—and
particularly, as he sees it, the Bush administration’s “unilateralism” and pursuit
of preeminence. The implicit assumption in that charge is that self-constraint
through adherence to multilateral treaties by the United States would lead to a
decline in many of the threats we face, including China’s rapidly increasing con-
ventional and nuclear weapons capabilities. However, the evidence is quite
strong that China’s military buildup and strategic reach are proceeding apace
with the growing resources and ambitions of a rising power that does not fully
share the values of the prevailing neoliberal international order. Certainly
Beijing’s January 2007 antisatellite test, ten years of double-digit defense
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spending increases, and the discovery of a new PLA Navy base on Hainan Island
all suggest that Chinese military capabilities are driven by requirements well be-
yond the Taiwan contingency. Similarly, while there is much evidence to suggest
that North Korea seeks normalized relations with the United States, there is very
little evidence to support the proposition that Pyongyang would give up nuclear
weapons to do so. It does not fit the worldview of The Great Experiment that
states like North Korea would see it as essential to their survival to exist outside
the international system while increasing their leverage on major powers
through the possession of nuclear weapons, nor that multilateral agreements
like the Non-Proliferation Treaty or institutions like the United Nations are ill
equipped to stop proliferation by leaders like Kim Jong Il.
Nevertheless, The Great Experiment does offer at least half of a successful
menu for improving stability and American influence in Asia. Asia is a region
that struggles to find patterns of multilateral security cooperation in order to
tame the forces of rivalry and to reduce uncertainty. Talbott singles out for ac-
tion precisely the kind of challenges that will help bring greater cohesion to
Asia’s burgeoning multilateralism. The big transnational challenges Asia faces,
from potential pandemics to terrorism and proliferation, require improved in-
ternational governance and cooperation. In many ways, these issues—particu-
larly climate change—cannot be addressed on a global level without first finding
a framework for cooperation with China. Working on these issues productively
with Beijing may help to reduce the dangers of rivalry and competition inherent
in China’s rise.
However, missing almost entirely from the transnational threat focus and
appeals for world governance of The Great Experiment is the Hobbesian side
of Asian international relations today. Despite the twenty-first-century
agenda of challenges that Talbott illuminates, Asia retains many characteris-
tics of nineteenth-century great-power rivalry. The United States must at-
tend to balance-of-power considerations in the region, or Asian states will do
so themselves—and perhaps to our detriment.
DO NO HARM
In Memo to the President Elect, former secretary of state Madeleine Albright fo-
cuses on more traditional state-to-state relations in addition to the megathreats
addressed by Talbott. Her overarching agenda is more modest than Talbott’s but
in many ways no less daunting. She recommends that the new president give pri-
ority to five challenges:
• Developing a more productive working relationship with the Arab and
Muslim worlds
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• Restoring an international consensus in opposition to the spread of nuclear
weapons
• Defending democratic values against a new generation of dictators and
demagogues
• Attacking poverty, ignorance, and disease
• Addressing the intertwined global issues of energy supply and environmen-
tal health.
Albright also reminds the new president of the fact that he will be simulta-
neously inheriting three conflicts—Iraq, Afghanistan, and the struggle against
al-Qa‘ida.
Albright is careful to devote a chapter to Asia, even in the face of this impos-
ing list of pressures on the new president. She implicitly acknowledges the suc-
cesses of the Bush administration, recommending no major changes other than
in North Korea policy (where she advocates a less confrontational approach
along the lines latterly pursued by the Bush White House). In fact, she levels an
indirect criticism at her own administration’s decision in June 1998 to signal
that China was more important than Japan, when President Clinton refused to
stop in Japan on his way to an eight-day tour around China. As she notes to the
new president, “When you first visit East Asia, you are likely to have China up-
permost in mind. Your initial destination, however, should be Tokyo. A loyal ally
deserves precedence” (p. 178). Albright also acknowledges the centrality of the
Taiwan issue in U.S. relations with China and for broader stability in Asia, stress-
ing that the new president must provide assurances to Chinese president Hu
Jintao on America’s “one China policy” but also recalling that the Chinese
backed away from conflict over Taiwan in 1996 “because they didn’t think they
could prevail in a confrontation with the United States” (p. 195).
For Albright, state-to-state relations still figure prominently in Asia, and U.S.
strategy for the region should focus on maintaining the right “balance,” in which
the “United States acts as a kind of friendly referee” among the many rivals (p.
177). For much of the postwar period this approach was sometimes also called
“double containment,” meaning that the goal of U.S. policy was to keep Russia,
China, and Japan from developing significant military capabilities. Albright
writes critically of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s security pact
with Australia and his symbolic upgrading of Japan’s Defense Agency to a minis-
try, suggesting also that the Bush administration pushed the limits of regional
tolerance in cooperating on theater missile defense and encouraging Japan to
send “high-tech” destroyers to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM (p. 179). Lifting restrictions further on Japan’s security
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role, she warns, would “likely spur China into an even more rapid buildup of its
own, while pushing Korea into a closer relationship with Beijing.”
This static view of Japan’s role stands in contrast to Albright’s warning that the
United States alone will not be able to continue dissuading and deterring China
from military action, as it did in 1996. As she cautions, “Although its military re-
mains far inferior to that of the United States, China is modernizing with a single
contingency uppermost in its
mind, while our armed forces are
stretched thin”(p. 196). The reality
is that the closer U.S.-Japan alli-
ance relationship begun in the
mid-1990s has now virtually guar-
anteed that China has to consider
not just U.S. but also Japanese forces as obstacles to the use of force against Taiwan.
That increases dissuasion, deterrence, and stability. Moreover, Japan’s defense
budget remains below 1 percent of GDP, and its defense spending is declining in
real terms, in contrast to China’s major defense-spending increases. A dangerous
arms race might result from internal balancing (significant unilateral Japanese of-
fensive military capabilities), but as of now, that is not happening. Instead, Japan is
pursuing external balancing through closer ties to the United States, as well as
with India and Australia. That strategy minimizes the danger of an arms race
while complicating Chinese military planning and serving notice to Beijing of the
broader strategic implications for Chinese interests of an unchecked PLA military
buildup. Also, while Japan continues to have difficult relations with its neighbors
over history, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs ranks Japan ahead of China
(and behind only the United States) in terms of “soft power” in the region.6
Albright’s Memo to the President Elect gives good advice to the new president on
Asia (including the recommendation that he bring a fork to Japan). It puts allies
front and center in U.S. Asia strategy—at least symbolically—and acknowledges
the complex and multifaceted strategy needed to manage the rise of Chinese
power. It also eschews utopian visions of a new multilateral security framework in
Asia, where she urges the president to take a “light hand” (p. 199). But Albright’s
strategy for Asia also asks the new president to work with one hand tied behind his
back. Shaping China’s strategic choices requires active engagement of Beijing, as
well as the development of tighter and increasingly agile alliance relationships in
the region, to ensure a balance of power that encourages China’s strategic role to
develop in a benign direction.
Albright is not alone in writing a grand strategy that puts the United States in
the role of mediator in Asia. In Statecraft and How to Restore America’s Standing
G R E E N 2 1
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in the World, veteran Middle East peace negotiator Dennis Ross also recom-
mends that the next president work to prevent a security dilemma with China
where hedging becomes a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (p. 322). Ross rightly recog-
nizes that the center of gravity is shifting to the Pacific and stresses that the
United States must demonstrate to China that when it plays by the rules, those
rules will not be used against Beijing (p. 330). However, the entire thrust of the
argument is that China’s rise can be managed through the “elemental statecraft”
of embedding an agenda for cooperation in bilateral and multilateral mecha-
nisms that gradually reduces the “perceived need to hedge” (p. 331). Ross is ab-
solutely right about the need to expand win-win cooperation with China in this
way, but missing entirely from the strategy is any attention to maintaining the
regional balance of power. Indeed, U.S. alliances in Asia are mentioned in State-
craft only in terms of reducing the security dilemma with China, since Beijing
will see the U.S.-Japan alliance as having benefits for Beijing, “insofar as that
presence and those alliances limit the Japanese impulse to remilitarize its pos-
ture in Asia” (p. 330).
In The Post-American World Fareed Zakaria also recognizes the shift of power
to China and Asia, and he notes that this trend should not be viewed as a simple
story of American decline and Chinese rise but rather as “the rise of the rest.”
Precisely because India and other states in the system are growing in power and
ambition at the same time as China, the United States can continue leading in
international affairs if it learns to broker and mediate relations among these as-
piring powers and to build coalitions around different challenges. Zakaria is ex-
actly right when he argues that the United States must learn to share power,
create coalitions, build legitimacy, and define the global agenda. His model for
such statecraft is Bismarck. But unlike Bismarck, Zakaria recoils at the notion
that part of American strategy must focus on balance of power. He acknowl-
edges that lines must be drawn with China, “but [the United States must] also
recognize that it cannot draw lines everywhere.” Ultimately, “‘balancing’ against
a rising power would be a dangerous, destabilizing, and potentially self-fulfilling
policy. Were Washington to balance against China, before Beijing had shown any
serious inclination to disrupt the international order, it would find itself iso-
lated—and would pay heavy costs economically and politically for itself being
the disruptive force” (p. 236, emphasis supplied).
It is striking that Zakaria is not talking about “containment” (a strategy that
would be both self-defeating and virtually impossible to implement vis-à-vis
China) but “balancing”—a strategy that Japan, India, and increasingly South
Korea are playing every day toward Beijing, even as their economic interdepen-
dence grows with China. It is a strategy that these nations look to the United
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States to continue playing even in the complex interwoven international system
we live in today.
A NEW CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES?
Robert Kagan’s The Return of History and the End of Dreams goes in an entirely
different direction from Talbott, Albright, Ross, and Zakaria. It offers a strategic
worldview that is as sweeping as Talbott’s but focuses on the Hobbesian and not
the Lockean world before us. Kagan’s whipping boy is Francis Fukuyama’s The
End of History and the Last Man and the subsequent post–Cold War writings that
anticipated a new peaceful international order, in which governments were ex-
pected increasingly to embrace liberal democracy after the collapse of commu-
nism. For Kagan, the world has again returned to normalcy and nation-states
remain as strong as ever, fueled by ambitious nationalism. Now there is a new
collision of ideologies: between the democratic West and an authoritarian bloc
centering on China and Russia.
Kagan’s dissecting of the new ideational contest between East and West has
far more nuance than his critics usually attribute to it. He acknowledges that the
ideological contest between Western liberalism and Eastern autocracy has none
of the neatness of the divisions of the Cold War. He points out that the huge eco-
nomic interdependence of the West on China for commercial relations and on
Russia for oil has blurred the lines between friends and adversaries. He also
highlights the weaknesses within China’s own political system and its
unattractiveness to most major powers in the world.
At the same time, Kagan also hits on some central truths about the dynamics
of East Asian security that are missing from most of the other books on Ameri-
can grand strategy. It is hard to refute his assertion, for example, that “today the
Chinese believe that their nation’s ancient centrality, appropriately adjusted for
the times and circumstances, can, should and will be restored” or that they “con-
sider the trend toward Chinese regional hegemony unstoppable” (p. 27). He is
also right when he warns that concerted action on nuclear nonproliferation of
the kind advocated by Talbott is being undermined by the clash of great powers
with competing forms of government, as China and Russia run interference for
Iran while the United States and Europe support India’s nuclear ambitions (p.
77). This ideological divide also hampers international action on such humani-
tarian crises as Darfur, Burma, and Zimbabwe.
Kagan sees the authoritarian camp taking shape in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), which the Russians celebrate as an anti-NATO alliance and
the Chinese as another vehicle to expand their influence in Asia. In contrast, he
sees democratic nations increasingly working together “beneath the radar” to
counter the authoritarian principle of “noninterference in internal affairs” and
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encourage the embrace of universal values. Kagan may at this point be overstat-
ing the solidarity of the SCO, particularly in the wake of China’s refusal at the
August 2008 SCO meeting to endorse Russia’s justification for the attack on
Georgia. On the other hand, there may be more movement among like-minded
democracies than he suggests. In addition to Indian prime minister Manmohan
Singh’s declaration in 2005 that the “idea of India” is one of a democracy and
that “all countries of the world will evolve in this direction as we move forward
into the 21st Century,” and Japanese prime minister Taro Aso’s concept of build-
ing an “arc of freedom and prosperity” in Asia, other nations in the region have
begun branding their national identities in terms of universal values.7 Indonesia
championed the inclusion of democratic norms in the new charter for the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations and held up its ratification because of weak
enforcement mechanisms for the
charter’s proposed human rights
commission. The new conserva-
tive government of South Korea
has hosted the first senior offi-
cials’ meeting of the Asia-Pacific
Democracy Forum, echoing simi-
lar sentiments to Japan’s and India’s about the idea of Korea being a model of
democratic development.
The difficulty in applying Kagan’s insights to policy lies in the question he
himself asks: Are the democracies ready to step up and take the lead in shaping
the emerging international order? His proposal for a global concert or league of
democracies became a political hot potato in this election year, but in the book it
is a fairly modest proposition—convening “perhaps informally at first, but with
the aim of holding regular meetings and consultations among democratic na-
tions on the issues of the day . . . to signal a commitment to the democratic idea.”
That much is already happening with the Asia-Pacific Democracy Forum, the
U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, and quiet meetings before
meetings of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, among the “APEC Friendlies.”
Building on those examples makes perfect sense.
The higher bar to cross is Kagan’s proposal that the concert, or league, of de-
mocracies might pool resources to address issues that cannot be addressed at the
United Nations (pp. 97–98). The fact is that this is also happening, in the form of
U.S.-Japan–Republic of Korea trilateral strategy meetings on North Korea and
in the G-7 agreements on financial sanctions toward Iran, for example. But an
overt attempt to supplant the United Nations will be a difficult sell even among
nations (like Indonesia, India, Korea, and Japan) that are already highlighting
their unique roles in demonstrating the importance of democratic values to the
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region. The sell will be even more difficult if it is posed as a counterbloc to the
SCO, since none of China’s neighbors are eager to risk trade or political relations
with Beijing by appearing to align with either of two adversarial camps. Kagan is
right that the United States must strengthen coordination among democracies,
but in Asia that strategy will be more successful if it is regionally focused (i.e.,
not a “global concert”) and if the lead is taken by Asian democracies wherever
possible. The danger in pushing too hard for an American-led bloc is that the
United States may end up being the only member.
Kagan’s The Return of History stands out among the big strategic books that
have come out this presidential election cycle because it focuses on state-to-state
relations, balance of power, and ideologies. Kagan also stands out in one other
respect—unlike Albright, Ross, and Talbott, he was on the losing side of this
presidential election.
THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE ASIA STRATEGY
There is one thing that every author preparing a grand strategy for the new ad-
ministration does agree on, and that is the indispensable role that the United
States plays in Asia. Yet few seem to come to terms with the fundamental sources
of American leadership in the region. Certainly, the United States has standing as
an “honest broker” in a region burdened with historical mistrust and nationalism,
as Albright argues. But the United States is not really neutral when it comes to the
rise of Chinese power. If it were, it would seek to accommodate China by allowing
Beijing to shift the terms of the neoliberal order to benefit a more mercantilist
view of the world and a more Sino-centric view of Asia. Instead, we have sought to
shape Chinese behavior over the past ten years to encourage Beijing to become
what former deputy secretary of state Bob Zoellick calls a “responsible stake-
holder.” We have done this by building a positive agenda for cooperation with
China where we can—for example, on North Korea—but also by demonstrating
the benefits to China of playing by the rules of the neoliberal order, as well as the
downside risk for China of moving in a less responsible direction.
Shaping Chinese behavior requires us to demonstrate not only that we are pre-
pared to defend American interests (hedging) but also that other major powers in
the region share our determination to avoid a more mercantilist international or-
der or Sino-centric Asian order (shaping). Placing our hopes in the United Na-
tions system as Talbott suggests will not sustain that proposition, though it may
reinforce patterns of cooperation with China and help to bring China into inter-
national frameworks on challenges like climate change.
The reality is that we will need a strategy that builds regional cooperation
based on twenty-first-century concepts of globalization and that strengthens in-
ternational governance while we attend at the same time to the fundamental
nineteenth-century balance-of-power issues that Asia’s great powers watch with
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such intensity. The latter part of the strategy requires a disciplined focus on our
allies and their interests so that we collectively reinforce a regional order that
benefits China as Beijing reassures its neighbors that it is playing by the right
rules. As one bipartisan group of Asia experts (including this author) wrote in
March 2007, “To get China right, we need to get Asia right.”8 We need to both en-
gage and balance.
The steady erosion of balance-of-power logic in the big books on interna-
tional strategy in recent years is an unmistakable trend. Richard Haass’s “The
Age of Nonpolarity,” in Foreign Affairs, and the “Phoenix Initiative” on the
American role in the world, led by prominent advisers to Barack Obama during
his campaign, both pick up on the theme that the international order is increas-
ingly defined by transnational forces beyond the control of single states and that
American exceptionalism is somehow outdated.9 These themes probably reflect
the foreign policy elite’s rejection of some of the logic that led to the Iraq war.
Taken from an Asian perspective, however, they do not create a compelling vi-
sion of America’s role in the world for friends and allies who are forced to live
with the reality of balance-of-power politics every day and who look to the
United States to provide reassurance and leadership.
Asia is a maritime theater, and the U.S. Navy is poised at the cutting edge of
each of most of that region’s challenges and opportunities. In the 2004–2005
tsunami relief operations the Navy demonstrated that American preeminence
rests in part on our ability to provide “public goods” but also that rising powers
like Japan, India, and Australia could win influence and respect for doing the
same in times of crisis. The 2007 MALABAR exercise series in the Bay of Bengal
(involving naval forces from India, the United States, Japan, Australia, and Sin-
gapore) sent a signal that the major maritime democracies had the capacity to
work together to maintain open sea-lanes of communication and welcomed
others willing and able to do the same. Through the Proliferation Security Ini-
tiative, the U.S. Navy helped to create a new regional and international norm
with respect to interdiction of transfers by dangerous states of materials related
to weapons of mass destruction. The successful missile defense tests off of Ha-
waii in December 2007 demonstrated that the United States and Japan are work-
ing toward increasing interoperability and virtual jointness in the face of new
threats. The list could go on for pages, but in each instance the Navy has rein-
forced the American national objectives of reassurance, dissuasion, and deter-
rence in the region.
The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard October 2007 strategy document
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower captures all of these dimen-
sions of Asian security, from managing the global commons to deterring the use
of force by potential adversaries.10 Importantly, the document highlights Asia as
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one of two key theaters for U.S. maritime power. That should have been a highly
reassuring signal to our Asian allies. Yet I found surprising anxiety expressed in
private about the new maritime strategy among strategic thinkers in Japan, Aus-
tralia, and India. Where I shared other American experts’ views that the new
strategy offered a healthy mix of cooperation on transnational challenges to-
gether with attention to traditional balance-of-power concerns, many of my in-
terlocutors in maritime Asia thought they saw too much of a focus on
cooperative engagement and not enough on defending their respective nations
and maintaining a favorable balance of power. I suspect that this says less about
the maritime strategy itself than about the larger context of American strategic
discourse on Asia that some of our friends think they hear. We need to be certain
that the search for new strategic “vision” does not blur the national security real-
ities right before our eyes.
American strategic thinking has flirted with new security paradigms before.
After the First World War, the prevailing strategic view was that alliances and
balance-of-power logic were fundamentally dangerous and that new multilat-
eral agreements, such as the
Washington and London naval
treaties, would better help to pre-
serve the peace in Asia. That
proved to be a fallacy, as Japan re-
armed and drifted unchecked to-
ward aggressive expansion. Postwar American strategy in Asia focused solidly
on alliance relations and balance of power, while reinforcing the peace through
open markets and economic development. After the Cold War the Clinton ad-
ministration came into office with a new paradigm that emphasized national
economic security and devalued alliances and traditional balance-of-power
logic. But by 1995 the region was questioning the staying power of American
strategic leadership in Asia, as Chinese power grew and the Pentagon led a
course correction with the “Nye Initiative” and the April 1996 joint security dec-
laration between President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto that
expanded defense cooperation with Japan.
New administrations tend to import big strategic ideas that collide with reality
before very long. It is not clear how much influence the focus on megathreats and
the growing resistance to balance-of-power logic will have on a president-elect
who has already demonstrated a hardheaded pragmatism and will inherit two
wars and a major financial crisis. Whatever the evolution in strategic thinking
about Asia, the broader implications of this debate for the Navy are significant.
There is plenty to commend the new maritime strategy to senior officials focused
on megathreats, coalition building, and global governance. But do those missions
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require a surface combatant fleet as large as we now have in the Pacific? Also, if the
danger of a security dilemma with China is deemed equal to or greater than the
threat posed by the PLA’s growing anticarrier capabilities, how far should the U.S.
Navy go in terms of deploying new assets, strengthening interoperability with Ja-
pan, or updating planning for Taiwan contingencies in ways that might cause a re-
action in Beijing? Similarly, if remaining questions about arms sales to Taiwan and
Japan (for example, Taiwan’s request for F-16s or Japan’s interest in F-22s) are
viewed as too provocative, how else will we redress the growing delta between our
allies and the PLA capabilities? Set against these strategic questions is the obvious
backdrop of the financial crisis and growing budgetary requirements for the Army
in the Central Command theater.
The Navy may face a difficult “branding” issue in the years ahead. The new
maritime strategy encompasses all of the tools a new president would want to
have in order to face the complex array of challenges in Asia, from the
megathreats to traditional power competition. But depending on where the
larger strategic debate goes, and given coming resource constraints, the Navy
may be forced into the position of having to trumpet the “dissuade, deter, defeat”
part of its mission in the Pacific in order to ensure that those capabilities are not
devalued. That may be uncomfortable for a service that also sees itself, rightly, as
the leading edge of military diplomacy in the region. But as an Asia strategist
taking the long view of U.S. interests in the region, I for one hope that the Navy
does not shy away from an effort to keep policy makers focused on the underly-
ing strategic dynamics in this vital region.
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THINKING THROUGH U.S. STRATEGIC OPTIONS
FOR AFRICA
General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
For the past decade, much has been debated and written about U.S. securityinterests in Africa. The George W. Bush administration has demonstrated a
heightened awareness of Africa’s importance to American geopolitical and eco-
nomic interests as well as sensitivity to the continent’s humanitarian challenges.
The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy identifies Africa as “a high priority”
and “recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to
strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the con-
trol of effective democracies.”1 To this end, the Bush administration has signifi-
cantly increased aid, developmental assistance, military assistance, and other
economic investments over any previous administration.2 Moreover, it has
taken the important step of creating a unified combatant command for Africa,
which “will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create
new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa and help
bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals
of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in
Africa.”3
Africa Command, or AFRICOM, is a sensible and innovative mechanism for
addressing U.S. security relationships with African nations and institutions. It
reached full operational capability in October 2008 and will demonstrate sincere
U.S. intentions for support to Africans while raising American awareness and
understanding of both the security and humanitarian challenges on the African
continent. AFRICOM will also help American policy makers understand the im-
portance of the strategic relationship with Africa and move us from an era of
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crisis-response relationships to a more mature partnership in order to foster
stronger relationships on the continent and a more stable, secure environment
for African citizens.
To date, however, the United States has neither publicly defined its own stra-
tegic goals and objectives with regard to Africa nor effectively coordinated its ac-
tions across various departments and agencies of the U.S. government. This has
led to suspicion on the African continent as well as uncertainty among other
U.S. allies about Washington’s true intent. The purpose of this article is to present
a framework for such a strategy—a “white paper on Africa”—and encourage the
next administration to form promptly a task force to define a U.S. strategy. This
strategy should lead to coordinated interagency actions and to engagement and
actions with other supportive governments, as well as representatives of responsi-
ble nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil-society groups in the
United States and in Africa.
A VISION FOR AFRICA
The first step is to establish a long-term vision for Africa in which its citizens’
economic and human security needs are addressed and the strategic interests of
the United States are protected. Formulating such a vision requires a more gran-
ular understanding of Africa and its constituent nations and people than the
United States has customarily brought to bear on policy. This vision must be
couched in reality and must be achievable within a definable time frame. I offer
the following as a straw man—fully cognizant that before it is accepted as valid
this vision must be discussed and coordinated with a wide audience: within our
government, with Africans, and with other nations and institutions.
Africa is a continent made up of stable, well-governed nations, committed to
peaceful coexistence and international order, contributing to the global economy,
and rewarding its citizens with freedom, security, and prosperity.
When discussing Africa—if not the entire continent, certainly the sub-Saharan
region—people often speak as if Africa were a single nation. In fact, Africa com-
prises fifty-three unique and different nations (fifty-four, if you include Western
Sahara) and a population approaching a billion people—a sixth of the world’s to-
tal. Some nations are democratic, some autocratic, and many are somewhere in
between. Some are well governed, by leaders who want what is best for their citi-
zens and have visions for the future. Some are governed poorly, by leaders who
seemingly are interested only in preserving their own power bases or further en-
riching themselves. Poverty is rampant in many of the countries, yet some are
blessed with abundant natural resources that could be developed; these coun-
tries, given the required investment in technology and value-adding industrial
assets, could be transformed into modern, wealthy states. Other nations are
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without these natural resources and also suffer from lack of water, fertile soil,
temperate climate, or other means of sustaining their citizens. Corruption is a
major factor in many African nations. Some of the world’s most devout Chris-
tians and Muslims can be found throughout the continent, and with just about
equal representation. In Africa one finds Nobel laureates, esteemed poets, and
educators. One also finds vast numbers of the uneducated, unemployed, impov-
erished, and hopeless.
Africa is a very diverse landscape that does not respond to a unitary,
one-size-fits-all solution. Africa also has a long history of being exploited, a fac-
tor that contributes greatly to suspicions that exist today. This history must be
understood and appreciated as U.S. strategy is developed. Europe, Asia, and the
United States have all seen Africa as a source of labor and natural resources and
generally have taken what they wanted. No one can go back and rewrite history
or make right all the wrongs of centuries, but we can be sensitive to this history
as we forge our way ahead.
Finally, and significantly, Africans are not anti-American. It is true that they
are suspicious of American intentions, a bit envious of what they see as dispro-
portionate American wealth, and that they see Americans as sometimes arro-
gant and overbearing, but they like America and the ideals it advocates. The U.S.
strategy should understand and build on this fact.
STRATEGIC COMPONENTS
I propose that the U.S. strategy focus on governance, security, and economic op-
portunity. If the nations of Africa are to succeed in this age of globalization, they
must have all three of these strategic components. Failure of any of the three will
cause the other components to fail and ultimately thrust the affected country
into chaos and turmoil. Furthermore, to be successful, America’s strategic rela-
tionship with Africa cannot rely on military, diplomatic, commercial, or hu-
manitarian relationships alone. Only by coordinating actions across a broad
engagement front can the United States effectively support Africa in building a
civil society and attaining a better quality of life for its citizens while achieving
the vision I am proposing.
Governance
Governance is fundamental to building a stable nation but has often been over-
looked in planning efforts to develop strategic relationships with countries in
Africa. The challenge of putting in place an effective, accountable government is
formidable. The United States and other nations tend to accept what is in place
and are reluctant to attempt to alter the internal relationships between the peo-
ple of a nation and the government that represents them. Consequently, it often
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appears the United States is more concerned with regime security than national
security.4 A few decades ago, there were divisive political debates over U.S. for-
eign policy emphasis on human rights within the countries with whom we inter-
acted. During the Cold War, when ideological alignments were paramount, the
prevailing view was that the United States put itself at a strategic or economic
disadvantage by focusing on the “internal affairs” of a nation. Emphasis on good
governance in the twenty-first century could be viewed as an evolutionary man-
ifestation of human rights. Today, an increasing number of key leaders on both
sides agree that governance is a key component of stability and that supporting
nations have the moral justification to concern themselves with this component.
Dictating what kind of government a nation chooses and publicly assessing
how well that government executes its responsibilities can, if carried to ex-
tremes, become symbols of arrogance and barriers to productive support. That
said, the United States should endeavor to apply baseline standards to African
nations—standards reflecting American values as well as those of any nation
with whom the United States elects to build partnerships. To take an extreme ex-
ample, the actions of the government of Sudan with respect to its citizens in
Darfur are governance practices that the international community should refuse
to accept. The same goes, with only slightly less force, for Robert Mugabe in
Zimbabwe. There are other signs of poor governance on the African continent
that the U.S. and other governments should refuse to recognize as acceptable.
More broadly, the United States can help build more effective governance by
setting standards higher than it has in the past—against corruption, fraudulent
elections, human rights abuses, and human trafficking. The United States
should not condone such abuses in Africa any more than it would in any other
part of the world. Rather, American leaders should work with responsible Afri-
can leadership to define acceptable universal standards of governance to ensure
that the cultures and identities of African citizens are preserved. These standards
should be applied consistently and comprehensively in our relations with each
country, providing support and assistance only to those governments meeting
the standards. In those countries failing to meet the standards, the United States
should seek ways to provide humanitarian support and hope through
nongovernmental and responsible civil organizations, while exposing and con-
demning poorly performing African governments. This will require discipline
within the U.S. interagency across economic, commercial, diplomatic, and secu-
rity relationships. Once the United States demonstrates intolerance of poor gov-
ernance over the spectrum of these activities, governments will change and
conditions will be set for progress in security and economic opportunity.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation takes a step in the right direction by
tying financial loans and grants to performance in seventeen governance
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categories. These indicators focus on investments in education and health, con-
trol of corruption, respect for civil liberties and the rule of law, and commitment
to policies that promote political and economic freedom.5 These indicators
should be expanded and consistently applied in our relationships with African
nations. The United States is committed to democracy as the best form of gov-
ernment. Most African countries proclaim a public adherence to democracy, but
their commitment to democracy in Africa is likely to remain, for the foreseeable
future, a “mile wide and an inch thick.”6 Accordingly, the focus here should not
be on telling Africans what kind of government they must have but on how well
or how poorly an existing government is carrying out its responsibilities to its
citizens. Countries that are moving toward or consolidating democracy are
making significant gains: multiparty elections are becoming institutionalized,
and the activities of their parliaments, courts, and other institutions of govern-
ment are improving. African nations that meet the standards should be encour-
aged and supported. Those that do not meet the standards should suffer
consequences.
The World Bank measures and ranks the actions of 212 nations in six dimen-
sions of governance, and the data it collects allow officials to compare trends by
country over the past decade. The metrics are increasingly comprehensive and
use data derived by multiple sources across a wide spectrum of academic, pri-
vate, and nongovernmental organizations.7
Unfortunately, eight African countries appear in the lowest tenth percentile,
while almost all the remaining nations are in the lower fiftieth percentile. These
findings demonstrate the seriousness of the problem of poor governance and
weak institutions on the African continent. That said, Botswana and Namibia
rank among the world’s leaders in the dimension of political stability, South Af-
rica ranks in the top twenty-fifth percentile in government effectiveness, and
Botswana is in the top twenty-fifth percentile in control of corruption.8 These
performances should be held out as examples and models of what can be ac-
complished. Notably, no African nation ranks in the top twenty-fifth percen-
tile in the rule of law, and thirteen of the bottom twenty nations in this
category are African.9
Trends also provide insights. The evolution of governance standards in Côte
d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe—both of which were once among Africa’s best-governed
nations—have shown the most sharply negative trends in governance over the
past decade. On the positive side, South Africa, Algeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Ghana, Niger, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are among the ten
countries showing the greatest improvement over this same period, though
some of these countries started at very low levels.10 These trends demonstrate
the profound impact that political leadership can have in both directions. At the
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same time, the distinctions among African countries caution us not to view the
continent simplistically as a “hopeless” region (as the Economist’s May 2000
cover put it). Different countries face different problems and present different
opportunities, relating to size, natural resource endowment, location, and past
political record. This calls for greater differentiation and policy nuance on the
part of the United States.
African nations require focused internal actions to improve governance as
well as international encouragement and support. Improvement will establish
the conditions necessary to achieve the vision. Failure, however, will lead to fur-
ther disenfranchisement, vulnerability to extremist ideology, and, ultimately, vi-
olent conflict.
Inconsistent application of international governance standards on the part of
the United States and other nations for economic or security reasons may pro-
vide short-term tactical advantages but will inevitably create strategic setbacks.
The recent unrest in Kenya, a close and traditional U.S. partner in East Africa,
highlights this fact. Kenya’s governance factors have been trending negatively for
some time; for example, Kenya recently overtook Nigeria as one of the most cor-
rupt nations in the world, as measured by Transparency International.11 Kenya’s
December 2007 presidential election was marred by fraud, intimidation, and
political abuse; observers unanimously labeled it as deeply flawed. Yet the
United States officially congratulated President Mwai Kabiki within a day of his
claim of victory, even before Kenyan election officials announced results. This
and similar actions from the international community probably did not trigger
the violent reaction that led to the deaths of over a thousand Kenyans, but it did
reinforce arguments by the opposition faction that the “system” was stacked
against it and that only violence would vindicate its position. Kenya’s internal
stability and the Kenya-U.S. bilateral relationship would have been much better
served had the United States withheld its approval and supported a review of
fraud allegations by Kenyan election authorities, with African Union and other
international oversight.
Generally speaking, most African governments need to show serious im-
provement in how they provide for the welfare of their citizens at the most basic
level. Responsible African leaders have formally recognized the importance of
good governance. When the African Union (which succeeded the moribund Or-
ganization of African Unity) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD) were established earlier this decade, both prescribed a peer-review
process. The idea is for nations to have their governments evaluated by knowl-
edgeable and reasonably impartial Africans, who would expose weaknesses and
highlight strengths. The United States should formulate, in conjunction with
the African Union and respected African leaders, universal standards of
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governance and apply these standards consistently across the breadth of its ac-
tivity with each nation. Thanks to NEPAD, these standards need not be imposed
in a heavy-handed way that might feed African fears of neocolonialism. Rather
than stitching the standards from whole cloth, the United States should support
and help refine and energize NEPAD’s peer-review process. This process was in-
stitutionalized specifically to temper international cynicism and build support
for African initiatives, and several nations have completed it. Unfortunately, re-
sults have not been made public; the peer-review process has been slow to
achieve its intended result. With American backing and technical assistance, the
African Union should develop a schedule for all its member nations to undergo
the peer review at least once every five years and hold its members accountable
for taking corrective action.
Security
Security—like the other aspects of any strategy toward Africa—is both complex
and multifaceted. African countries have been beset by political conflict and in-
stability over the last fifty years of independence, causing human suffering on a
massive scale and retarding economic, social, and political development.12 Suc-
cess in this realm is important, in that good governance and economic opportu-
nity have no chance without a reasonably safe and stable environment. Yet
excessive emphasis on security consumes valuable resources and opens the door
to abuse by illiberal regimes and rogue elements. Many Africans, after many
years of violent military takeovers, conflicts, and corruption, view their security
forces with fear and suspicion. Others live in fear of armed militias that weak ar-
mies and police forces cannot keep at bay. The challenge for African states is to
build professional security forces with limited resources while keeping them un-
der civil control.13 For this reason, assistance in building capability and capacity
in security structures must be accompanied by efforts to provide professional
education and training and to inculcate ethics consistent with high interna-
tional standards and in harmony with the cultural ethos of the region.
My vision is of an Africa that is committed to peaceful coexistence and inter-
national order. To achieve these goals, Africans must work harder to get along
with their neighbors; maintain awareness of activities within their borders, air-
space, and maritime regions; develop collective capacity to respond to illegal or
threatening activity; and provide local law and order forces that are respected,
not feared.
Several strong trends point in the right direction. One of them is that inter-
state conflicts are declining. However, all too frequently militias, rebels, extrem-
ists, and criminals find sanctuary just across national boundaries and use this
sanctuary to enable conflict, intimidation, or illegal activity. Borders—land,
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maritime, and air—are vast and frequently unregulated. Although larger,
better-equipped border control forces are needed, improved subregional coop-
eration growing out of greater trust and recognition of mutual interests with
neighboring states is the single most important requirement.
Another positive trend is that coups are no longer casually tolerated by the
African Union and the international community. Even when a despotic leader is
overthrown, as in Mauritania in 2005, the clear message from Africans and from
the international community has been that regime change by force will not be
condoned and that recognition, support, and relationships would be suspended
until a civil government is restored. Unfortunately, after a brief (two-year) pe-
riod with a democratically elected leader, Mauritania again finds itself under
military rule. The people of this troubled nation will suffer as the international
community suspends relationships in disapproval. This policy is sound and
should be continued, without exception. The corollary has also to be recognized:
How should the United States react when a civilian “coup d’état”—an abroga-
tion of the electoral process—happens, such as recently occurred in Kenya and,
even more egregiously, in Zimbabwe?
Further, the Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union is concep-
tually sound, though slow in actualization. The Peace and Security Council as a
major subordinate organ of the African Union works to develop programs and
concepts across the continent. The Africa Stand-By Force, the Military Staff
Committee, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, and
the Peace Fund are all sound, useful concepts for Africa. If these mechanisms
were fully implemented, the security of the continent would vastly improve. Un-
fortunately, organizational incapacity, limited resources, and bureaucratic leth-
argy have rendered implementation slow and weak.
In many cases, such subregional economic aggregations as the Economic
Community of West African States, the East African Community, and the
Southern African Development Community have made decisions and moved
forward absent guidance and support from the African Union. This is under-
standable and not all bad, but it will lead to problems down the way in matters of
interoperability, logistics and sustainment, and balance of forces. U.S. strategy
should strongly support the African Union and the regional economic commu-
nity organizations that show promise. Diplomatic and developmental posture
should be increased with these multilateral organizations, and AFRICOM
should have a presence nearby to offer support, assistance, and advice when
needed. This does not mean that bilateral relations should be forgone but that
bilateral support and assistance should be congruent with the goals and aims of
larger subregional and regional security plans. AFRICOM could be a very effec-
tive enabler of this approach.
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On the bilateral level, nations should be encouraged and assisted in conduct-
ing comprehensive, cross-government reviews of security force requirements.
Typically, African armies are too large, and police and judicial systems are weak
and underresourced. Likewise, most nations’ maritime and air forces are too
small and too poorly equipped to serve their security needs. Logistics, mainte-
nance, and sustainment capacities either do not exist or are far too small to meet
requirements. AFRICOM could assist through training, mentoring, and negoti-
ating affordable but effective contract-support efforts at the regional level. The
U.S. Navy’s Africa Partnership Station, which recently completed its inaugural
tour in the Gulf of Guinea, represented a significant enhancement of some of
these efforts.14
African nations should be strongly encouraged to conduct comprehensive
and realistic security reviews to identify and evaluate security threats, highlight
and understand the risks of various courses of action, commit resources prag-
matically, and develop long-term capacity-building plans to structure their se-
curity forces to meet the needs of the twenty-first century. These plans should
include agreements for regional cooperation where possible. Regional hubs for
maritime operations, air and transportation capacity, and maintenance/logisti-
cal support are all feasible and would likely garner donor support while yielding
operational efficiencies.
In their internal reviews, African nations should be urged to factor in their
contributions to the regional standby brigades and to commit themselves to en-
suring that their contributions—staff elements, infantry battalions, or engineer,
medical, or transportation elements—are organized, trained, equipped, and
prepared. Units assigned to the standby brigades should view this assignment as
one of honor, and nations should be held accountable to assign forces that are
ready and capable.
Finally, AFRICOM should be a conduit for the professional military educa-
tion of security forces in Africa. Many African officers attend military education
and training institutions in the United States, Europe, and China, and this
should be continued and encouraged. Beyond that, the effectiveness of several
war colleges and command and staff colleges on the continent could be greatly
enhanced through partnerships with U.S. professional military education insti-
tutions. Sharing research, exchanging faculty and students, and establishing vir-
tual connectivity are but a few ways in which this collaboration could
materialize and yield substantial dividends. Professional military educational
initiatives should stress links between the military, parliament, and civil society.
Other high-priority topics would include budgeting and fiscal responsibility,
democratic control, and professional ethics.
F U L F O R D 3 9
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Winter 2009\NWCR Winter 09\NWCR W09.vp
Thursday, December 18, 2008 11:12:20 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
45
War College: Winter 2009 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
An important operational goal of this professional education would be to ad-
vocate professional noncommissioned officer corps and to encourage and sup-
port the efforts of African nations to build them. The manpower is present, but
emphasis on training, empowering, holding accountable, and properly paying
this all-important element of African security forces is notably lacking.
AFRICOM and other allies can render much help in this area.
Economic Opportunity
Economic opportunity equates to hope. Mankind can endure hardship and
trepidation if there is hope for a better tomorrow for self and family. Too fre-
quently in Africa extreme poverty, catastrophes (natural and man-made), and
other factors combine to deny hope to citizens. Without hope, people become
disenfranchised and bitter, easy prey for extremist ideology.
Economic opportunity across the continent is heavily influenced by the
world’s growing demands for African energy resources and other commodities.
China’s growing energy thirst and greater involvement in the economies of
many African nations are particularly salient. China has brought the benefit of
cheap and durable goods to African consumers as well as investment in infra-
structure, health care, and education. China’s policy of noninterference in the
sovereign affairs of nations has provided de facto support for some of the
world’s worst despots and therefore poses an unacceptable strategic alternative
to U.S. goals concerning governance standards and practices. China’s trade with
Africa increased dramatically, from $11 billion in 2000 to $56 billion in 2006,
making it the continent’s third-largest trade partner, behind the United States
and France. Beijing’s target for African trade in 2010 is $100 billion. Over eight
hundred Chinese state-owned enterprises are active on the continent, and An-
gola has become China’s largest supplier of oil. Chinese firms have already in-
vested more than $6 billion in Africa in nine hundred projects, most heavily in
the hydrocarbon sector. U.S. policy, then, must incorporate America’s strategic
interest in ensuring commercial and physical access to hydrocarbons. American
policy should also recognize that while Africa’s hope resides in the economic op-
portunity latent in its natural resources, especially oil, its potential for benefiting
the African people at large has thus far been squandered. Reversing this trend
calls for building both human capital and physical infrastructure.
Achieving the vision in this sphere will be neither quick nor easy, but it is at-
tainable. On the human side, the focus must be on health care and education, in
order to build a competitive labor force for the twenty-first century. It may take a
generation or more, but ensuring that all children have access to schools is a man-
datory first step. African nations must take the lead in promoting opportunities
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for children to go to school; they must re-create a culture that emphasizes the im-
portance of education for all children.
Public-private partnerships can help. I have been in schools on the continent
that have no books, no paper or chairs, where dozens of eager children sit on the
ground listening to a teacher as she writes on a slate board. If schools in the
United States adopted sister schools in villages in Africa and donated books and
supplies, the schools in Africa would benefit and the children, who are the future
of Africa, would be durably grateful.
What is lacking on the part of the United States is not material, however, but
bureaucratic attention and coordination. In 2002, for example, the Bush admin-
istration launched the Africa Education Initiative and committed itself to pro-
vide $600 million over eight years to increase access to quality basic education.
In 2007, the President’s Expanded Education for the World’s Poorest Children
was announced, with an additional $525 million over five years.15 The United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) recently introduced the
Basic Education Initiative and asked the U.S. Congress to appropriate over $600
million in fiscal year 2009 to support basic educational programs worldwide.16
This initiative should continue and grow, and much more effective coordination
should be put in place across U.S. government agencies working in Africa.
Likewise, through the Malaria Initiative and the President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief, the United States has done a great deal to improve health care in
Africa. However, much remains to be done. Two-thirds of HIV/AIDS-infected
persons worldwide live in Africa.17 African statistics in birth mortality (the aver-
age life spans of both mothers and children are at the bottom of the world’s aver-
ages) reflect the inadequate health care infrastructure across the continent.
African children under five die at twice the rate of those in the developing world
as a whole. The odds that a sub-Saharan African woman will die from complica-
tions of pregnancy and childbirth are one in sixteen, compared to one in 3,800 in
the developed world.18 Almost half the population does not have access to clean,
safe drinking water, and two-thirds lack basic sewage and waste disposal sys-
tems.19 This situation is exacerbated by the flight of trained health care workers
seeking higher-paying jobs in Europe and the United States. The international
community can and should increase efforts to help. Again, this is best led by
NGOs and private organizations on a local level.
Food security is the next area that needs attention. Nature is not kind to vast
areas of the continent; droughts and other natural disasters routinely threaten
the food supply. Still, there are large swaths of Africa that could serve as fertile
food baskets for the continent. Countries like Nigeria and Zimbabwe were once
food exporters that now, for different reasons, must now rely on imports or food
aid. Good internal agriculture programs and governmental incentives in these
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countries can turn this situation around. In the 2006–2007 growing season, Ma-
lawi doubled its agricultural productivity through United Nations assistance
with fertilizers and seeds.20 The U.S. Department of Agriculture and USAID can
assist many other countries with twenty-first-century agro-technology that can
turn them into bountiful food producers.
Electricity is another critical dimension of infrastructure, one requiring ad-
ministrative focus as well as resources. More modern and better-maintained hy-
droelectric plants along the Congo and Zambezi rivers could provide clean,
efficient, low-cost energy for much of south and central Africa. The U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and other public-private
ventures could facilitate such development with investment support from the
World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Millennium Challenge
Corporation.
Transportation in Africa also needs serious help. Most of the road and rail
networks on the continent were built to provide access from the interior to the
ocean ports to carry extracted resources for shipment. Even now, China is re-
pairing and modernizing a railroad from Zambia through Tanzania to support
the extraction of copper from a mine China has purchased in Zambia. Both
Zambia and Tanzania will benefit from this rail line, as will China. But more
needs to be done within the continent to build and repair roads, railways, and
navigable waterways that will encourage intercontinental trade and exchange as
well as port and harbor improvements that will ease export operations. It would
be in the strategic interest of the United States, as well as helpful to African part-
ners, for Washington to play a leading role in developing these transportation
networks.
If Africans are to realize value from their goods, they must be able to trade
them with fewer hurdles and costs. The costs of interior transportation to major
capitals can be five times higher than for shipping from African ports to markets
in Europe, Asia, or North America. Part of this is due to low volumes, bad roads,
and lack of competition. But corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy is also a major
factor.
The United States could do Africa an enormous service and promote its own
interests by acting as an agent for change of multilateral international trade rules
on behalf of African governments. It has much to gain diplomatically, commer-
cially, and strategically by doing so.
The United States should adopt a comprehensive strategy in its activities with
African nations and institutions. The United States should engage international
partners, challenging them to lead, follow, or get out of the way. Most impor-
tantly, the United States should work more closely with well disposed African
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partners to improve their governance, security, and economic opportunity. It is
the morally right thing to do; it demonstrates American intentions to maintain
ethical balance; and it is in our own strategic interests. America can demonstrate
its true greatness while helping worthy African citizens attain a better life.
A new administration with focused priorities, using all the tools of our na-
tion, including a fully operational Africa Command, is positioned to accomplish
the recommendations of this article and to help African nations attain the vi-
sion. In the words of that great corporate philosopher Nike—“Just do it!”
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THE GLOBAL FLEET STATION
A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict
Kathi A. Sohn
The October 2007 initial deployment of the Africa Partnership Station (APS)to the Gulf of Guinea and the coincident rollout of A Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower signaled a strong American commitment to leveraging
U.S. sea power to protect and sustain the global, interconnected maritime
sphere. The APS is a Global Fleet Station (GFS) sea base designed to assist the
Gulf of Guinea maritime community in developing better maritime governance
for denying use of the sea to those who threaten regional and global security.
The Global Fleet Station, born out of a need for military shaping and stability
operations without the trappings of war, is a proven concept for this mission in
such areas as the Gulf of Guinea and the Caribbean basin. It also serves as a plat-
form from which to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to na-
tions within its area of operations. The GFS is more a concept than a “platform,”
and its promise and flexibility arise from, respectively, its minimal military foot-
print ashore and the wide cross-section of professional resources that it hosts.
The prevention of violence—still a challenge for the conflict-resolution profes-
sion and entirely new ground for the Defense Depart-
ment—is one potential contribution, however, that
the GFS has yet to realize fully.
The pilot Africa Partnership Station mission, which
ended in May 2008, laid the foundation for conflict pre-
vention by future deployments through the relation-
ships it built with and between the peoples of the
Gulf of Guinea region, by the goodwill it instilled
through its humanitarian-action and disaster-relief
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efforts, and through its promotion of African maritime security. The U.S. Naval
Forces Europe–Sixth Fleet staff has planned APS missions through 2012, with a
scheduled 1 November 2008 deployment of the dock landing ship USS Nashville
(LPD 13). By tapping worldwide conflict-prevention resources and improving
coordination with international and regional nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), the Africa Partnership Station can effectively support the mission of
the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to enable African solutions to Afri-
can problems. In this process, the APS can demonstrate how powerful a tool the
Global Fleet Station can be for preventing violent conflict.
THE MARITIME STRATEGY: A FOCUS ON OPPORTUNITIES
Al-Qa‘ida ushered in a new era of terrorism on September 11, 2001, amplifying
the need to address the underlying causes and conditions that give rise to ex-
tremist behavior. Subsequently, American national security strategies focused
on the denial of safe havens to reduce the pool of terrorist recruits. These strate-
gies acknowledged that peaceful alternatives could be offered to the disenfran-
chised through the building of civil institutions and relationships. This has
traditionally been the work of NGOs, but these organizations have been largely
crippled during recent decades. Spread thin by post–Cold War conflicts, chroni-
cally underfunded due to international-donor fatigue, and subject to inconsis-
tent support from local governments, NGOs cannot alone foster the positive
environment prescribed in post-9/11 strategies.
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41, as updated through 2005,
mandated better integration and synchronization of department-level strate-
gies; a number of subsequent documents clarified matters of authority and re-
sponsibility.1 Federal agencies reorganized to that end, and the military services
aligned their efforts to eliminate “stovepiped” decision making and to increase
communication and collaboration. The 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Se-
curity and its eight supporting plans established a comprehensive effort to pro-
mote global economic stability and protect legitimate activities while
preventing hostile or illegal acts in the maritime domain.2
On 17 October 2007, at the International Seapower Symposium in Newport,
Rhode Island, Admiral Gary Roughead, the newly named Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (CNO), unveiled the new joint maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy
for 21st Century Seapower, to representatives from ninety-eight countries.3 This
strategy translates the 2005 maritime strategic guidance into a collaborative ef-
fort by the U.S. maritime forces—the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast
Guard. It addresses the need for regionally concentrated, credible combat power
and for globally distributed, mission-tailored maritime forces. It reflects a core
requirement for maritime mobility, flexibility, and power, but it does not imply
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that U.S. maritime forces alone are to do everything, everywhere, and all the
time to prevent, deter, or victoriously end conflict. Instead, the strategy declares
a strategic imperative to foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more
international partners; however, it warns, “trust and cooperation cannot be
surged.” The implication is a general need to work smarter, not harder, and so
achieve more; former CNO Admiral Michael Mullen gave this idea specific
form—a “thousand-ship navy,” in which membership “is purely voluntary and
would have no legal or encumbering ties. It would be a free-form, self-organizing
network of maritime partners—good neighbors interested in using the power of
the sea to unite, rather than to divide. The barriers for entry are low. Respect for
sovereignty is high.”4
The new strategy boldly places “Preventing wars is as important as winning
wars” in a long-overdue framework of a collaborative, conflict-preventive
maritime approach to global security. The strategy “focuses on opportuni-
ties—not threats; on optimism—not fear; and on confidence—not doubt.”
The U.S. maritime services can meet the strategic imperative to prevent or
contain local disruptions before they impact the global system by planning each
joint, combined, or interagency initiative in light of all potentially affected
conflictual processes. The Global Fleet Station program provides an ideal
opportunity.
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND THE ROLE OF THE GLOBAL FLEET
STATION
There is no consensus within the conflict-resolution community on the nature
of conflict prevention. One major reason is that prevention involves ac-
tion—and what action is required will depend on the shifting needs of a particu-
lar region at a particular time. Therefore, how conflict prevention is approached
becomes more important than precisely what is done, where, or when. This criti-
cal conflict-prevention key is reflected in a 2006 study conducted by the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada to provide expert
insights into current thinking about conflict prevention. Regarding normative
gaps, the study concluded that “the foremost issues that Canada should address
are those of constructive engagement and cooperation among nonstate, state,
and intergovernmental actors.”5
Also key to successful conflict prevention is a greater understanding of the
nature of conflict itself and the difficulties of its resolution. Conflict is the meta-
phorical elephant groped by blind men, each trying to describe the entire ele-
phant based on his perception of a part he can touch. American civilian and
military leaders need to examine the conflict “elephant” from a variety of per-
spectives. One of them is the perception of conflict as a process, a “moving
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elephant,” the inherent nature of which might be completely misunderstood if
not reassessed over time.
Viewing conflict as a process also allows prevention to be understood in
terms of aftermath. In June 2005, members of the international aid community
met in Paris to discuss lessons learned during the thirteen years of peace build-
ing following the appearance in 1992 of the groundbreaking An Agenda for
Peace, by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, secretary-general of the United Nations. This
document signaled a paradigm shift in the UN approach to conflict, acknowl-
edging the “critically related concept of postconflict peacebuilding” as action to
identify and support “structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”6 Thereafter, experts expanded the
conflict lexicon to describe nuances. For example, “conflict prevention” became
“violent conflict prevention” because conflict is a natural, productive process
that should be allowed to occur, as long as it proceeds in a nonviolent fashion.
Another example is the contemporary differentiation between “positive peace”
(the absence of the underlying causes and conditions for violent conflict) and
“negative peace” (absence of violent conflict), a distinction useful for decisions
regarding intervention.
Further, because the organizational perspectives of military services and ci-
vilian agencies and the emotional impact of real-time media on public opinion
exacerbate the “fog of war” in periods of conflict, it is crucial that civilian agen-
cies and military planners build working relationships during times of peace.
The GFS represents a great opportunity to build civil-military communication
and coordination practices that can be leveraged in any theater in the event of
war. The need for cooperation between military and civilian entities during
joint operations is not new, as evidenced by the 1996 joint publication Inter-
agency Coordination during Joint Operations.7 What is new since 9/11 is an in-
creasing urgency for the Defense Department to engage in peacetime operations
traditionally considered nonmilitary. It therefore becomes equally urgent to
streamline interagency processes and move beyond cultural civil-military
barriers.
The GFS concept arose from this urgency, as a way to conduct security coop-
eration and capacity-building operations without deploying traditional carrier
and expeditionary strike groups. Taking advantage of existing status-of-forces
agreements and memorandums of understanding, as well as funding from the
International Military Education and Training program and other such sources,
the GFS is now a self-sufficient regional headquarters that “serves as the model
for coordination with local government agencies, international organizations,
and non-governmental organizations.”8
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Naval Operations Concept 2006 describes the Global Fleet Station, illustrating
its capacity to perform as a vital resource to combatant commanders:
Like all sea bases, the composition of a GFS depends on Combatant Commander re-
quirements, the operating environment, and the mission. From its sea base, each GFS
would serve as a self-contained headquarters for regional operations with the capac-
ity to repair and service all ships, small craft, and aircraft assigned. Additionally, the
GFS might provide classroom space, limited medical facilities, an information fusion
center, and some combat service support capability. The GFS concept provides a le-
veraged, high-yield sea based option that achieves a persistent presence in support of
national objectives.9
The operations concept also features the Global Fleet Station as “a future sea
story,” highlighting the potential of the platform to build relationships and trust
with the local populace of such depth that the security payoff transcends peace
operations and ultimately contributes to counterterrorism.10
Just as the new maritime strategy defined the joint military nature of the
Global Fleet Station, authority and guidance for interagency and international
participation in the GFS can be found in the many follow-up documents to
NSPD-41. For example, one of the eight supporting plans to the 2005 National
Strategy for Maritime Security is the International Outreach and Coordination
Strategy, implemented by the Secretary of State. This document calls for the
State Department to coordinate closely with other departments and agencies to
“enhance existing ties and forge new partnerships with other nations, interna-
tional and regional organizations, and the private sector to improve global mari-
time security.”11 A further presidential directive, NSPD-44, assigned the
management of foreign interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and sta-
bilization to the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
fense, in an effort “to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S.
military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”12
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states:
Recognizing that stability, security and transition operations can be critical to the
long war on terrorism, the Department [of Defense] issued guidance in 2005 to place
stability operations on par with major combat operations within the Department.
The directive calls for improving the Department’s ability to work with interagency
partners, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and others to
increase capacities to participate in complex operations abroad.13
This guidance to “place stability operations on par with major combat opera-
tions” sounds very similar to the new maritime strategy statement that “prevent-
ing wars is as important as winning wars.”
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A Defense Department directive, Military Support for Stability, Security, Tran-
sition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, states, “Many stability operations
tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or American civilian profes-
sionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks
necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Success-
fully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the
timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.”14 In 2004, General Anthony Zinni
stressed the need for improved civil-military cooperation in the interest of
postconflict reconstruction. In language reminiscent of the directive, he de-
clared, “The military is not the best answer for providing humanitarian support,
but if there is a gap, the military will fill it.”15 The Africa Partnership Station has
proved the Global Fleet Station highly suitable for filling the humanitarian sup-
port gap and has demonstrated the focus on opportunities, optimism, and
confidence called for by the new maritime strategy.
THE PILOT APS MISSION AS PROOF OF THE GFS CONCEPT IN
THE GULF OF GUINEA
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) sponsored the first pilot Global Fleet
Station mission from April to September 2007, using the high-speed vessel
(HSV 2) Swift. During the course of visits to seven Caribbean and Central
American nations its crew “conducted 39,890 hours of subject matter expert ex-
changes in such areas as leadership, small boat operations, port security and
small unit tactics.”16
Two weeks before the issuance of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower, the Sixth Fleet deployed two platforms—the Swift again and the USS
Fort McHenry (LSD 43), a large amphibious ship—on a seven-month joint and
combined (that is, multiservice and multinational) maritime APS mission.
Naval Forces Europe developed this Africa Partnership Station mission as part
of efforts in West and Central Africa resulting from a pivotal 2006 conference in
Cotonou, Benin. There, all eleven Gulf of Guinea nations had expressed their com-
mitment to addressing maritime governance on local, national, and regional lev-
els. They specifically resolved to “continue engagement with international
maritime partners, including the African Union and African nations outside
the Gulf of Guinea, the International Maritime Organization, the United Na-
tions and its relevant agencies, bilateral partners and non-governmental agen-
cies.”17 Representatives from eight European navies were to join the three
American maritime services in APS visits to Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon,
Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe, Togo, and other African countries over the
seven-month period. Numerous media reports underscored the many successful
activities undertaken by the Africa Partnership Station, including all aspects of
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maritime security training and awareness building, humanitarian work, and cri-
sis response. U.S. agencies involved include the Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, the Agency for International Development, and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
In March 2008, the prepositioning ships of the Military Sealift Command’s
West Africa Training Cruise joined the Africa Partnership Station for a
sea-basing and humanitarian-assistance-distribution exercise off Monrovia, Li-
beria. The 28 March 2008 edition of Rhumb Lines, a weekly Navy Office of Infor-
mation e-mail circular for senior Navy leadership, reported the impact of such
additional sea-base platforms as the Improved Navy Lighterage System, a rede-
signed floating-dock system originally used during World War II, in its first op-
erational deployment. Rhumb Lines reported, “The ability to create a mobile
platform at sea enables future execution of the Maritime Strategy, complements
APS initiatives and has the potential to enhance future support in the African re-
gion.”18 One report on an early February 2008 visit by APS to Cameroon to assist
with the relief of refugees escaping to the northern part of that country from
civil conflict in Chad illustrates the multifaceted relationship-building nature of
the APS mission: “In addition to providing relief assistance during the visit, Sail-
ors from Swift will conduct a community relations project, meet with local offi-
cials, play soccer with the Cameroon Navy, and support a diplomatic reception
aboard the ship.”19
The diplomatic role of each member of the APS crew cannot be underesti-
mated, and continuing cultural education is vital. A July 2007 GFS concept pa-
per referred to building cultural awareness as a critical component of GFS
shaping and stability operations, tying in the Defense Department–mandated
military Foreign Area Officer program as further expanding “the Navy’s
enablers and capability to engage more effectively around the world in a cultur-
ally informed and meaningful manner.”20 A November 2007 report entitled
“Cultural Awareness Personifies Africa Partnership Station Mission” highlights
the importance of cultural training for the APS crew, quoting a senior Marine
Corps Africa analyst: “Our steaming here is a means to an end. A lot of people on
the ship, regardless of where they work, will be going ashore in terms of either
liberty or community relations events.”21
Beyond the press reporting about diplomatic events and the training of
mission personnel on African culture, there is an invaluable opportunity to
capture the experiences and insights of the men and women on board the Af-
rica Partnership Station, so quickly lost by rotation. The potential for building
cross-cultural understanding spans the multiple dimensions of day-to-day
joint, combined, interagency, and foreign interactions. Between formal and in-
formal liaison activity, input gained during a time of peaceful interaction can be
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used to inform operations during a time of crisis. To that end, the AFRICOM
commander, General William E. “Kip” Ward, emphasized during an interview in
October 2007 that the APS initiative and his new command would strive “as a
whole” to help African countries build capacity. He elaborated on how the new
APS initiative “provides a good example of what the newly established Africa
Command is all about as it relates to helping our partner nations on the conti-
nent of Africa build their capacity to better govern their spaces (and) to have
more effect in providing for the security of their people.”22 The Sixth Fleet com-
mander, Vice Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, referred to the Africa Partnership Sta-
tion as “a Noah’s Ark of tremendous capability.”23
When the APS returned in May 2008 from its seven-month deployment to
the Gulf of Guinea, the Center for Naval Analyses, European Command, and
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (in Norfolk, Virginia) completed as-
sessments begun during the mission of its effectiveness and perceptions of it.
These reports informed the decision to continue the APS program through
2012. As General Ward implied, the Africa Partnership Station is an integral part
of the new AFRICOM and U.S. policy in the African region.
AN APS AT SEA PROMOTING AFRICOM SUCCESS ON THE
CONTINENT
On 7 February 2007, President George W. Bush directed the establishment of
AFRICOM to “strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help create
new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa.”24 Like the
new maritime strategy and the GFS project, AFRICOM reflects how senior
American policy makers are digging in for “the long war” against terror. The
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review proposed developing “the authorities and re-
sources to build partnership capacity, achieve unity of effort, and adopt indirect
approaches to act with and through others to defeat common enemies—shifting
from conducting activities ourselves to enabling partners to do more for them-
selves.”25 AFRICOM, which was “stood up” on 1 October 2008, is such an “au-
thority”—as the APS is a “resource” for building partnership capacity in the
African region.
Previously, responsibility for operations on the African continent was di-
vided among U.S. European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Com-
mand. Channeling all American security initiatives in the African region
through one unified command should help streamline the communication and
coordination processes critical to the novel approach of enabling “African solu-
tions to African challenges.” General Ward stated in early 2008 to delegates of the
fifteen member nations of the Economic Community of West African States that
U.S. assistance will be “not as we think or what we direct, but what comes to us
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in the way of requests, and again, in keeping with our stated U.S. foreign policy
objectives.”26
Reaction to the plans for AFRICOM has been as mixed as were responses to
the new maritime strategy.27 Robert G. Berschinski addresses the main concerns
in his AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The “Global War on Terrorism,” “Capacity Build-
ing,” Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa. The new
command’s critics “allege that the Command demonstrates a self-serving Amer-
ican policy focused on fighting terrorism, securing Africa’s burgeoning energy
stocks, and countering Chinese influence.”28 Berschinski points out that
post-9/11 American “kinetic” operations in the trans-Sahara and Horn of Africa
regions have not produced lasting solutions while they have served to alienate
segments of the African population. Further, policies of “aggregation” regarding
Africa have reflected an ignorance of the true nature of the regional insurgent
threat, amalgamating the regional insurgent threat into a “frightening, but arti-
ficially monolithic whole.”29
AFRICOM, in conjunction with the Africa Partnership Station, has the
unique opportunity to adopt a new security paradigm for an integrated ap-
proach to violent-conflict prevention, an approach that will lessen the need for
quick military reaction in crisis intervention. A major factor will be the chance
to leverage the indigenous wisdom and expertise of the African people, not force
Western solutions on their problems. Instead of the conventional plan to put
“boots on the ground,” cooperative security and diplomatic events can take
place on the APS with “minimal footprint ashore.”
African leadership perceptions regarding the true intention of AFRICOM
will be as important to the command’s success as are the leaderships’ own per-
spectives of regional problems. It is particularly vital that the United States resist
the urge to build military bases on the African continent to host AFRICOM ini-
tiatives. The United States can assuage fears that the true intention of the new
command is to militarize the region by decentralizing the command, continuing
to use the Africa Partnership Station, and making an unwavering commitment
to addressing the root causes of conflict.
AN INTEGRATED APS APPROACH TO VIOLENT-CONFLICT
PREVENTION
On the African continent, AFRICOM has begun its work amid conditions of on-
going violent conflict processes and negative peace. It will be especially impor-
tant for the command to fend off criticism for not producing quick results by
educating observers—using precise conflict terminology—regarding the length
of time required to build trust and institutions. It will also be necessary for all
concerned to understand that conflict is a cycle, characterized by varying
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degrees of intensity, from nonviolent manifestations of underlying structural
conflict to full-scale bloodshed. Further, it will need to be stressed that
AFRICOM has chosen an approach reflective of the appropriate role for external
actors in an advanced stage of postconflict (or nonviolent conflict) interven-
tion—a critical time, full of opportunity to promote positive peace and prevent
violent conflict.
The classical stages of postconflict intervention include, first, a stabilization
stage, during which external actors manage the society.30 The next, or transition,
phase can last for one to three years while an interim government is established
and humanitarian relief shifts to developmental projects. During this time, in-
ternal and external actors increasingly work together to bring about the disar-
mament, demobilization, and reintegration necessary for stabilization. The
final, consolidation, phase lasts between four and ten years, during which secu-
rity sector reforms occur, internal actors take the lead, and external actors
assume a role of capacity building and support.
In this schema, the current engagement of the APS and the future role of
AFRICOM relate to consolidation—the longest and, because of its role in pre-
venting violence, most critical stage of peace building. This is also the most diffi-
cult stage to manage; the characteristic ineffectiveness of postconflict programs
has been historically attributed to “the lack of attention to the point of view of
local populations, and to the disjointed nature of international response and
lack of coherence between different actors.”31 The proceedings of the June 2005
Paris conference mentioned above highlighted the importance of integrated
preventive measures in postconflict strategies, noting that “as a large percentage
of countries coming out of crises are at risk for falling back into the conflict trap,
there is a need to see the post-conflict stage as also a conflict prevention stage.”32
These suggested integrated preventive measures could be a natural function
of the APS integrated operation. In 2005, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Richard Myers, U.S. Air Force, suggested that “integrated opera-
tions” is a more accurate, inclusive term than “interagency” or “combined” for
contemporary collaborative efforts: “Many services, Federal agencies, allies and
their governmental agencies, corporations, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions must cooperate to meet the full spectrum of military operations, from
peacekeeping to battle to the transition to lasting peace.”33
In addition to its potential conflict-resolution role in the Gulf of Guinea, the
APS is concurrently serving that of violent-conflict prevention in the general Af-
rican region. It is important for military planners to acknowledge, in their effort
to place all security-related initiatives within the context of the conflict spec-
trum, that the APS maritime security mission has this dual function. In his dis-
cussion paper “Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional
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Perspectives,” Owen Greene acknowledges, “It is clear that [security-sector re-
forms] can contribute in many ways to conflict prevention and reduction. How-
ever, many efforts to reform the security sector are not primarily concerned with
conflict prevention or reduction, and so their contribution to these goals may be
more or less direct.”34
Of additional significance is the opportunity for AFRICOM to learn during
the conduct by APS of its integrated maritime security mission. Lessons learned
in this floating laboratory for collaborative efforts—whether about successes or
failures—are perishable but can greatly contribute to synchronizing missions.
This can be a particular challenge, considering the additional complexity cre-
ated by giving the lead role to African leadership. Failure to plan, implement,
and evaluate integrated processes properly could degrade progress toward
AFRICOM’s overall objectives as well as diminish Africa’s confidence in the
command.
The 2005 Paris conference participants agreed that integration needs to occur
during all the stages of intervention, from planning to evaluation. This means
that regular reporting and widespread information sharing are crucial, because
each perspective is a piece of the puzzle. These stages are not necessarily linear,
and the processes of one could inform another. For example, aid workers imple-
menting a humanitarian project could collect valuable qualitative metrics on
progress made toward establishing a positive peace. AFRICOM could facilitate
the reporting of such insights and maintain a centralized database for the
African region.
In a December 2007 technical report entitled A Systems Engineering Approach
for Global Fleet Station Alternatives in the Gulf of Guinea, twelve Naval Postgradu-
ate School student officers evaluated interagency and NGO coordination as a facet
of Global Fleet Station that was not in itself a mission but deserved attention
to equal that given “shaping” operations and humanitarian or disaster-relief
missions.35 They acknowledged that “outside” agencies “provide to an
overall campaign for regional stability, [including] a historical perspective on
lessons learned out of the changing nature of war and how to prevent it.”36
The following recommendations would maximize the opportunities repre-
sented by the Global Fleet Station concept for implementing the principles of A
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and for leveraging the knowl-
edge, skills, and experiences of GFS crewmembers.
Widen the Global Fleet Station program. Lessons learned from the APS mis-
sions and SOUTHCOM’s past and current Navy Diver Global Fleet Station can
illustrate the adaptability of the GFS to the requirements of combatant com-
manders. GFS deployments to the Central and Pacific theaters should be
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considered, taking care to maintain international perception of the platform as
noncombatant.
Widened use of the Global Fleet Station concomitant with an increased use of
the sea for staging combatant forces would risk contaminating the noncomba-
tant image of the GFS. Nonetheless, sea basing as an alternative for staging com-
batant forces needs to be seriously considered. Minimizing the U.S. military
footprint ashore has support from analysts who see grave consequences in
building military bases on foreign soil. For example, University of Chicago pro-
fessor Robert Pape strongly believes that suicide terrorism has found encourage-
ment in the coerced withdrawal of American and allied forces from territories.
He suggests that the United States use a strategy of “offshore balancing” as an al-
ternative to putting bases where violent acts are likely to be perpetrated to force
them to leave.37
Keep the Africa Partnership Station afloat as a partner to AFRICOM in inte-
grated violent-conflict prevention. APS deployments to the African region should
continue, with the least amount of time possible between deployments. The
Global Fleet Station featured in the 2006 Naval Operations Concept, “Future Sea
Story,” was on station for two years building partnership and trust. The Africa
Partnership Station sustains symbolic and practical relevance for Navy planners
with regard to American policy in Africa. A persistent presence of the APS can
assist AFRICOM in developing an end-to-end integrated approach to violent-
conflict prevention, which will incorporate the unique contributions of all
agencies, services, and organizations involved in promoting security in the Afri-
can region.
Tap worldwide conflict-prevention resources for GFS missions. Peace-building
and conflict-prevention resources on board the GFS and among its partners on
the continent are rich, but even so, they could be greatly enhanced by tapping
worldwide academics and practitioners. AFRICOM databasing of aid worker
evaluations and a myriad of other metrics related to conflict prevention could be
replicated in other theaters to share lessons learned and track global trends.
Apply lessons learned from GFS in peacetime to integrated operations in war.
During times of war, conflict is continually reassessed and courses of action ad-
justed. A clear picture of the desired end-state and war-termination indicators
can guide conflict and postconflict planning. All courses of action during the vi-
olent phase of the conflict should help bring about the desired end state, and all
postconflict planning should assume conditions that end the war. American
military planners can apply lessons learned from streamlined, integrated opera-
tions during Global Fleet Station violent-conflict-prevention missions to de-
velop better military exit strategies from war in any theater of operations.
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Although Africa has long been a low strategic priority for the United States,Washington now has a sharp and pronounced strategic interest in protect-
ing access to rich reserves of sub-Saharan oil and gas, mainly in the vicinity of
the Gulf of Guinea, as part of its drive to reduce dependence on Middle East sup-
pliers. By 2010, Africa’s share of U.S. oil imports could rise to 20 percent, and
China has begun to engage the United States in a geopolitical contest for hydro-
carbons and other economic and political benefits in sub-Saharan Africa. There
are also roughly 400 million Muslims in Africa, and Muslim radicalism has been
on the rise in countries like Nigeria and Somalia, the latter of which has become
a hot training destination for aspiring jihadists. Weak and failed states are vul-
nerable to co-optation by bad actors, and there are more of them—the two of
greatest concern being Islamist-governed Sudan and anarchic Somalia—in
sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else. Some of Africa’s problems are of interest
to the United States as a matter of philosophical values, as opposed to immediate
strategic interests. Poverty and disease (HIV/AIDS in particular) pervade the
continent, and many of Africa’s fifty-three nations are politically unstable or
economically dysfunctional or are run by malign regimes. Zimbabwe, for exam-
ple, is afflicted by all of these scourges.
Accordingly, the Department of Defense conceived Africa Command, or
AFRICOM, to help Africans help themselves and to
frame Africa, for purposes of formulating and imple-
menting American foreign policy, as an end in itself
rather than the geopolitical construct that it was dur-
ing the Cold War. The idea is for the U.S. military to
Jonathan Stevenson is a professor of strategic studies at
the U.S. Naval War College. He was embarked upon the
USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) in the Gulf of Guinea,
part of the Africa Partnership Station, in April 2008.
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stress the prevention of and, contingently, preparation for insecurity through
building African military capacity rather than to default to mere crisis manage-
ment. AFRICOM would become a key component in an interagency effort to
use especially “nonkinetic” military resources (e.g., command, control, and
communication assets; engineering capabilities; and public health expertise) to
provide more readily benefits related to humanitarian assistance and develop-
ment, as well as improvements in defense infrastructure, and to support (not
control) African leadership.1 Announcing AFRICOM’s creation in February
2007, a Pentagon spokesman said that many of its missions would in fact be
nonkinetic ones, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and that the
command would be set up mainly for preventing war and establishing stability.2
Yet Africans have not easily bought into Africa Command. Washington’s
public-relations rollout of AFRICOM in early and mid-2007 came at an inoppor-
tune time, when the security situation in Iraq was deteriorating and U.S. forward
military activity was perceived, at worst, as imperialistic and recklessly inept or, at
best, as focused exclusively on counterterrorism and devoid of any broader effort
to help host nations. Amplifying this problem, the official line on AFRICOM was
scattershot. The Defense Department first bruited the possibility of new Ameri-
can military bases in Africa, then blandly cast the new command as simply a bu-
reaucratic reorganization that rationalized responsibility for the continent by
unifying it (except Egypt) under a single combatant command. The Pentagon’s
statement that the new command’s focus would be preventing rather than fight-
ing wars came later. In yet another tonal shift, the State Department in April 2008
portrayed AFRICOM’s inception as “history in the making.”3
The mixed signals in these official characterizations of AFRICOM have fu-
eled rising fears of American hegemony and the “militarization” of America’s
Africa policy. Africa Command currently operates out of the headquarters of
European Command—which previously had responsibility for West Africa—in
Stuttgart, Germany, with supporting Army and Navy components based in
Vicenza, Italy, and Naples, Italy, respectively. Only war-torn Liberia has offered
to host an AFRICOM regional headquarters. The fourteen-nation Southern Af-
rican Development Community voted expressly not to do so. Algeria and Libya
unceremoniously ruled out the possibility, and Morocco—the closest ally of the
United States in North Africa—has shown no enthusiasm. In December 2007,
Nigeria officially rejected a request that it agree to be the venue for a regional
headquarters and encouraged other African nations to follow its lead; Ghana,
arguably the most pro-American country in West Africa, did so. In May 2008,
AFRICOM put aside plans for a permanent regional headquarters and decided
instead to place staff in embassy-based offices of defense cooperation, on an
as-needed basis.4 More recently, African resistance to AFRICOM appears to be
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diminishing, but the neuralgic attitude of African populations and governments
toward American “boots on the ground” is durable. Given that reality, it is
salutary that the U.S. Navy, rather than the Army, is taking the lead in a new
strategic effort in Africa.
THE AFRICA PARTNERSHIP STATION
This endeavor is the “Africa Partnership Station,” or APS, a small and varied
group of warships that completed a six-month tour in the Gulf of Guinea, the
first of its kind in that region, in April 2008.5 The APS’s lead element was the USS
Fort McHenry (LSD 43), a 610-foot amphibious landing ship whose shallow
draft and multiple shore-connecting modes eased the task of pursuing concur-
rent operations in several locations. Other Navy ships involved were the
high-speed vessel (HSV) Swift, a 322-foot catamaran originally meant for mine
warfare and for developing littoral combat concepts; the USS Annapolis (SSN
760), a nuclear attack submarine; and the 567-foot USS San Jacinto (CG 56), a
guided-missile cruiser. Part of the Navy’s Global Fleet Station program, the APS
is based on the recently refined strategic concept of “maritime sector develop-
ment.” The operational goal is to establish maritime safety and security by build-
ing African naval capabilities in maritime domain awareness, military
professionalism, technical infrastructure, and operational response. The strate-
gic objective is to make African nations both self-sufficient in maintaining mar-
itime security and more favorably disposed toward the United States, through
relationships enriched through the operation of the APS itself.
The notion of a “thousand-ship navy”—mooted by the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, in 2005, when he was Chief of Naval
Operations—contemplates a set of navies aligned with that of the United States
with total assets of as many as a thousand vessels.6 More particularly, Admiral
Harry Ulrich—as (before his recent retirement) commander of Naval Forces
Europe (NAVEUR), with a pre-AFRICOM area of responsibility that covered
the Gulf of Guinea—believed that the Navy had to do something operationally
constructive between maritime wars. To him, this meant disabusing African
governments of any grandiose dreams they might have of acquiring power-
projecting blue-water navies that they did not really need, while encouraging
and supporting their efforts to develop brown-water patrolling and policing ca-
pabilities that would address immediate maritime security demands and to es-
tablish interoperable forces that would engender a truly regional capability.7 The
APS concept is designed to develop mutually advantageous relationships—that
is, partnerships—rather than dependencies. For African nations, there are
strong motivations to cooperate. A quarter of the cocaine consumed in Europe
is transshipped through West Africa. Some 60 percent of the world’s human
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trafficking occurs in sub-Saharan Africa. Attacks in Africa were largely responsi-
ble for the 10 percent global increase in piracy in 2007. Sub-Saharan Africa loses
a billion dollars a year to illegal fishing, and illegal oil bunkering in Nigeria alone
sucks three million dollars a day from the legitimate economy. Further, African na-
tions share global strategic objectives, such as counterproliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and interdiction of the narcotics traffic.
In formulating and honing the Africa Partnership Station concept, NAVEUR
under Admiral Ulrich carefully considered what message it would send to Afri-
can populations and governments and how it would affect their views of the
United States—in a phrase, strategic communication. Barring outright armed
intervention, NAVEUR decided, it made sense to operate from ships, without
the political and psychological baggage that came with a big American ground
presence. Hence, the APS would make long-term patrols with frequent but rela-
tively brief stops, offering operational training to build durable ties and com-
munity outreach programs to improve local goodwill. Thus, the program seems
a sensible diplomatic remediation of a George W. Bush–era foreign policy that
has, on balance, alienated foreigners and made overseas partners more tentative
about their links with Washington. At the same time, the creation of AFRICOM
appears to signal a pragmatic and largely apolitical reorientation of American
military priorities in an epoch of Middle East instability, a reorientation that
stresses the protection of non–Middle East oil supplies and the containment of
Islamic radicalism and terrorism.
THE APS AND THE NAVY’S STRATEGIC RELEVANCE
In the first decade of the nineteenth century, the U.S. Navy helped reestablish
maritime security in Africa during the small naval wars against the Barbary pi-
rates. About a hundred years later, Theodore Roosevelt’s “gunboat diplo-
macy”—employed to consolidate American primacy and bolster American
political and economic interests—followed from Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theory
of sea power, which cast a powerful blue-water U.S. Navy as the vehicle and guar-
antor of national economic prosperity and international political clout. Neither
model, however, neatly fits with the APS, which is the product of innovative
twenty-first-century thinking within the Navy. It was the commander of Naval
Forces Europe—not the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the State Depart-
ment—who convened and hosted the inaugural Gulf of Guinea Maritime Secu-
rity Conference, in October 2004. The Navy’s theater security engagement plan,
anchored by the APS, has been more enterprising vis-à-vis Africa than has plan-
ning by other elements of the U.S. interagency framework.
The APS also appears well designed to meet the Navy’s internal challenges. Of
the four major services, the Navy has the smallest pieces of the counterterrorism
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and counterinsurgency “pies” and therefore faces budgetary disfavor in the
short term. Strategically, it is incumbent on the Navy to husband its resources
for any blue-water naval challenge from China in decades to come, while bu-
reaucratically the service needs to secure a role in safeguarding more urgent
American interests, such as ensuring access to oil and winning hearts and minds
in places that could otherwise prove vulnerable to Islamic radicalism. The Navy
has understood that a large American ground-force presence could undermine
both of these key American strategic interests in Africa, by discomfiting local
populations and moving people to active opposition to the United States. Mari-
time initiatives like the APS, however, are inherently less intrusive than
ground-based ones; with the Navy in front, the United States could win over Af-
rican governments and populations and shore up local goodwill. While the Navy
may carry some historical baggage as a practitioner of gunboat diplomacy, the
Africa Partnership Station projects a more benign image to potential allies,
partners, and even adversaries.
Of course, certain U.S. ground-based military efforts in Africa may be un-
avoidable with respect to American interests, values, or both. Accordingly, in
continuing to clarify the uses of Africa Command for public consumption,
Washington should acknowledge openly and clearly that two of the new com-
mand’s biggest challenges may end up as sustaining energy security for mutual
benefit, as well as peacekeeping and state building, which the Pentagon is weav-
ing more thoroughly into U.S. military doctrine.8 It should note further that
AFRICOM will provide the United States with bureaucratic means for enhanc-
ing diplomatic and military-to-military relationships with key African states
and regional organizations the better to meet these challenges. The United States
should also emphasize its official preference that African forces or United Na-
tions peacekeeping contingents, rather than the American military or U.S.-led
coalitions, be used in African territory.
At first blush, such a dispensation seems to cut against the Defense Depart-
ment’s reconfiguration of the ground-force structure through the dramatic ex-
pansion of the remit, personnel, and budget of U.S. Special Operations
Command. The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA),
which will become an AFRICOM asset, constitutes an early example of this new
bias. It has facilitated impressive regional partnerships and a desirable inter-
agency approach to humanitarian assistance and military-to-military training
programs, but most Africans see that force mainly as a hard counterterrorism
tool—its most visible effort being support of the Ethiopia-led occupation of So-
malia and targeting of suspected terrorists there, sometimes with regrettable
and politically inflammatory civilian losses. Thus, CJTF-HOA tends to signify
uses of force that jeopardize rather than advance the long-term strategic
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position of the United States in Africa.9 Accordingly, the suggestions of some
American officials that Africa Command’s prospective mode of engagement
should be modeled on CJTF-HOA’s local-capacity-building mission seem dubi-
ous.10 Instead, the policy thrust should be toward increases in AFRICOM
funding for foreign military financing, international military education and train-
ing, and peacekeeping operations—to all of which the APS would contribute. This
would at once accelerate the American objective of building African military capac-
ity, improve interoperability critical for any combined deployments that may be-
come necessary for peace enforcement or peacekeeping, and validate the stated U.S.
intention to help Africans to help themselves.
So framed, Africa Command should become more acceptable than it initially
has been to African governments and populations and ultimately win their ap-
proval, or at least acquiescence. Yet the Africa Partnership Station has already
earned the confidence and enthusiastic participation of most littoral West Afri-
can states, and it remains at once the most operationally effective and politically
agreeable component of the military engagement of the United States with
sub-Saharan Africa. In that light, it may well prove Africa Command’s most
politically valuable strategic asset.
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U.S. NAVY SURFACE BATTLE DOCTRINE AND
VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC
Trent Hone
The basic strategic problems confronting the U.S. Navy during the interwaryears of the 1920s and 1930s were how to move a large fleet across the Pacific,
absorb or avoid Japanese attritional attacks, seize forward bases for further oper-
ations, and retain sufficient fighting strength to defeat Japan’s Combined Fleet.
Japanese and American policies in Asia were in conflict, and war was a possible
result; the U.S. Navy planned to win by destroying Japan’s navy, imposing a
blockade, and forcing Japan’s surrender. Details of the strategic dilemma were
the focus of interwar plans, large fleet maneuvers, and complex war games at the
Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island. By the time war arrived in 1941,
the concept of an advance across the Pacific had become the subject of extensive
and detailed strategic planning.1
However, the fleet that advanced through the Pacific in World War II was not
the fleet of prewar plans. The prewar Navy had centered on a battle fleet, a
battleship-centric formation that, concentrated together with a large fleet train,
would move as a unit, seizing objectives along its path.2 By early 1943, a new and
more effective fleet organization had become available. Fast carrier task forces
had demonstrated their ability to form powerful strik-
ing forces, maneuver independently of slower assault
shipping, and force a decision on their own.3 The fleet
that took the war to Japanese shores was built around
carrier task forces.
It is generally assumed that the change from a
battleship-centric formation to carrier task forces
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invalidated the strategic and tactical planning carried out before the war, but
this view is incorrect. The continuity in the Navy’s strategic planning has already
been illustrated by Edward Miller’s War Plan Orange; a similar continuity can be
found in tactical plans and doctrine.4 Although the relatively high speed and
flexibility of carrier task forces gave them operational maneuverability signifi-
cantly greater than that of the battleship formations that preceded them, the ba-
sic tactical principles that the Navy employed in its battle doctrines remained
unchanged.
The changes were confined to the method of applying and distributing these
principles. Two important factors combined to temper the prewar concepts and
produce a new approach. The first was the flexibility afforded by carrier task
forces and the way they could concentrate against multiple targets simulta-
neously or against a single target without becoming a single target themselves.
The second factor was wartime experience. By late 1942, the Navy’s prewar ap-
proach to the development and dissemination of tactical doctrine had shown se-
rious flaws. Ships and men were going into battle without the proper
indoctrination, limiting their effectiveness.5 A new approach was needed; the
Navy’s Pacific Fleet was the first to synthesize all three elements: the necessity of
a new approach to tactical doctrine, the challenge introduced by fast carrier task
forces, and existing prewar doctrinal concepts. These were married together by
new tactical manuals, new fleet organizations, and refined battle plans. Together,
these elements enabled success in the rapid string of offensives that moved
through the Central Pacific, returned American forces to the Philippines, and
crushed Japan as a naval power.
OFFENSIVE IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC
In early 1943, the Pacific War was entering a new phase. The Pacific Fleet, under
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, had defeated the Japanese in the attritional struggle
for Guadalcanal and forced them onto the strategic defensive. It was essential
that Nimitz’s forces seize the opportunity afforded by their success and begin a
strategic offensive, if they were to maintain the initiative.6
The Central Pacific would be the objective of the new offensive. Before the war,
both sides had recognized the strategic importance of the Marshall, Caroline, and
Mariana island groups, collectively known as the Mandates.7 The islands occupied
a central position and provided numerous bases. The Navy could use these to sup-
port further offensives in the direction of the Philippines, Formosa, or Japan itself.
It was estimated that the seizure of the Mandates would “make available . . . ap-
proximately 20 airfields, 15 seaplane bases, 8 submarine bases, and 10 fleet an-
chorages.”8 Accordingly, in June 1943 Nimitz was directed by the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff (JCS) to develop a plan to penetrate the Japanese perimeter; the initial tar-
get would be the Marshall Islands.9
The campaign plan Nimitz and his staff developed stressed two specific oper-
ational goals—a rapid pace of operations that would pressure the Japanese and
keep the initiative firmly within the Pacific Fleet’s grasp, and a decisive show-
down with the Japanese fleet. GRANITE, as the plan was code-named, stressed
both of these objectives, emphasizing the need to maintain “unremitting pres-
sure against Japan” and seeking the destruction of “the Japanese Fleet at an early
date.”10
The fast pace of operations presented several challenges. It would be neces-
sary to keep the striking arm of the fleet in forward areas almost continuously;
this required a new approach to logistics.11 Increased tempo also required a new
approach to the development and dissemination of tactical doctrine. The pre-
war concept of a fleet that would move through the Pacific as a cohesive unit had
to be discarded.12 To sustain the rapid pace of operations, individual ships and
small task units would have to be interchangeable. They would have to move out
of forward areas without disrupting the pace of the offensive; they would have to
move into the combat zone and be effective immediately; and they could not be
expected to spend adequate time training with their cohorts. Further exacerbat-
ing these issues was the need for ships of the Pacific Fleet to support two major
offensives in two theaters simultaneously.13 A new tactical manual, Current Tac-
tical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Pacific Fleet, known as PAC 10, would help resolve
these issues.
Victory in a major fleet action is commonly assumed to have been a tactical
objective of the Pacific Fleet, but the GRANITE plan illustrates that it was a strate-
gic goal.14 “All operations will be conducted as to maintain maximum readiness
to take advantage of opportunities to bring important enemy naval forces to ac-
tion.”15 The Japanese fleet was a credible fighting force, and so long as it could
sortie and threaten the success of an amphibious operation, it would limit the
Pacific Fleet’s freedom of maneuver. Operational and tactical plans had to ac-
count for this contingency. Thus GRANITE assumed that “a major fleet action, al-
though it may delay amphibious operations for a brief period, will greatly
accelerate them thereafter.”16
The movement into the Mandates was expected to draw out the Japanese fleet
and enable its destruction. Every subsidiary operation plan to GRANITE—in-
cluding GALVANIC for the invasion of the Gilberts, FLINTLOCK and CATCHPOLE
for the Marshalls, HAILSTONE for Truk, LONGHOP for Manus, and FORAGER for
the Marianas—therefore had to account for the possible opportunity of decisive
action. Tactical and operational plans were developed to meet this contingency.
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PREWAR EXPERIENCE AND DOCTRINE
The Navy’s existing tactical doctrine provided a backdrop for offensive prepara-
tions. Sophisticated and nuanced after refinement in the interwar period, this
doctrine emphasized major fleet action and relied on several fundamental prin-
ciples, including tactical concentration and coordinated action against the
enemy.17
The doctrine’s set of “major tactics,” those for a large fleet in battle, were thor-
ough and flexible; they covered a variety of contingencies apart from the main
fleet action. Cruisers and destroyers were drilled in “night search and attack”
procedures, designed to locate and damage an enemy battle fleet the night before
a battle.18 Battle-line aircraft carriers operated with the battle fleet, providing air
cover for the battleships and fleet train.19 Independent carrier task forces per-
formed reconnaissance and targeted their opposite numbers to establish aerial
superiority. Submarines scouted ahead and attacked enemy surface vessels.20
But the main emphasis of major tactics was the complex ballet of a battle-line
action. Battle plans emphasized the cooperation of all fleet units to destroy the
main objective—the enemy battle line. The publication of Tentative Fleet Dispo-
sitions and Battle Plans, 1930 introduced a new level of complexity and coordi-
nation.21 For the first time, the Navy had standard plans to govern the entire fleet
in action. The new plans were further refined by General Tactical Instructions,
United States Navy (FTP 142) in 1934 and by General Tactical Instructions,
United States Navy (FTP 188) in 1940.
Battle plans were designated by a system of coded numbers and letters. The
first number would determine the overall type of action to be fought. A normal
action on similar courses—that is, with the Navy’s battle line steaming in the
7 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
FIGURE 1
TYPICAL BATTLE FORMATION
Source: Operation Plan 12-44, p. J-I-7.
Note: DD = destroyer, DesRon = destoyer squadron; Deg = degrees relative to enemy bearing.
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same direction as that of the enemy—was indicated by 1. The numeral 2 indi-
cated a reverse action, with the Navy’s battle line moving in the opposite direc-
tion and chasing the enemy’s tail. Reverse actions were believed to offer
significant advantages, because the Japanese were expected to put fast and pow-
erful forces in the van of their line; if the battle moved away from them, their ef-
fectiveness would be reduced.22 Other numbers were used for more complex
situations.23 After the number followed a letter that prescribed a specific range
band: E indicated a fight at extreme range, twenty-seven thousand yards and
above; L signified long range, twenty-one to twenty-seven thousand yards; M
was for medium range, seventeen to twenty-one thousand yards; and C meant
close range, seventeen thousand yards and below. Other letters provided details
on the use of supporting forces.24 Common plans, such as “1L,” a normal action
at long range, and “2M,” a reverse action at medium range, were described in
detail.25
All these scripted plans assumed the same basic battle formation, a focused
concentration of offensive power. Battleships were positioned in the center, with
their broadsides facing the enemy (see figure 1); light forces—groups of cruisers
and destroyers—were positioned on either flank. A group of destroyers was gen-
erally retained with the battle line to provide close protection against enemy de-
stroyers and submarines. Carriers and ships of the fleet train would position
themselves on the far side of the battle line from the enemy.26 The intent was to
allow all elements of the fleet to cooperate, to fight as a unit toward the common
goal of destroying the enemy battle line.
Concentration of the battle fleet was particularly vital to success in a gunnery
action, and the battle formation reflected this. Although the range and accuracy
of battleship guns increased during the interwar period, battleships had to
group together to maximize their fighting power.27 Experiments during tactical
exercises were conducted with distributed formations, but results had repeat-
edly shown that dispersion invited defeat in detail. Accordingly, concentration
had become a doctrinal tenet.28 A concentrated formation maximized the offen-
sive power of not only the battle line but also the other fighting units that made
up the battle fleet.
The lessons of the interwar period had also led to an emphasis on combined
arms—coordinated attacks on the enemy formation by all elements of the fleet,
including battleships, destroyers, and airplanes.29 For a time submarines and
minelayers were even considered important elements of a major fleet action.30
All available weapons were to be used in concert. Admiral Harris Laning, writing
in his 1933 pamphlet on fleet action, emphasized this point: “With so many
weapons carried on such different types of ships it is apparent that if we are to
get the maximum effect of all weapons and make our blow the sum total of the
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blows of all, there must be perfect coordination between the types carrying
them.”31
The effectiveness of each individual attack, then, was expected to be increased
by coordination with other types. This was particularly true of attacks by air-
planes and destroyers; under normal circumstances enemy battleships were be-
lieved capable of thwarting them through a combination of defensive fire and
maneuver, but when combined with battleship gunfire, aircraft and destroyers
were considered to be far more effective.32 Coordinated attacks using planes, de-
stroyers, and the guns of battleships were a recurring feature of the Navy’s Fleet
Problems and tactical exercises. The idea of using aircraft and surface ships in
concert to destroy an enemy fleet became an essential feature of the Navy’s plans
for decisive battle.33
Submarines were another important element of the Navy’s plans in the inter-
war period. They had long been considered for use in major actions, but the spe-
cifics of how they were to be employed had not been resolved. Early plans had
envisioned using them as a tactical scouting force for the fleet, sailing ahead to
report on and attack approaching enemy ships.34 This proved difficult to imple-
ment; submarines were too slow. In general, their usefulness in fleet operations
proved limited. Wartime commanders would adopt a new solution.
WARTIME LESSONS
Opportunities for the employment of “major tactics” were lacking in the two
years following Pearl Harbor. The combat that did occur—furious battles of
light forces and long-range carrier duels—revealed flaws in the Navy’s prewar
approach to the development and dissemination of tactical doctrine.
Minor Tactics
In contrast to preparations for decisive battle, “minor tactics”—those that
would govern the employment of smaller forces—were neglected before the war.
Very limited doctrinal guidance was provided for minor actions at the fleet level.
Instead, individual squadron and task force commanders were expected to de-
velop combat doctrines and battle plans themselves for the employment of their
forces.35
This mechanism worked well under prewar conditions, when formations
were cohesive and had time to drill under individual commanders. Where these
circumstances held in wartime, the Navy’s light forces were effective in battle.
The performances of Commander Paul H. Talbot’s Destroyer Division 59 at
Balikpapan and Rear Admiral Norman Scott’s Task Force (TF) 64 at Cape
Esperance are worthy examples. In both these cases, the forces involved were fa-
miliar with their commanders’ doctrines and were able to practice together
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before going into action.36 In the latter half of 1942, however, combat losses, the
pace of operations in the Pacific, and the demands of a two-ocean war made this
increasingly difficult. The climactic battles for Guadalcanal in November 1942
saw ships thrown together in haste; commanders had no time to develop com-
mon doctrine or plans, and the resulting losses were severe.37 It became obvious
that the development of “minor tactics”could not be left to commanders at sea.
The Pacific Fleet’s initial approach to addressing this problem was inade-
quate. “Tactical bulletins” and “confidential letters” on specific topics were pro-
duced and distributed to fleet units. These documents modified, enhanced, or
introduced procedures that reflected lessons of combat and experience with new
tactics and techniques. They covered a variety of topics—major action plans,
night battle tactics, the use of radar, and the introduction of the Combat Infor-
mation Center. Their proliferation, however, led to redundancy and inconsis-
tency.38 By 1943, war experience had shown that a comprehensive revision of
tactical manuals was necessary.
Carrier War
The Navy’s carrier battle doctrine was effective enough to allow operational, if
not tactical, success in all the major carrier battles of 1942. However, lessons
from combat illustrated that improvement was necessary, particularly in the co-
ordination of multiple carriers within a single formation.39 The Navy had lim-
ited experience with task forces containing multiple carriers. For much of the
interwar period, the Navy had had only two large carriers for experiments and
exercises, Lexington and Saratoga. During Fleet Problems, they were regularly
placed on opposite sides; when teamed together, they operated in independent
task groups or were tied to the battle line.40
Technological factors also contributed to the Navy’s lack of experience in this
respect. Before the advent of radar and effective fighter-direction techniques,
carriers were best protected by keeping them hidden. A carrier that had been lo-
cated could be struck and rendered inoperable by an enemy attack. Dispersing
carriers into separate strike forces, away from the main body and each other, was
a logical defensive measure.41 The war and the advance of technology changed
the situation. Improved radars to detect incoming strikes and more effective
techniques for vectoring fighters to intercept them allowed groups of carriers to
pool resources and offer mutual support. The Navy’s carrier task force doctrine
was revised on the basis of these developments and of lessons from the 1942 bat-
tles. Single-carrier formations were abandoned; task forces were formed around
multiple carriers operating together.42
Even more fundamental changes would occur. Fast carrier task forces became
the basis of the offensive power of the Pacific Fleet. The shift to carrier task
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forces and away from a battle fleet offered opportunities. For instance, because
each of the carrier task forces could operate independently, it was possible to dis-
perse them and strike multiple targets simultaneously. This would help achieve
one of the major operational goals of the offensive, a rapid tempo. However, this
was not without risk; carriers were still considered vulnerable to surface action,
and they needed support during their thrusts into the enemy’s defensive perim-
eter.43 The new, fast battleships were ideally suited to provide this support, and
they would be made part of the carrier task forces.
The dispersal of battleship strength, however, ran counter to the principle of
concentration the Navy had emphasized for decades. It introduced the risk that a
lone carrier task force might be isolated and destroyed; it also made it essential
that the carrier task forces concentrate prior to major fleet action in order to
bring the battleships together. Thus, although dispersal enabled the rapid pace
of operations, it hindered the second goal, the need to bring the Japanese fleet to
decisive action. An approach that balanced the two factors was necessary.
THE NEW APPROACH
A combination of approaches was used to satisfy the operational goals of the
Central Pacific offensive. New fleetwide tactical manuals were developed that
covered “minor tactics” and the operations of small task forces; the common
doctrines they established allowed for the interchangeability of ships and task
units demanded by the rapid operational tempo. Operation plans called for the
seizure of multiple objectives but also acknowledged the need to concentrate for
decisive action. Tactical plans emphasizing concerted action against the enemy
prepared the Navy for the expected battles. Together, these methods ensured the
success of the offensive in the Central Pacific.
In April 1943, Nimitz created a board to revise the Pacific Fleet Cruising In-
structions. The officers of the board were ordered to review current doctrinal
publications, examine combat reports, interview officers returning from com-
bat zones, and produce a new set of cruising instructions.44 They would in fact
exceed this authority. By drawing on operational goals of the coming campaign,
existing principles of the Navy’s doctrine, and doctrinal flaws exposed by war-
time experience, the board produced a new doctrinal manual for the Pacific
Fleet, and the most important one issued by the wartime Navy.
Although carrier airpower would dominate the coming offensive, Nimitz
chose three surface officers for the board and only one aviator. The senior mem-
ber, Rear Admiral Robert M. Griffin, was an experienced surface warfare officer
(as they are known today). He left the board before it completed its work, going
on to command Battleship Division 3.45 Captain Roscoe F. Good became senior
member with Griffin’s departure; later in the war he would command the
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battleship Washington.46 Captain E. M. Crouch replaced Griffin.47 As com-
mander of Destroyer Division 57, Crouch had survived the initial Japanese of-
fensives in the South Pacific.48 The aviator was Captain Apollo Soucek, who had
served with distinction on the carrier Hornet and at the time of its loss had been
its executive officer.49 It was their labors that would produce Current Tactical Or-
ders and Doctrine, U.S. Pacific Fleet, PAC 10.
PAC 10, issued in June 1943, provided what the Navy had been missing—a
common set of tactical principles for the cooperation of small forces and de-
tached units in battle. It corrected the underemphasis on “minor tactics,” grant-
ing them the same detailed treatment that major actions had received for over a
decade.50 The coded system of letters and numbers used for major actions was
recycled and applied to small task forces. Compact battle formations developed
specifically for combat by such forces were presented.51 Existing battle forma-
tions for light forces in night combat were retained.52
Instead of having to create and distribute their own tactical doctrines, small
task group commanders could now develop battle plans rapidly, having a com-
mon doctrine to which they could refer. This streamlined the process, relieved
small-unit commanders of an unnecessary burden, and ensured a common
approach.53
Now, new ships could familiarize themselves with PAC 10 as they prepared to
join the fleet and, because the manual applied to all task forces in all Pacific com-
bat zones, it became possible to move ships from group to group or theater to
theater without reequipping them with lengthy instructions by their new com-
manders. This was an extremely important development, and it was stressed in
the manual’s introduction.
PAC-10 is intended . . . to obviate necessity for . . . special instructions under ordi-
nary circumstances and to minimize them in extraordinary circumstances. The ulti-
mate aim is to obtain essential uniformity without unacceptable sacrifice of
flexibility. It must be possible for forces composed of diverse types, and indoctrinated
under different task force commanders, to join at sea on short notice for concerted
action against the enemy without exchanging a mass of special instructions.54
Successors to PAC 10 built upon the foundation that the original provided. In
February 1944, the U.S. Fleet followed the lead of its Pacific arm and issued Cur-
rent Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet, known as USF 10A.55 USF 10A built
directly upon PAC 10: its format, structure, and the majority of its contents were
unchanged from the Pacific Fleet’s publication.56 Although its title implied that it
was an amendment of the prewar USF 10, Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine,
United States Fleet, the new manual shared very little with its predecessor and
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provided far more tactical detail.57 A revision, USF 10B, followed in May 1945,
introducing additional wartime lessons.58
THE OFFENSIVE BEGINS
With PAC 10 the fleet solved two significant problems. First, as noted, the cre-
ation of a single, common doctrine allowed ships to be interchanged between
task groups, and this in turn enabled the rapid operational tempo Nimitz de-
sired. Second, shifting the development of small-unit tactical doctrine to the
fleet level and out of the hands of individual commanders increased the effec-
tiveness of all units, particularly the fast-moving carrier task forces. Tactical and
operational plans for the coming offensive were built on this foundation.
GALVANIC
Although the JCS directive ordered the seizure of positions in the Marshalls,
Nimitz considered a thrust directly into the island group too dangerous. Too lit-
tle was known about Japanese positions; experience had demonstrated the im-
portance of reconnaissance before amphibious landings, and the Marshalls were
too far away for land-based planes to photograph the targets.59 An intermediate
objective was needed. Nimitz and his planners chose the Gilbert island group,
formerly a British possession, recently seized by the Japanese. The code name for
the operation was GALVANIC.
Nimitz’s Central Pacific Force, augmented by ever-growing numbers of new
ships and aircraft, was by November 1943 ready to begin major offensive opera-
tions. Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance had assumed command on 5
August.60 The relative inexperience of the growing fleet had made a comprehen-
sive doctrine for tactical operations imperative. Most of the ships of the force
were new, the majority of their officers were reservists, and many of the men had
never been to sea before.61 These ships could not operate as a cohesive unit with-
out a doctrine to guide them, particularly if the Japanese sought a fleet action.
The possibility of fleet action heavily influenced plans for GALVANIC. The Cen-
tral Pacific Force would seize three atolls: Tarawa, Makin, and Abemama. Posses-
sion of these would guarantee American dominance of the Gilbert Islands and
provide airfields from which to reconnoiter and attack the Marshalls. Although
long-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft could reach the Gilberts, the ex-
treme range forced Spruance to provide direct air support for the invasion forces
with his fast carrier task forces.62 This severely limited the carriers’ freedom of
maneuver. In prewar exercises, combat forces caught while supporting amphibi-
ous assaults had been damaged by attritional raids and then defeated by major
attacks.63 At Savo Island, the Japanese had reinforced these lessons by decimat-
ing an Allied covering force.64 Japanese responses in the Central Pacific were ex-
pected to be even more powerful.65 Minor raids could be handled by the invasion
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forces, using PAC 10 as a guide, but a major Japanese response would be a serious
threat.66
Spruance’s GALVANIC plan accounted for this possibility. The main objectives
would be seized simultaneously, Tarawa by the Southern Attack Force and
Makin by the Northern. The atolls were expected to be occupied before the Japa-
nese could mount a major response.67 Simultaneous attacks divided his forces,
but the best defense against the threat of attack in the middle of an amphibious
operation was to overwhelm the objectives quickly, granting the fleet freedom to
maneuver; this also satisfied the desire for a rapid operational tempo.
The potential for a major action was very real. Powerful Japanese forces based
at Truk in the Caroline Islands could quickly move into the Marshalls and chal-
lenge the invasion. Estimates suggested that the Japanese could oppose the at-
tack with ten battleships, seven aircraft carriers, and supporting forces.68
“Current Intelligence indicates the presence of the major portion of the Japa-
nese Fleet in the Truk area at the present time. Whether this fleet can or will be
used to interfere with GALVANIC we do not know. . . . [W]e must be prepared at
all times during GALVANIC for a fleet engagement.”69
Over a hundred miles separated Tarawa and Makin; the forces covering the
assaults were too far apart to provide mutual support, unless Spruance had
timely warning of a Japanese approach. He was extremely apprehensive that a
powerful attack would fall on a portion of his force and defeat it in detail. Of the
two island objectives, Makin was closer to the Marshalls and much more vulner-
able to a Japanese response. Spruance expected air searches to give him adequate
warning and allow concentration of the Central Pacific Force. If weather pat-
terns were unfavorable, however, storm systems could prevent aerial searches in
the direction of the Mandates; Spruance considered delaying the attack on
Makin if such circumstances developed.70
Even if they did not, however, the forces around Makin had to be ready to de-
fend themselves. Spruance placed significantly more firepower in his northern
groups. The old battleships in the Northern Attack Force, Idaho, Mississippi, and
New Mexico, had been extensively modified before the war and were the most
powerful of the old battleships available.71 In addition, all six fast battleships
supporting the operation were near Makin, evenly divided between the carrier
task group providing direct support to the attack and the “interceptor” carrier
group.72 The latter, under the direct command of Rear Admiral Charles A.
Pownall, Spruance’s carrier force commander, was positioned to intercept Japa-
nese aerial attacks and provide early warning of enemy forces approaching from
the Marshalls.73 Spruance urged these carrier groups to remain concentrated:
“Carrier Task Groups which are screened by fast battleships and are supporting
the attack on Makin and covering our northern flank will . . . be operated in as
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close tactical support as possible of each other and the combatant units of the
Northern Attack Force.”74
If the Japanese sought battle, the nine battleships in the north could separate
from their task groups and unite to form a powerful battle line under Rear Ad-
miral Willis A. Lee.75 But this was not Spruance’s desired approach. He wanted a
margin of superiority over his foe, and his battle plan called for the entire Cen-
tral Pacific Force to come together to counter any major Japanese move.76 Three
old battleships and additional ships supporting the landing at Tarawa would
join the forces around Makin, giving Spruance a battle fleet of twelve battleships,
nine heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and twenty-eight destroyers.77 It is im-
portant to emphasize that this battle fleet drew not only from the fast carrier
groups but also from the invasion forces. As it would form on the spot, common
doctrine would be essential.
Spruance’s GALVANIC plan emphasized the importance of destroying the Jap-
anese fleet, and it echoed the goal of the GRANITE campaign.
If . . . a major portion of the Japanese Fleet were to attempt to interfere with GAL-
VANIC, it is obvious that the defeat of the enemy fleet would at once become para-
mount. Without having inflicted such a defeat on the enemy, we would be unable to
proceed with the capture and development of Makin, Tarawa, and Apamama [sic].
The destruction of a considerable portion of Japanese naval strength would . . . go far
toward winning the war.78
In fact, the Japanese too anticipated a major fleet action. Prior to GALVANIC,
when Central Pacific carrier task forces had raided Tarawa, Makin, and Wake Is-
land, Admiral Mineichi Koga, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, cor-
rectly anticipated that these actions signaled the start of an offensive. Twice—in
September and again in October—he moved the bulk of his forces from his main
base at Truk to Eniwetok in the Marshalls, ready to counter Spruance. Each time,
when the expected offensive did not occur, Koga returned to Truk.79 By the time
of the landings on 20 November, Koga was no longer prepared. In late October,
faced with a threat to his southern flank by Allied advances toward Bougainville,
Koga reinforced the bastion of Rabaul.80 He sent his carrier squadrons there,
along with most of his cruiser forces.81 Nimitz’s rapid operational tempo was de-
livering results. Frequent raids had kept the Japanese guessing about where the
first blow would fall, and, pressured on two fronts, they chose to reinforce their
southern flank. When Spruance moved into the Gilberts, stripped of its air
squadrons and cruiser scouts, there was little the Combined Fleet could do. The
looked-for decisive action did not materialize.
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FLINTLOCK
With the success of GALVANIC, attention quickly shifted to the Marshalls. The
important question was how best to continue the rapid pace of the offensive and
quickly neutralize Japanese positions in the island group. The essential initial
objective was an airfield that could support bombers; there were bomber air-
fields on Wotje and Maloelap in the eastern portion of the Marshalls. A phased
approach, breaking the capture of the Marshalls into eastern and western opera-
tions, was considered and endorsed by the JCS.82 Nimitz and his planners re-
jected this idea; they did not want the offensive to degenerate into an attritional
struggle like the fighting in the Solomons.
As plans for the Marshalls were refined, concurrent raids struck Japanese po-
sitions; PAC 10 facilitated these minor operations.83 Lee’s fast battleships were
detached from the carrier task forces and moved to the South Pacific; along the
way, they bombarded the Japanese base on Nauru, west of the Gilberts. Pownall
led two of his carrier groups into the heart of the Marshalls, attacking the
Kwajalein and Wotje atolls. Raids like these sustained the operational tempo.
Pownall’s strikes destroyed planes, sank ships, and damaged installations, but
their most valuable achievement was a photograph of a large airstrip the Japa-
nese were constructing on Kwajalein Island. This proved what none had ex-
pected, that a bomber airfield could be built on Kwajalein.84
Plans to capture the Marshalls in one operation were quickly finalized.
Kwajalein, the centerpiece of the Japanese defensive position, would be seized;
the eastern Marshalls would be isolated and left to wither on the vine.
FLINTLOCK, as the operation was code-named, required three attack forces. The
first two would strike Kwajalein; the northern element would assault the twin is-
lands of Roi-Namur, while the southern would capture Kwajalein Island, on the
southern end of the atoll. The third force would occupy undefended Majuro
Atoll, which would become a local anchorage for assault forces, and be an opera-
tional reserve. The reserves would be held ready to assist in the capture of
Kwajalein; if not needed there, they would take part in Operation CATCHPOLE,
the assault on Eniwetok.85
The fast carrier task forces, now designated TF 58, had a new commander for
FLINTLOCK, Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher. As in GALVANIC, they had to oper-
ate in direct support of the assault forces, but the previous approach of teaming a
carrier task force to an assault objective was discarded. Pinning carriers to physi-
cal objectives restricted their mobility, and the decision had been criticized.86
Mitscher would operate his carriers offensively in the Marshalls, rotating be-
tween supporting landings and neutralizing Japanese air bases.87 Two of these
carrier groups were kept near the main objectives at Kwajalein Atoll, close
enough to concentrate quickly for mutual support. On 29 January 1944, Task
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Groups (TGs) 58.2 and 58.3 attacked Kwajalein. The next day, TG 58.1 replaced
TG 58.3, and the latter moved to Eniwetok, farther to the west and closer to Truk.
These relative positions were held until TG 58.3 retired to fuel on 3 February.88
The use of TG 58.3 as the advanced guard was deliberate. That group con-
tained the two newest battleships, Iowa and New Jersey. The fastest and most
powerful in the fleet, these two battleships constituted Battleship Division 7.
Their high speed, over 32.5 knots, allowed them to keep pace with the fast carri-
ers.89 With Battleship Division 7, TG 58.3 could outfight any enemy surface force
it could not outrun. If a major Japanese counterattack ensued, the task group
would fall back on Kwajalein. The remaining six fast battleships were divided
evenly between TGs 58.1 and 58.2.
Major action was once again anticipated. This was the first advance into the
Mandates, which were known to be an important element of Japanese defensive
strategy. In prewar plans, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel had expected to entice
the Japanese to battle in the Central Pacific by threatening their position in the
Marshalls.90 Now Nimitz expected to do the same with the much larger and
more powerful Central Pacific Force.
Spruance’s battle plan for FLINTLOCK again called for the concentration of all
fifteen available battleships, new and old, into a single battle line.91 Supporting
units would be drawn from both the invasion fleet and the carrier groups. To
guide the fleet in battle, Spruance planned to employ major action plans from
FTP 188.92 These provided a mutually understood frame of reference and re-
quired the minimum of signaling—though if necessary, Spruance would de-
velop his own battle plans and distribute them by signal.93 Admiral Lee would
command the battle line, as before.94
CATCHPOLE and HAILSTONE
The anticipated Japanese response to FLINTLOCK did not occur. Majuro,
Roi-Namur, and Kwajalein were all seized without interference from Japanese
surface units. The reserve force moved to Eniwetok, initiating Operation
CATCHPOLE. Admiral Spruance set his sights on the Combined Fleet. Aerial re-
connaissance of Truk showed that major elements of the Japanese fleet were in
the Carolines. A powerful attack, HAILSTONE, was planned to cover the land-
ings at Eniwetok by neutralizing Truk and destroying any forces encoun-
tered.95 If the Japanese fleet did not come out to fight, Spruance would take the
fight to it.
Unlike previous major operations involving the fast carriers, HAILSTONE
did not have an amphibious component; CATCHPOLE was a separate operation.
HAILSTONE, however, was not just a raid but a deliberate attempt to destroy a
large portion of the Combined Fleet. All the fast battleships were concentrated
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into a single carrier group, TG 58.3, ready to deploy quickly and engage the en-
emy in the anticipated fleet action. The old battleships were left behind.96
By the time of the initial air strikes on 17 February 1944, the Japanese had
withdrawn their heavy units from Truk, but a large amount of shipping was dis-
covered and attacked in the lagoon. When a group of Japanese light forces at-
tempted to escape through the northern passage, Spruance detached a
high-speed surface striking force, TG 50.9, to intercept. Battleship Division 7
formed its core; two heavy cruisers and four destroyers were attached in
support.97 This was the first employment of the new battleship division in a role
that would often be assigned to it—pursuit and destruction of enemy ships.98
The high speed of the battleships made them especially well suited for it, and on
this occasion they were able to destroy four Japanese ships; a lone destroyer
escaped.
The creation and detachment of ad hoc units like this, with no opportunity to
train together, had produced unfortunate results fifteen months before off
Guadalcanal.99 PAC 10 and the recently issued USF 10A had made an important
difference, enabling tactical commanders to seize opportunities presented by
the rapid operational tempo.
The ships of TG 50.9 were not the only ones waiting to strike Japanese crip-
ples. Ten submarines had been sent to prowl the waters around Truk in concert
with the operation.100 On 16 February Skate sighted and torpedoed the cruiser
Agano, sinking it. The submarine’s place in the decisive battle had been found. In
future operations commanders ashore would strategically position submarines
to provide distant reconnaissance and to attack targets of opportunity.
Additional carrier raids followed. After the successful strike on Truk and the
enemy withdrawal from the Carolines, Spruance was free to range deeper into
the Japanese defensive system. On 23 February 1944, TF 58 struck Japanese air
bases in the Marianas, attacking the islands of Guam, Saipan, Tinian, and Rota.
On the last day of March and first of April, the fast carriers hit Palau and Yap. The
rapid pace of operations emphasized in the GRANITE plan was being sustained,
and it was keeping the pressure on the Japanese.
DESECRATE II
The invasion of Hollandia on the northern coast of New Guinea was a southwest
Pacific operation, not a Central Pacific one, but the JCS had decreed that the fast
carriers would support it.101 Seizure of the Japanese base complex between
Tanahmerah and Humboldt bays would provide General Douglas MacArthur’s
Southwest Pacific Force with an ideal position from which to further its advance
along the northern coast of the island.102 Admiral Nimitz remained, however, fo-
cused on the destruction of the Japanese Combined Fleet, the primary aim of
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GRANITE. On 23 March, during a visit to Brisbane, he emphasized the Navy’s pri-
orities to the general and made it clear that if the Japanese came out to fight,
their fleet would become the primary objective of the fast carrier force.103
The participation of TF 58 in the operation was code-named DESECRATE II.
Mitscher was in command. (Spruance and the Central Pacific Force’s amphibi-
ous elements remained behind, preparing for the invasion of the Marianas.) As
in FLINTLOCK, the fast carriers were to provide direct support to the assault
forces and suppress nearby Japanese airfields. Mitscher used three carrier task
groups: TG 58.1, which had no battleships, would range to the west and attack
Japanese airfields at Wakde, Sawar, and Sarmi;104 TG 58.2, with the two fast bat-
tleships of Battleship Division 7, was to support the landings in Humboldt Bay;
and TG 58.3, with four other fast battleships, would cover the landings in
Tanahmerah Bay.
This arrangement positioned the bulk of Mitscher’s surface striking power in
the center, facilitating concentration if the Japanese appeared in force. Should a
powerful battle fleet be required for a major action, six battleships, ten heavy
cruisers, three light cruisers, and twenty-two destroyers were to concentrate un-
der Admiral Lee; a carrier group, TG 58.1, would operate in direct support, un-
der Lee’s command.105 In battle, Lee expected to leverage plans and dispositions
from FTP 188 and USF 10A.106 The remaining two carrier groups, stripped of the
bulk of their escorts, would remain under Mitscher’s command and operate in
distant support.107
Two additional plans were developed, for minor action, should the Japanese
challenge with small forces. One teamed Lee’s six battleships with two destroyer
squadrons.108 The other was a pursuit force built around Battleship Division 7,
very similar to TG 50.9, which Spruance had sent around Truk; this time, the two
fast battleships would be matched with two heavy cruisers and seven destroyers.
Their preferred battle plan was “1E2,” from USF 10A—an engagement on paral-
lel courses at extreme range, with light forces on both flanks operating
defensively.109
DECISIVE BATTLE
By June 1944, Japanese bases in the Marshalls and Carolines had been seized or
neutralized, the major base at Rabaul had been rendered untenable, and the Al-
lies were rapidly advancing along the northern coast of New Guinea. It seemed
as if the Japanese were content to let their defensive perimeter crumble without
risking major fleet units, but this was about to change.
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FORAGER
The third major offensive of Spruance’s force, officially designated the Fifth
Fleet on 29 April 1944, was the seizure of the Marianas. Operation FORAGER
comprised the capture of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. Saipan would be attacked
first, on 15 June; landings on Guam were initially scheduled for three days later.
The assault on Tinian would follow, but the specific date remained flexible.110
Because the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines had not produced a fleet ac-
tion, the “prevailing opinion . . . was that the Japanese navy would not fight for
the Marianas.”111
But Spruance had to be prepared for that contingency, and his battle plan for
the Marianas changed little from those developed for earlier operations.112 As
before, he expected to concentrate all his battleships into one formation; seven
old ones supporting the amphibious assaults were to combine with seven fast
battleships from the carrier groups to give a total of fourteen. Supporting ships
would be drawn from the carrier task groups and assault forces. Concentration
and employment of his entire force remained fundamental elements of
Spruance’s plan.113 Concentration was also still a guiding principle of the em-
ployment of the fast battleships specifically: “In acting as a covering force have
[carrier] task groups which are screened by fast battleships operate in as close
tactical support of each other as the nature of their tasks and enemy action will
permit.”114
The increasing number of escort carriers in the invasion forces allowed the
primary focus of the fast carriers to become the suppression of enemy air bases,
rather than direct air support for the invasion. The plan called for the carriers to
start their attacks three days before the landings, but this date was advanced a
day, because of the “large estimated strength of enemy aircraft in the
Marianas.”115 On June 11, planes from Mitscher’s TF 58 struck Japanese posi-
tions on Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan. These attacks continued for the
next two days.
The carriers operated in four task groups: TG 58.1 attacked Guam, and the
other three hit Saipan and Tinian. The fast battleships were kept concentrated;
TG 58.2 contained the two high-speed battleships of Battleship Division 7, TG
58.3 the other five fast battleships. Finally, TGs 58.1 and 58.4 were supported by
cruisers.116 The night before the landings, these two groups were sent north to at-
tack the islands of Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima. The two other groups, with their
battleships, remained to cover the landing beaches and assault forces.
In the meantime, the Japanese had resolved to contest the landings. On 12
June, having received word of the strikes in the Marianas, the new commander
in chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Soemu Toyoda, issued orders to execute
Operation A-GO, his plan for a major fleet action. Three days later, he made his
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intention explicit: “The Combined Fleet will attack the enemy in the Marianas
area and annihilate the invasion force. Activate A-Go Operation for decisive bat-
tle.”117 A powerful fleet was assembled under the command of Vice Admiral
Jisaburo Ozawa, including nine carriers, five battleships, and eleven heavy cruis-
ers.118 This force approached the Marianas in two main groups. The carriers and
three battleships, with Ozawa embarked, left their base at Tawi Tawi in the
southern Philippines and sailed through the archipelago, transiting the San
Bernardino Strait. A second force, with the large battleships Yamato and
Musashi, came north from Batjan in the Moluccas and rendezvoused with
Ozawa in the Philippine Sea.
Spruance received word of these movements from submarines and realized
that a major action was possible if the Japanese continued their approach.119
During the night of 14–15 June, he ordered TGs 58.1 and 58.4 to cut short their
attacks on Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima and return for a rendezvous near Saipan on
18 June. On 16 June, he postponed the invasion of Guam and held a conference
with Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner, commander of the invasion force. The
two developed a plan of action to deal with the approaching threat.
Two aspects of the developing situation presented particular challenges for
Spruance. The battle for Saipan was still going on and limited his mobility; but
he had expected that the Japanese would strike before one or more of the islands
were secure all along.120 The fact that the Japanese were approaching in two dis-
tinct groups was a more significant problem. Spruance’s original plan had antic-
ipated that the Japanese might have two formations, a carrier group and an
advanced guard, but he had expected them to be within supporting distance.121
The sightings so far suggested instead two independent formations.
Therefore, rather than concentrating the entire Fifth Fleet as per the plan,
Spruance and Turner elected to strengthen TF 58 with five heavy cruisers, three
light cruisers, and twenty-one destroyers detached from the invasion forces. The
old battleships, three cruisers, and five destroyers were formed into a blocking
force and sent west of Saipan.122 This plan had two advantages: the blocking
force provided close cover for the Saipan beachhead, and TF 58 retained its mo-
bility by separating itself from the slower old battleships. On 17 June, in prepara-
tion for a surface action, Admiral Mitscher recommended detaching the
battleships entirely from the carrier task groups and placing them into a separate
formation.123 This would prevent the confusion that would inevitably result if
the battleships and their escorts had to form in the middle of an air battle.
Spruance concurred; the resulting TG 58.7 was placed under command of Ad-
miral Lee. It contained seven battleships, four heavy cruisers, and thirteen
destroyers.124
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Spruance then issued his battle plan. It called for air strikes to disable the en-
emy carriers and surface action by the battle line: “Our air will knock out enemy
carriers . . . then will attack enemy battleships and cruisers to slow or disable
them. Task Group 58.7 will destroy enemy fleet either by fleet action if enemy
elects to fight or by sinking slowed or crippled ships if enemy retreats.”125
Early on 18 June, when TGs 58.1 and 58.4 were to rejoin, a new submarine
contact suggested the Japanese were close enough for a surface action that night.
Mitscher asked Lee if he desired a night action.126 Lee declined emphatically:
“Do not[,] repeat[,] do not believe we should seek night engagement.”127 Lee’s
response reflected both his own experience and the limited training of his com-
mand.128 He had fought and won a night battle and knew how quickly such an
action could degenerate into a melee, particularly if the forces involved lacked
cohesion.129 Lee’s formation, formed on the spot from four different task groups,
could operate together in daylight, by virtue of the common doctrines of USF
10A, but it was not prepared for night action.130 Lee’s comments after his earlier
battle provide clues as to his state of mind at this point: “Our battleships are nei-
ther designed nor armed for close range night actions with enemy light forces. A
few minutes intense fire . . . from secondary battery guns can, and did, render
one of our new battleships deaf, dumb, blind and impotent through destruction
of radar, radio and fire control circuits.”131
Soon after Lee responded, Spruance decided against night action.132 He did
not want to get too far from the forces at Saipan and risk defeat in detail. It is
likely that he also wanted to ensure the concentration of all elements of TF 58;
TGs 58.1 and 58.4 had not yet rejoined. In his response, Spruance mentioned
concern at the prospect of a “diversionary attack” on the flank.133 Most interpre-
tations take this to mean that Spruance worried that a Japanese southern force
would slip beyond him to raid the invasion beaches, but there is another possi-
bility.134 Captured Japanese planning material, which Spruance had reviewed,
discussed “flanking,” but in another context—attacking an opposing carrier
force after its attack planes had been committed to another, less important, tar-
get.135 The Japanese believed they had been flanked in this sense at Midway, in
that their carriers had been struck by surprise from an unanticipated direction
while preoccupied with attacking Midway Island.136 They hoped to do the same
to the Americans in future battles, and since Spruance had come into possession
of a Japanese document discussing this approach, it is likely that he expected to
face such tactics.137 This explains his preference for remaining concentrated and
not striking in force until the Japanese had shown their hand.
Spruance’s emphasis on concentration continued to influence the developing
action. He did not accept Mitscher’s recommendation to detach TG 58.1 and op-
erate it to the northwest in order to cut off Ozawa’s escape route to the home
H O N E 8 5
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Winter 2009\NWCR Winter 09\NWCR W09.vp
Thursday, December 18, 2008 11:13:41 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
91
War College: Winter 2009 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
islands.138 When a direction-finding fix from Pearl Harbor on 18 June placed the
Japanese formation approximately 355 miles to the west, Mitscher recom-
mended closing at night to launch a morning strike and get the battleships into
position.139 Spruance again refused, citing the possibility of an “end run.”140
With that decision, the chance for a decisive action was lost.
The details of the ensuing battle are well known.141 The Japanese sent a series
of air strikes against TF 58, but none succeeded in causing major damage; their
losses in planes and pilots were tremendous. Unable to sustain the attacks,
Ozawa turned toward Japan and began to withdraw. Spruance pursued, and on
the evening of the next day a long-range strike succeeded in sinking the carrier
Hiyo, but Spruance again refused to detach task forces.142 Before the action, Vice
Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, commander of the Pacific Fleet’s submarines,
stationed four of his boats in a square surrounding the area in which he believed
Ozawa’s forces would operate. On 19 June, two of them found their targets. Alba-
core sighted and torpedoed Ozawa’s flagship, Taiho, just after it had completed
launching its first strike; eight hours later Taiho sank, destroyed by the fires that
ultimately resulted. In the interim, three torpedoes from Cavella sank carrier
Shokaku.143
The outcome in the battle of the Philippine Sea, however, was not decisive,
even when the successes of submarines are considered. The Japanese were
soundly defeated, but the majority of their fleet units, including most of their
carriers and all their battleships, withdrew to fight again. Nonetheless, the first
phase of the decisive naval battle of the Pacific War, the carrier duel, was over.
KING II
In the summer of 1944, in order to keep up the rapid pace of operations in the
Pacific, Admiral Nimitz developed a second command for the Central Pacific
Force, parallel to that of Spruance. The two flags and their respective staffs
would command the same ships, alternately directing an operation and plan-
ning their next, thereby allowing less time between offensives and increasing the
pressure on the Japanese. Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of the Third
Fleet, was selected to be Spruance’s counterpart. When under Halsey’s com-
mand, the ships of the Central Pacific would be the Third Fleet; when Spruance
led them, they would once again become the Fifth Fleet.144
Halsey took Mitscher and the fast carriers, now TF 38, on a series of raids in
September 1944. They struck the Palaus, Mindanao, and the Visayas, covering
the invasions of Morotai, the Palaus, and Ulithi. The lack of resistance encoun-
tered convinced Halsey that the existing timetable for landings in the Philip-
pines could be accelerated. Within a matter of days, the JCS had approved the
new schedule.145
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The invasion of Leyte, code-named KING II, differed from previous large am-
phibious operations. The unity of command that had existed in GALVANIC,
FLINTLOCK, and FORAGER was absent. The Central Pacific and southwestern Pa-
cific offensives met in the southern Philippines, and KING II used forces from
both theaters. Command was divided between the two, hindering effectiveness
and leading to confusion during the naval battles that resulted.146 Halsey’s Third
Fleet retained the fast carriers, but the Central Pacific Force’s amphibious units,
including the old battleships and escort carriers, were transferred to the Seventh
Fleet, under command of Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, who was subordi-
nate to General MacArthur. Kinkaid led the amphibious assault.
As in FORAGER, the fast carriers were to suppress Japanese air bases and pro-
vide direct air support for the amphibious assault, but Halsey was freed of many
of the burdens his predecessor had faced in the Philippine Sea. Without the old
battleships and amphibious forces under his command, Halsey was able to de-
velop plans that took full advantage of the mobility of his task forces. He was also
free to seek out the Japanese; Nimitz’s plan for the operation stressed that “in
case opportunity for destruction of major portion of enemy fleet offers or can be
created, such destruction becomes the primary task.”147
Third Fleet battle plans stressed the importance of this task.148 They differed
from those of the Fifth Fleet in two important respects. Lacking the old battle-
ships, Halsey ignored them in his tactical planning and envisioned a battle line
composed of only fast battleships. This increased his flexibility, because all
forces in the battle fleet had sufficient speed to keep up with a carrier formation.
Halsey planned to capitalize on this with a well developed prewar technique.
Halsey planned a coordinated attack. He assumed that his four carrier
groups, far superior to what the Japanese could muster at this stage of the war,
would either win the opening carrier duel or sight the enemy too late in the day
for strike operations. In either case, the ensuing plan would be the same. Rather
than steaming away at night as Spruance had done, Halsey would approach and,
along the way, reorganize the carrier forces. Battleships, cruisers, and supporting
destroyers would leave their respective task groups and form TF 34, a battle for-
mation under the command of Admiral Lee, about seventy miles ahead of the
carriers. As morning approached, planes would ready and launch. The coordi-
nated movements of the fleet were designed to bring the attacking planes and
the battleships within range of the enemy at the same time, at dawn.149
Particular effort . . . will be made to gain a position from which a predawn carrier
strike may be launched concurrently with the release of fast heavy striking force from
a favorable attack position. Development of a favorable tactical situation . . . will be
effected by dispatching TF 34 and carrier air groups to attack the enemy. The ap-
proach will be so conducted as to give TF 34 an opportunity to strike from a
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favorable position and so coordinate its offensive efforts with those of carrier air
groups.150
Halsey considered this the “optimum plan for decisive action.”151 It would col-
lect nearly all the striking power of TF 38 into one decisive pulse and overwhelm
the Japanese. Halsey had revived the prewar coordinated attack.
The main landings took place on 20 October, with two of Halsey’s carrier
groups providing direct support. Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4, with cruisers in
support, attacked targets on Leyte and suppressed airfields on Mindanao and
the western Visayas.152 The two other carrier groups, TGs 38.2 and 38.3, re-
mained concentrated farther north, scouting for potential threats from the di-
rection of Japan and Formosa.153 Halsey kept all the battleships together: TG
38.2 had Battleship Division 7 (Iowa and New Jersey), and four battleships were
with TG 38.3.154
The possibility that the Japanese would commit significant naval forces to de-
fend the Philippines was not seriously considered in Third or Seventh Fleet
plans.155 This was a mistake; in the summer of 1944, the Japanese had created a
series of plans, code-named SHO-GO (Victory).156 The southernmost of these,
SHO-1, covered the defense of the Philippines.157 On the basis of preliminary
landings around Leyte, the Imperial General Headquarters made the decision to
implement SHO-1 on 18 October.158 Two days later, Vice Admiral Ryunosuke
Kuasaka, chief of staff to Combined Fleet commander Admiral Soemu Toyoda,
issued the final plans to units of the Combined Fleet.159
The Japanese moved toward Leyte in four elements. Vice Admiral Takeo
Kurita’s 1st Diversionary Attack Force divided in two, one part comprising his
1st and 2nd sections; led by Kurita himself, it would transit the San Bernardino
Strait. Kurita’s 3rd Section, commanded by Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura, was
ordered to pass through Surigao Strait. Kurita planned to reunite with
Nishimura in Leyte Gulf early on the morning of 25 October and destroy the in-
vasion forces.160 The third Japanese element, the 2nd Diversionary Attack Force,
under Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima, would come through Surigao Strait behind
Nishimura and also attack the invasion fleet. Between them, these three attack
forces had seven battleships, sixteen cruisers, and twenty-three destroyers.161
The fourth and last Japanese group, commanded by Vice Admiral Jisaburo
Ozawa, was a decoy. Ozawa took the Combined Fleet’s remaining carriers south
from Japan, hoping with them to draw the Third Fleet’s covering forces back
north, away from Leyte Gulf.162 Ozawa had four carriers, two battleship-carriers,
three cruisers, and nine destroyers.163
Halsey, still confident that the Japanese would not seek battle, was preoccu-
pied with preparations for the Third Fleet’s major follow-on operation, an
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attack against the Japanese home islands.164 On 22 October he sent TGs 38.4 and
38.1 to the fleet base at Ulithi to refuel and rearm. Before detaching them, he
took two battleships from TG 38.3 and transferred them to TG 38.4, to go with it
to Ulithi.165 Two task groups and just four fast battleships remained in the area.
The same day, Kurita’s 1st and 2nd sections left their anchorage at Brunei Bay
on the north coast of Borneo. U.S. submarines again provided early warning of
Japanese moves. The morning of 23 October, while transiting Palawan Passage,
the submarines Dace and Darter sighted and attacked Kurita’s ships, hitting
three heavy cruisers—Atago and Maya were sunk, Takao was damaged and
forced to retire.166 Halsey and Kinkaid received these sightings and additional
information from long-range air searches; they became convinced that the Japa-
nese were moving toward the Philippines in force. Halsey quickly realized his
dispositions were inadequate and recalled TG 38.4 and its two battleships. He
did not recall TG 38.1. That group had more planes available than TG 38.4, but
Halsey considered the two battleships more important.167
Halsey disposed his forces to allow effective aerial searches to the west and
provide warning of the Japanese approach. TG 38.3 was farthest to the north,
east of Polillo Island. He placed TG 38.2 in the center, off the San Bernardino
Strait, and TG 38.4 in the south, east of Samar.168 This arrangement dispersed
Halsey’s battleship strength—each task group had just two battleships—but al-
lowed him to cover the major passages through the archipelago.
On 24 October, Kurita and Nishimura were sighted by Halsey’s carriers. TG
38.4 subjected Nishimura to a single attack, slightly damaging two of his ships.
Since Kurita posed the greater threat, Halsey left Nishimura to Kinkaid and
moved quickly to consolidate his battleship strength: TG 38.4 was ordered
north; all three carrier groups would concentrate off the San Bernardino Strait,
launching strikes against Kurita’s formation along the way. Over the course of
several hours repeated air attacks sank the battleship Musashi and damaged sev-
eral other ships. In the early afternoon Kurita turned back, seeking relief from
the onslaught.169
In the meantime, Halsey had issued a preparatory battle order in expectation
of Kurita’s force exiting the strait. TGs 38.2 and 38.4 were close enough to con-
centrate; the plan combined Battleship Division 7 with the two battleships from
TG 38.4. Four battleships, five cruisers, and ten destroyers would form as a sur-
face striking unit. Admiral Lee would command the resulting formation, desig-
nated TF 34.170 Because TG 38.3 was too distant, its battleships were not
included. Halsey planned to make do with the forces immediately on hand.
He did not implement the plan; a variety of circumstances convinced him
otherwise. Scouting reports indicated that Kurita was withdrawing, heavily
damaged. Also, intelligence available to Halsey suggested that Japanese forces in
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the area of the home islands were stronger than in fact they were, and this led
him to the conclusion that the most serious threat would come from the
north.171 In the afternoon, planes from TG 38.3 found that threat: they sighted
Ozawa’s main body. Halsey considered his alternatives.
[The option of] leaving TF 34 to block San Bernardino Straits . . . was rejected; the
potential strength of the Northern Forces [Ozawa] was too great to leave unmolested,
and requiring TF 34 to engage the Center Force [Kurita] while at the same time ex-
posed to attack by land-based and carrier-based air attack was not sound. This alter-
native spread our strength and risked unprofitable damage in detail.172
During the evening of 24 October, Halsey made the decision to move north with
all his forces and pursue Ozawa.173
Along the way, he put his battle plan in motion. The fleet slowed as all six bat-
tleships, seven cruisers, and eighteen destroyers separated themselves from the
carrier groups and formed TF 34, under Lee. TG 38.2 was designated as the
battle-line carrier group, to support Lee’s surface forces.174 Mitscher expected
the surface contact to take place at 4:30 AM, but estimates of the Japanese posi-
tion were incorrect. The first air strike from the carriers hit Ozawa long before
TF 34 could come into action. Coordinated attacks would have to wait until the
battleships were in position.
Halsey ran out of time. As TF 34 approached the Japanese, urgent messages
were received from Kinkaid. Escort carriers on his northern flank were engaged
in a running battle with Kurita’s 1st and 2nd sections. The remnants of the 1st
Striking Force had reversed course, passed through the San Bernardino Strait,
and were now moving toward the landing beaches. Halsey sent TF 34, minus
four cruisers and nine destroyers, south to assist; TG 38.2 followed in support.175
The cruisers and destroyers detached from TF 34 filled in and formed a sur-
face striking force.176 They continued north and attacked Japanese ships dam-
aged by the carrier strikes, finishing off the carrier Chiyoda and sinking the
destroyer Hatsuzuki after a running gun battle.177 Ozawa’s other carriers,
Zuikaku, Zuiho, and Chitose, were sunk by planes from TF 38.178 The submarine
Jallao, coached to the scene with several consorts by Admiral Lockwood, sank
the light cruiser Tama, previously damaged by air attack.179 Demoralized and
broken, Ozawa’s force retreated. In the meantime, Nishimura’s 3rd Section had
steamed into a trap set by Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet in Surigao Strait and been vir-
tually annihilated.
Although Kinkaid had not anticipated that the Japanese would seek major ac-
tion, his forces had been well prepared for it. The Seventh Fleet’s battle plan
called for Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf ’s Fire Support Group, designated TG
77.2, and Rear Admiral Russell S. Berkey’s Close Covering Group, TG 77.3, to
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combine in the face of strong enemy opposition.180 Oldendorf had all six of the
old battleships supporting Leyte, along with escorting cruisers and destroyers;
he and his ships had been part of the Fifth Fleet’s offensives in the Central Pa-
cific.181 Berkey’s group was part of the multinational Seventh Fleet.182 Depend-
ing on the nature of the threat, Kinkaid planned to detach Berkey, Oldendorf, or
both. Kinkaid also envisioned combining Berkey’s group with units from the
Third Fleet if Japanese light forces threatened the invasion fleet.183 Details were
left up to the individual commanders. USF 10A was perfect in situations like
these, in which disparate task groups would come together for battle; Oldendorf
would put it to good use.
By noon on 24 October, Kinkaid had realized that the Japanese were seeking
major action and ordered Oldendorf to prepare for a night battle in Surigao
Strait and to take Berkey’s TG 77.3 in support.184 Oldendorf began to formulate a
plan. He called Berkey and his battle-line commander, Rear Admiral George L.
Weyler, to his flagship so he could familiarize them with the details. The battle-
ships were loaded mainly with bombardment ammunition; Oldendorf stressed
the need to fire at medium ranges, where the effect would be maximized. He also
discussed the use of destroyer attacks before the main action; he planned to send
them down both sides of the strait.185
After the conference, Oldendorf signaled his battle plan to the six battleships,
eight cruisers, and twenty-one destroyers of his force. The battle plan specified
disposition “A-2” from USF 10A, intended for the employment of task forces like
this one.186 “A-2” (see figure 2) placed the battle line in the center and light forces
at either flank.187 This was an efficient arrangement for the confined waters at
the head of the strait, and it maximized the effectiveness of Oldendorf ’s gunfire.
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The plan worked to perfection, including one small, extemporized addition.
Picket destroyers from TG 79.11 commanded by Captain Jesse G. Coward were
the first to attack.188 Coward had joined Oldendorf on his own initiative, dis-
playing the aggressiveness inherent in the Navy’s doctrine.189 Nishimura’s at-
tempt to penetrate into Leyte Gulf failed, disorganized by a series of destroyer
torpedo attacks and shattered by battleship and cruiser gunfire. One destroyer
and a badly damaged cruiser were all that survived to retreat down the strait.
Following in Nishimura’s wake, Shima’s 2nd Diversionary Attack Force “fired
ineffective torpedoes at radar ghosts to the north” and quickly withdrew.190
Soon thereafter, Kurita’s force reappeared off Samar, within visual range of
Kinkaid’s escort carriers. A desperate fight ensued; both Halsey and Kinkaid
mustered powerful forces to counter the threat.191 Kinkaid ordered Oldendorf to
send a battleship division, a heavy cruiser division, and supporting destroyers to
assist the carriers. Oldendorf chose to send the three battleships that had the
most armor-piercing ammunition remaining, all four of his heavy cruisers, and
twenty destroyers, all of which had at least five torpedoes.192
As we have seen, Halsey sent TF 34 and TG 38.2 south to support Kinkaid, but
they would not find Kurita. Shortly after noon on 25 October, he had turned to
the north and headed back toward the San Bernardino Strait. When this became
apparent, Halsey ordered TG 34.5, a pursuit force formed around Battleship Di-
vision 7, to separate from TF 34 and go after the retreating enemy.193
The pursuit force contained two battleships, three cruisers, and eight destroy-
ers under the command of Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger. Halsey’s intention was
for Badger to employ battle disposition “A-1” (see figure 3) from USF 10A, con-
centrating all light forces in the van.194 TF 34.5 would engage on parallel courses
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at long range, with light forces on the offensive.195 This was battle plan “1L1.”
Badger arrived too late to engage Kurita but in the darkness found destroyer
Nowaki, which had remained behind to pick up survivors, and sank it. The battle
of Leyte Gulf was over.
Japanese efforts to contest the landings in the Philippines and Marianas had
led to the decisive battle both navies had anticipated before the war.196 Although
the expected clash of battle lines did not occur, the outcome was decisive. The re-
maining Japanese surface forces lacked the fuel and strength necessary to chal-
lenge further offensives; the Combined Fleet had become a hollow shell.
PREWAR PRINCIPLES AND WARTIME LESSONS
Several important elements of the Navy’s tactical doctrine contributed to the
success of the rapid offensive through the Central Pacific. The new approach to
the development and dissemination of doctrine introduced by the Pacific Fleet
in the summer of 1943 prepared it to divide itself into a series of carrier-centric
task forces and ensured that when the fleet came together in the face of enemy
surface threats, it could act as a cohesive unit. This approach rectified the short-
comings of prewar doctrinal development by relieving task force commanders
of the burden of creating battle plans and doctrines for their forces.
Principles of prewar doctrine also contributed to success. The most obvious
of these was the depth and richness of the Navy’s prewar major action plans,
which relied on concentration of all available forces and cooperative action
against the enemy battle line. The influence of these principles can be seen in the
major action plans developed by Spruance, Mitscher, and Halsey. The coordi-
nated attack attempted by the Third Fleet was derived directly from prewar
concepts.
The synthesis of prewar principles and wartime lessons in PAC 10 and USF
10A also benefited lower-level commanders, who consistently relied upon them.
The way Lee and Oldendorf leveraged the new manuals to ensure cooperation
and common understanding has been described.197 Other commanders, includ-
ing Badger, Weyler, Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth, and Rear Admiral Giffen,
employed them the same way.198 Use of these doctrinal manuals became perva-
sive—and this was essential. Because the standard operational formations were
fast carrier groups, surface commanders could not assume they would be able to
concentrate all ships of their battle formations for practice or indoctrination.
Coordinated action could only be ensured through specific common doctrines
provided at the fleet level or above.
However, the Navy’s approach was not without its flaws. The worst of these
was the failure to anticipate Japanese responses to the increasing size and power
of the U.S. carrier forces. The Japanese addressed the problem in several ways,
H O N E 9 3
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two of which are relevant here.199 The first was continued emphasis on a poten-
tial equalizer that had been an important part of their surface warfare doctrine
for years—night battle. The second was the use of divided dispositions and dis-
persed formations.
Both of these responses were asymmetric, and the Navy did not deal with
them effectively. This was particularly true of night combat. Existing doctrinal
principles, reinforced by prewar exercises and wartime lessons, stressed that
night action was undesirable, dangerous to powerful surface units. Concen-
trated formations of light forces could win minor battles at night, but major ac-
tions were to be fought in daylight. Spruance and Lee showed no desire to
challenge these principles on the night of 18 June in the Philippine Sea and, as a
result, missed an opportunity to force the Japanese into a decisive battle. Four
months later, Oldendorf ’s ad hoc task force achieved overwhelming victory at
Surigao Strait, suggesting what might have been.
The second Japanese response that caused problems touched upon a solidly
entrenched principle of the U.S. Navy’s tactical doctrine, concentration. Con-
centration was considered essential to the effectiveness of a battle fleet. Prewar
plans assumed that the Japanese approach to decisive battle would also empha-
size concentration and that major actions would accordingly be fought between
massed formations. The Japanese use of dispersed task groups in the carrier bat-
tles of 1942 should have challenged this assumption, but it did not. Even in 1944,
by which time the U.S. Navy had sufficient strength to divide into multiple task
forces and fight two battles simultaneously, it developed no major action plans
to counter dispersed enemy formations.
Spruance and Halsey emphasized concentration in their battle and opera-
tional plans. This conservative approach, driven by the fear of defeat in detail,
limited their opportunities when the Japanese gave battle. In the battle of the
Philippine Sea, Spruance repeatedly insisted on remaining concentrated and re-
fused to capitalize upon the mobility and flexibility of his multiple carrier task
forces. This reluctance allowed the Japanese to strike the first blow and permit-
ted them to withdraw when their attacks failed. Halsey was presented with a per-
fect opportunity to finish off the Combined Fleet at Leyte; a judicious division
of forces would have allowed him to defeat both Kurita and Ozawa on 25 Octo-
ber. But Halsey did not seriously consider divided action.200
The lesson was learned eventually, but too late. In his analysis of the October
fighting, Vice Admiral George D. Murray, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet,
wrote, “Concentration, though usually sound, may sometimes be pursued too
far, with diminishing returns. The ability to divide forces cleverly, as developed
by the enemy, and to ‘unconcentrate’ quickly, may often be an advantage.”201 Un-
fortunately, the failure to recognize and adapt to Japanese asymmetries had
9 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Winter 2009\NWCR Winter 09\NWCR W09.vp
Thursday, December 18, 2008 11:14:00 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
100
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 1, Art. 23
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss1/23
already prevented Spruance and Halsey from crushing the Combined Fleet in a
single decisive blow.
Ultimately, it made no difference—Leyte Gulf destroyed Japan as a naval
power. This victory was achieved not just by success in battle but through sus-
tained campaigning. The Central Pacific offensive is an illuminating example of
the benefits of prioritizing strategic, operational, and tactical goals appropri-
ately. The main strategic objective, the defeat of Japan, was paramount. It was
achieved by a sustained offensive through the Japanese defensive perimeter. This
offensive had two subsidiary goals, maintenance of a rapid operational tempo
and defeat of the Japanese surface fleet.
Airplanes and airpower—particularly the Pacific Fleet’s carriers, but also its
land-based air forces—were essential to securing the first of these goals. The fast
carriers were the engine that drove the fast pace of operations, suppressing Japa-
nese positions, destroying planes and ships, and enabling amphibious
landings.202 Accordingly, the Pacific Fleet organized itself around carrier task
forces, because only they could ensure a fast pace of operations.
The second goal, the destruction of the Japanese fleet, required a battle, a tac-
tical component of a larger operation. Even though this was a strategic goal, its
tactical nature gave it, appropriately, a secondary priority—carriers, and the op-
erational tempo they enabled, were paramount. This fact limited the opportuni-
ties for battle-line commanders to train with their units and develop cohesion,
and it led to Lee’s decision to decline a night battle at the Philippine Sea.203 But
the overall rewards justified such decisions.
This outcome contrasts starkly with the opportunities the Japanese lost by in-
verting the priority of their strategic and tactical planning. They developed a so-
phisticated tactical doctrine for major fleet action, around which they developed
operations and strategy—with predictable, and unfortunate, results.204
The success of the U.S. Navy’s approach and the emphasis placed on carrier
airpower have overshadowed the important role battleships played in the Navy’s
tactical doctrine. The long-awaited clash of battle lines never occurred; this fact,
coupled with the dominant role of the carriers in the last eighteen months of the
war, has led to the conclusion that battleships were relegated to supporting roles
during the Central Pacific offensive.205 The foregoing analysis has shown this
traditional view to be false. Battleships were an essential element of the Navy’s
plan for decisive battle and therefore collectively an essential part of the cam-
paign. Every plan for major action developed during the Central Pacific offen-
sive relied on the employment of a battle fleet. In this respect, Spruance, though
often considered to have been a “battleship admiral,” was no different from
Halsey and Mitscher.206
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When Halsey and Spruance emphasized concentration, it was the concentra-
tion of battleships that concerned them. Spruance always kept the bulk of his
battleship strength together: at Makin in the Gilberts, off Kwajalein in the Mar-
shals, in TG 58.3 at Truk, and around Saipan in the Marianas. Halsey, once he
knew the avenue of Kurita’s approach, quickly moved to mass his battleships.
When he went after Ozawa, all the battleships came with him, and when TF 34
reversed course, they all headed south again. It was only after Leyte Gulf and the
decisive defeat of Japanese surface units that battleships began to be distributed
evenly among the fast carrier groups on a regular basis and moved to supporting
roles.207
In the immediate postwar period, wartime experience was reviewed, and les-
sons were compiled into a new series of tactical manuals. The comprehensive,
single-volume format of USF 10B was discarded; numerous additions to the
core originally adopted from PAC 10 over the course of the war had made the
document large and unwieldy. Material from it and other manuals was collected
in several new volumes issued in 1946 and 1947: U.S.F. 2, General Tactical In-
structions, United States Fleets; U.S.F. 4, Carrier Task Force Tactical Instructions,
United States Fleets; U.S.F. 5, Surface Action and Tactics, United States Fleets; and
U.S.F. 15, CIC Instructions, United States Fleets.208
Nimitz, now Chief of Naval Operations, oversaw the issuance of the new
manuals. The introduction of USF 5 borrowed directly from PAC 10:
USF 5 is not intended nor shall it be construed as depriving any officer exercising tac-
tical command of authority to issue special instructions to his command. USF 5,
however, should make such instructions unnecessary under ordinary circumstances
and should minimize them in extraordinary circumstances. The ultimate aim is to
obtain essential uniformity without unacceptable sacrifice of flexibility.209
The new manuals retained both the doctrines developed before the war that
proved effective and those produced during it. They offered tactics for units
large and small.210 The range bands and battle-plan designators first introduced
in Tentative Fleet Dispositions and Battle Plans of 1930 were reissued in USF 5.211
Coordinated attacks were still considered effective.212 The problems of combat
with small units, the “minor tactics” first seriously addressed by PAC 10, formed
a large part of the new surface warfare manual.213
The synthesis of prewar principles and wartime lessons introduced by the Pa-
cific Fleet in 1943 was validated by the successful conclusion of the campaign
and defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The new approach enabled employ-
ment of fast carrier task forces in a way that allowed a rapid offensive. Detailed
operational and tactical plans completed the picture, preparing the Pacific Fleet
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to thwart Japanese countermoves and to triumph, even if not as thoroughly as
desired, in the decisive battle.
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LEARNING THE HARD WAY
Force Protection 1983–2000
Lieutenant Commander John Callaway, U.S. Navy
Since the attack on Khobar Towers in June 1996, the Department of
Defense (DoD) has made significant improvements in protecting its ser-
vice members, mainly in deterring, disrupting and mitigating terrorist
attacks on installations. The attack on USS Cole (DDG 67), in the port
of Aden, Yemen, on 12 October 2000, demonstrated a seam in the fabric
of efforts to protect our forces, namely in-transit forces.
USS COLE COMMISSION REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The October 2000 terrorist attack on the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole(DDG 67) in the port of Aden, Yemen, is commonly viewed in the larger
context of al-Qa‘ida’s September 11th campaign. Beyond the initial official in-
vestigations, the military force-protection context of the attack has largely been
overlooked as analysts have traced the movements of al-Qa‘ida operatives who
were traversing the globe at the time. But the proper context of the Cole bomb-
ing is a series of terrorist attacks against U.S. military forces abroad that started
in 1983.
The 1983 Beirut bombings, the Khobar Towers attack in 1996, and the Cole
attack in 2000 have striking similarities, though their perpetrators were differ-
ent. A comparison of these three cases highlights three trends concerning orga-
nizational learning in the military about force protection: organizational change
(command and control), intelligence support, and
recognition of the threat. This article assesses, on the
basis of the investigations conducted after the attacks,
what the military has learned about force protection,
and how well.1
These three cases are illuminating with respect to
casualties suffered and lessons learned. They also illus-
trate the military’s organizational change over time
with respect to the three underlying themes. By the late
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1990s (see figure 1), the military had acknowledged that command-and-control
structures were inadequate in the Beirut barracks and Khobar Towers bombings
and had begun to address them formally. Second, it had learned that while rele-
vant intelligence was collected, analyzed, and disseminated, warnings went un-
heeded in both earlier cases. Third, the military’s understanding of the terrorist
threat was by that time evolving from the relative ignorance of the 1980s to dim
recognition. More generally, and as depicted in figure 2, the 1996 Khobar Towers
bombing represented a “failure to learn” from the 1983 Beirut barracks attack.2
The 2000 Cole bombing, in contrast, was a “failure to anticipate” the next attack
despite having learned the lessons of Beirut.
April 2008 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1983 bombing of the
American embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The embassy was destroyed by a car
bomb in that attack, and sixty-one people were killed.3 The embassy’s vulnera-
bility in the April attack pointed to the vulnerability of U.S. military forces in
Lebanon. Indeed, the 1983 terrorist bombing that most people remember is the
attack on the U.S. Marine barracks at the Beirut International Airport in Octo-
ber. A battalion of Marines was ashore on a peacekeeping mission. Two hundred
twenty of its Marines plus another twenty-one military personnel were killed by
a truck bomb that exploded with the force of twelve thousand pounds of TNT.
The October attack exposed severe problems in command and control, spe-
cifically the lack of authority of the regional commander in chief (as today’s
combatant commanders were then known) over the Marines on the ground. It
also revealed micromanagement by Washington of military actions in Lebanon



















terrorism Accident War ?
FIGURE 1
MILITARY LEARNING AFTER THE 1983 AND 1996 ATTACKS
a. “Intelligence failure” is defined as “systematic organizational surprise resulting from incorrect, missing, discarded, or
inadequate hypotheses.” Robert Johnston, Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, D.C.: Cen-
ter for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2005), p. 6.
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through a bloated chain of command that stretched from the Pentagon to the
field.4 These faults contributed to the impetus for the Goldwater-Nichols De-
fense Reorganization Act of 1986.5
The investigations that followed the 1983 attacks also raised questions about
the effectiveness of intelligence. At the strategic level, the terrorist threat had al-
ready been widely understood, and the bombing of the embassy in April clearly
had indicated its seriousness. The next month, five months before the attack on
the barracks, a team surveyed intelligence support for the Marine peacekeepers
at the tactical level. It reported that much intelligence was available but that
there were problems in coordination of reporting and analysis.6 No action was
taken on the report.
Between the survey in May and the October bombing, attacks on the Marine
peacekeepers escalated from sniping to heavy rockets and artillery; the Marines
received “over 100 intelligence reports warning of terrorist car bomb attacks.”7
Yet still no action was taken on the survey’s recommendations. After the attack,
the Director of Naval Intelligence reviewed the intelligence data available before
the bombing and concluded, “The chances were pretty good we would have
been able to predict [the attack].”8 Tactically, intelligence had been available but
not had not been prioritized or tailored to support force protection.
The official Department of Defense investigation of the attack, known as
the Long Commission, identified a lack of antiterrorist human intelligence
(HUMINT) as contributing to the vulnerability of the Marines. Specific
threats, though received in high volume, “seldom materialized.”9 Additional
human-intelligence capability was needed to prioritize and determine the
credibility of those threats and then exploit any leads developed in the network
of sources. This type of fully integrated intelligence plan provides command-
ers on the ground a clearer picture of what they can actually expect.
The Long Commission also specifically investigated “terrorism as a mode of
warfare.”10 In 1983, terrorism was not considered a form of warfare, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms did not (per Locher)
C A L L A W A Y 1 0 9
FIGURE 2
MILITARY FAILURES IN TERRORISM
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define it. In fact, the cause initially listed for those killed in the bombing was “ac-
cidental death.”11 The commission argued, however, that “the systematic, care-
fully orchestrated terrorism which we see in the Middle East today represents a
new dimension of warfare.” Whatever the formal definition, however, a senior
European Command officer commented that commanders on the ground in
Lebanon “neglect[ed] their responsibility for security of their personnel in
high-threat areas, against repeated, proven attack capabilities.”12
In November 1995, terrorists bombed the office of a State Department–run pro-
gram in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing five American military personnel. In a re-
markable parallel to the Beirut attacks, seven months later the terrorists struck
again in the same country, with greater force and against a military target. This
time terrorists struck Khobar Towers, a U.S. Air Force barracks in Dhahran. The
facility housed American and allied personnel supporting Operation SOUTHERN
WATCH, the coalition enforcement of the no-fly zone then established over
southern Iraq. This attack, delivered by a truck bomb on 25 June 1996, killed
nineteen airmen and wounded approximately five hundred.13
The Khobar Towers bombing, thirteen years after the Beirut attack and
nearly ten after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, again shocked the U.S.
military. Goldwater-Nichols had given regional combatant commanders au-
thority to match their responsibility to forces in the field. However, their staffs
had still lacked an organizational focus on terrorism. Therefore, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff created an office, known as J-34, to deal with antiterrorist and
force-protection matters, and corresponding offices took shape at the lower
echelons of command.14
In the Khobar Towers case intelligence information had once again been
available, if not specific. The Downing Assessment Task Force was created to in-
vestigate the attack. Its Finding 7 states, “Intelligence provided warning of the
terrorist threat to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.” Senator Arlen Specter, chairman
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, declared after his committee
conducted its own investigation, “There was no failure of intelligence, but a fail-
ure to use intelligence.”15 However, the Downing assessment did lament the lack
of HUMINT capability: “Human intelligence . . . is probably the only source of
information that can provide tactical details of a terrorist attack. The U.S. intelli-
gence community must have the requisite authorities and invest more time,
people, and funds into developing HUMINT against the terrorist threat.”16
In marked contrast to conventional wisdom at the time of the Beirut bomb-
ing and even to the tentative language of the Long Commission, the Downing
task force asserted flatly that “terrorism . . . is a form of warfare.”17 Indeed, the
first opinion expressed in the Downing assessment articulated a new
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understanding of the terrorist threat, declaring terrorism to be “AN UNDE-
CLARED WAR ON THE UNITED STATES.”18 The Downing task force also recom-
mended command-and-control changes and identified intelligence lessons.
Some of the lessons repeated the Long Commission’s findings. Some lessons
were new. But some lessons were still to come.
USS COLE
On 10 October 2000, Cole transited the Suez Canal en route to the Persian Gulf,
where the ship was to enforce the United Nations sanctions against Iraq and
keep its Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles ready for possible use by the
Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). On 11 October 2000 Cole
passed southward through the Red Sea at twenty-seven knots. The next day, the
12th, the ship entered Aden and tied up alongside a dolphin, a pierlike structure
of concrete pilings in the middle of the harbor, to take on fuel. As is customary
when a ship visits a port, numerous small vessels soon approached it. Two tugs
maneuvered the ship along the dolphin, assisted by two smaller boats carrying
line handlers, who would pull the mooring lines to the dolphin’s cleats and make
them fast. The harbor pilot, when his task was complete, disembarked into a pi-
lot boat, and the husbanding agent, a representative of the company arranging
for fuel and other services, boarded from (probably) yet another boat. Several
small scows came to take trash, as well as sewage pumped from the ship’s holding
tanks.
Less than two hours after Cole’s arrival, another small craft approached the
warship from the pier area across the harbor. One man was in the stern, handling
the outboard motor, and a second was standing in the bow. The skiff turned to-
ward the center of the warship, the man in the bow waving to the crew topside,
and a moment later an explosion rocked the harbor. An explosive charge ripped
a forty-by-forty-five-foot hole through the steel skin of the ship, killing seven-
teen sailors and wounding forty-two others.19
The attack was actually a second attempt. Earlier that year, on 3 January, USS
The Sullivans (DDG 68), another guided-missile destroyer, had entered Aden Har-
bor to refuel. As it stood in, al-Qa‘ida operatives launched a small boat into the
water from a trailer. The boat, overloaded with explosives, sank to the bottom al-
most immediately.20 The failed attack escaped the notice of the U.S. intelligence
community and, apparently, of the Yemeni government.21 The boat and the explo-
sives were later recovered and reassembled for use against another target of oppor-
tunity, which turned out to be Cole.22
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Command and Control
Investigations into the Cole bombing revealed three main areas of concern with
respect to command and control. Ambiguity in the chain of command at the
time of the Beirut bombing had been resolved, but the attack on Cole exposed a
“seam” that came into play when forces transferred from one combatant com-
mander to another. Second, the staff structure to support antiterrorism and
force protection that had been created after Khobar Towers now proved weak
and inefficient. Finally, the investigations found fault with the engagement
strategy that had brought Cole to Yemen in the first place.
U.S. military forces are generally manned, equipped, and trained in the conti-
nental United States and then deployed forward to meet the requirements of re-
gional combatant commanders. The Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened the
authority of the combatant commanders in their respective regions, but it did
not enforce uniformity of practice and procedure. Therefore, when a ship, as
Cole did, left the European Command area of responsibility to enter
CENTCOM’s, its entire operational chain of command changed at the desig-
nated moment of transfer. This is significant because the changes included oper-
ating procedures, reporting processes, and administrative requirements, as well
as the authorities who monitored them. This change occurred for Cole on 9 Oc-
tober, three days before the attack. Cole was no different in this respect from doz-
ens of other ships passing into the Persian Gulf, but this “seam,” the magnitude
and abruptness of the adjustments required of the ship and the lack of opportu-
nity for the new commander to confirm them, likely made it easier for al-Qa‘ida
to surprise a newly arrived target of opportunity.
Specifically, the change of operational control to CENTCOM gave Cole a new
immediate superior—Commander, Task Force 50 (CTF 50), the Abraham Lin-
coln carrier battle group commander. CTF 50 assumed responsibility for, in ad-
dition to all other aspects of the ship’s employment and logistics, Cole’s
protection. The task force commander had designated an assistant to his staff in-
telligence officer as staff force-protection officer. One investigation of the subse-
quent attack was to criticize CTF 50’s lack of oversight of Cole. Specifically,
obvious administrative errors in the Cole’s own force-protection plan had not
been corrected, and, more important, the plan had not been tailored to address
the specific conditions of Aden Harbor—notably, the existence of the fueling
dolphin.
Lastly, the reports of the Defense Department’s Cole Commission (known as
the Crouch-Gehman Report) and the House Armed Service Committee investi-
gation would both question the appropriateness of Yemen as a place for fueling
American warships. The choice of Yemen was a primary focus during the Senate
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Armed Services Committee hearings as well. The chairman, Senator John Warner,
pointedly asked, “The one question all of us keep hearing . . . [is] why Yemen?”23
The answer was that in 1997 the Yemenis had approached the State Depart-
ment and Department of Defense hoping to improve relations with the United
States. The Navy generally refueled warships at sea, steaming in groups. How-
ever, single-ship transits were becoming more common as the post–Cold War
force structure began to draw down and as post–Gulf War requirements led
Central Command to call for ships one or two at a time to enforce sanctions,
their Tomahawk missiles ready. Until 1997 Djibouti had been the primary refu-
eling stop for ships transiting from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. However,
conditions there were becoming increasingly unsatisfactory. In 1998, given Ye-
meni interest, the deteriorating situation in Djibouti, and the lack of alternative
ports, the Navy concluded a bunkering (fueling) contract with the port facility
at Aden.
General Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps, who was the CENTCOM com-
mander at the time, and his subordinate Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, com-
mander of the Fifth Fleet, both visited Aden to see the fueling facilities at first
hand. A security survey, called a “vulnerability assessment,” was then conducted.
Between September 1997 and December 2000, twenty-nine U.S. Navy ships vis-
ited Aden Harbor. Twenty-six of the twenty-nine calls were brief stops for fuel.
Yemen was known to be a dangerous place, but the configuration of Aden’s
harbor, including the fact that ships would fuel at a dolphin in the middle of the
harbor, seemed to mitigate security concerns. Normally, refueling ships moor to
a pier and take fuel by hoses from “risers” installed in the pier or from trucks. A
ship moored to a pier is more difficult to defend than one moored some distance
from shore, because of vehicle and pedestrian access. Also, host nations typically
prohibit visiting foreign military personnel from carrying weapons onto a pier.
The choice of Yemen, then, was an attempt to balance engagement priorities and
operational requirements with force-protection risks. The Crouch-Gehman
commission, however, summarized its concern about this balance at the
macropolicy level: “The execution of the engagement element of the National
Security Strategy lacks an effective, coordinated interagency process, which re-
sults in a fragmented engagement program that may not provide optimal sup-
port to in-transit units.”24
Intelligence
With respect to force-protection intelligence, Cole was on its own in many ways.
The formal report to Commander, Fifth Fleet required by the Navy’s Judge Advo-
cate General Manual (in service parlance, the “JAGMAN investigation” of this in-
cident) described the system as “putting the burden on the unit to ‘pull’
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information ‘down’ from various sources.”25 Other avenues of assistance were
missing. For example, the Navy Criminal Investigation Service provides
force-protection intelligence in foreign ports frequented by the Navy, but none
of its personnel were assigned to Yemen, and none traveled to meet the ship
there.26 In any case, human intelligence of the type that might have uncovered
the attempted attack on The Sullivans was lacking. The Crouch-Gehman Report
declares: “We, like other commissions before us, recommend the reprioritization of
resources for collection and analysis, including human intelligence and signal in-
telligence, against the terrorist.”27
From a strategic intelligence perspective, there had been ample warning but
no specific indications and no “actionable” intelligence. Some specific intelli-
gence was later alleged to have come out of the 1998 al-Qa‘ida bombings of the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, but if so, either the Federal Bureau
of Investigation did not pass it on to the military or the warnings fell on deaf
ears. In any case, other warnings came from national foreign intelligence sources
in the summer of 2000. One was against a U.S. warship in Lebanon, but since the
Navy had no ships there and did not plan to send any, the threat became part of
the “chatter.”28 There was no specific intelligence that put Cole in danger of a
small-boat attack as it refueled in Yemen.
The Crouch-Gehman Report returned to the idea of a “seam,” this time re-
garding intelligence support. Apparently endorsing the JAGMAN investiga-
tion’s characterization of Cole as having had to “pull” relevant intelligence, the
Crouch-Gehman commission held that intelligence support should be “dedi-
cated from a higher echelon,” meaning that someone in the chain of command
(i.e., with more resources) above Cole should have provided better support to
the ship. The report went even farther and addressed specifically the tasking of
intelligence assets: “Intelligence production must be refocused and tailored to
overwatch transiting units to mitigate the terrorist threat.”29
Understanding the Threat
Between 1996, the year of the Khobar Towers bombing, and 2000, large-scale
terrorist attacks against American interests abroad continued, including the two
1998 East Africa embassy attacks. At the tactical level, antiterrorism and force
protection became a routine part of operational planning for military units. In
fact, Cole received accolades for the force-protection program it developed while
preparing for its departure in August 2000 for its deployment to the Mediterra-
nean and Middle East.30 These procedures were proven during four successful
port visits in the Mediterranean area on the way to Bahrain, in the Persian Gulf.
In the three days before the attack, the ship was focused on getting to its patrol
station. Cole navigated through the Suez Canal, which typically takes from
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twenty-four to thirty-six hours, then made a high-speed transit through the Red
Sea to Yemen, where it was to fuel and then head to Bahrain to take up its pri-
mary mission. This preoccupation is important in retrospect for three reasons.
First, the Navy facilities at Bahrain were recognized in April 2000 as having the
best force-protection program in the Department of Defense; it was reasonable
for the ship to assume accordingly that Bahrain was where the threat was acute.
No special arrangements had been made for Yemen, and no American official,
military or otherwise, came to meet the ship, not even the local defense attaché.
Second, Yemen was merely a brief stop for fuel, a necessary pause as Cole hurried
on the way to something more important. As the ship entered Yemen, the crew
was “not attuned to, or even aware of, the heightened threat level” (that is, of the
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean).31 Third, transiting forces are considered rela-
tively secure. It is difficult for potential enemies to locate, let alone target, units
moving from one theater to another. Discerning all this, the Crouch-Gehman
Report focused on transiting forces and recommended that antiterrorism and
force protection be treated as one of a ship’s primary missions.32
PUTTING CHECKS IN THE BOXES
Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, in their book Military Misfortunes, argue that “ev-
ery war brings to the surface areas of warfare that . . . do not come under the pur-
view of preexisting military organization.” They define this tendency as a
“problem-organization mismatch.”33 Terrorism was clearly just such a challenge
to the U.S. military in the 1980s and 1990s. Cohen and Gooch argue further that
leadership must perceive and correct the problem-organization mismatch in or-
der to win.34 But the military did not perceive the problem-organization mis-
match arising from the terrorist threat until after Khobar Towers. The military’s
lack of progress in understanding the threat of terrorism from the Beirut bar-
racks in 1983 to Khobar Towers in 1996 was a “failure to learn,” by Cohen and
Gooch’s definition.35 In its summary of observations, the Long Commission
stated, “The most important message it can bring to the Secretary of Defense is
that the 23 October 1983 attack on the Marine Battalion Landing Team Head-
quarters in Beirut was tantamount to an act of war using the medium of terror-
ism.” That lesson, however, was not actually learned until after Khobar Towers,
thirteen years later.
The creation of the J-34 network in 1996 at the Joint Staff and subordinate
force-protection positions throughout the chain of command was an attempt to
align the organization with the problem. Unfortunately, organizational alignment
was neither uniform nor sufficient to prevent the Cole attack. The “J-34” designa-
tion itself denotes that on a joint staff, the antiterrorism/force-protection office
works in the current operations (J-3) branch. In the field, however, several
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echelons below at the carrier-strike-group level, CTF 50’s force-protection offi-
cer was designated “N20”—that is, a member of the staff intelligence branch
(N2).36 The intelligence branch naturally focused on threats to the strike group
in its operating area (the Persian Gulf, in this case), not on the potential threats
to small units steaming to join. The Fifth Fleet JAGMAN investigation deplored
CTF 50’s lack of oversight of the ship’s force-protection planning and execution,
particularly its tolerance of administrative errors and its generally hands-off ap-
proach.37 The Crouch-Gehman Report recommended several organizational
alignments to correct such deficiencies, including coordination between the
State Department and the combatant commanders, as well as dedicated intelli-
gence support from higher echelons for transiting units.38
Cohen and Gooch define a second category of failure, “failure to antici-
pate”—that is, “failure to take reasonable precautions against a known haz-
ard.”39 The military learned to take seriously terrorism against its facilities
abroad after Khobar Towers but failed to anticipate that the same threat might
be faced by transiting forces. The new J-34 force-protection organization had
brought attention to the issue but clearly not proficiency. The mea culpa for
this fault came in plain language, and it came from Secretary of Defense Wil-
liam Cohen himself:
All of us who had responsibility for force protection of USS Cole—including the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman, the CNO, CINCCENT,
CINCLANTFLT, COMUSNAVCENT, and CTF-50, as well as the Commanding Offi-
cer of USS Cole—did not do enough to anticipate possible new threats.40
Failures at the Unit Level
Scott Snook, in Friendly Fire, an analysis of the accidental shooting-down of two
Army helicopters over northern Iraq, hypothesizes about general conditions
that increase the likelihood of mishaps. Complex organizations working in
stressful conditions over long periods of time are susceptible to something he
calls “practical drift”—a slow, steady uncoupling of local practice from written
procedure.41 Cole’s force-protection planning team had met before the previous
four port visits but did not meet before the brief stop for fuel in Aden. Its mem-
bers, having received no feedback on previous force-protection plans, modified
their CTF 50–approved Aden plan at their own discretion. More research is re-
quired to determine if the lack of attention to detail and of interaction with su-
periors displayed here was due to “practical drift,” but it is a plausible theory.
Admiral Harold W. Gehman (Retired), one of the co-chairs of the Defense
Department’s Cole investigation, offered an alternative theory in a speech at the
Naval Academy in 2005. In it he described an organizational defense mechanism
he called “trivialization”—diminishing the importance of something by endless
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layers of administration and nit-picking.42 “They had reduced the process down
to its lowest common denominator. I send off a message. I get an answer back.
Therefore, we are protected from terrorists.” Cole had put all the “checks in the
boxes,” but the force-protection training did not “sink in,” Admiral Gehman ar-
gued. “Our investigation found that they essentially had gone through the mo-
tions. In other words, they had determined the minimum that needed to be
done, and they had trivialized the whole event.”43
In the end, the Judge Advocate General Manual investigation concluded that
“USS Cole . . . had sufficient available information to make an accurate assess-
ment of the port Threat Levels and conditions in Aden, Yemen.” That is, the at-
tack was a failure at the tactical level. The Chief of Naval Operations disagreed.
He felt the attack could not have been prevented and the chain of command (in-
cluding himself) “did not equip the skipper for success in the environment he
encountered in Aden Harbor that fateful day.”44 The secretary of defense
concurred.
The Inevitability of Surprise
Richard Posner’s book Preventing Surprise Attacks is a critical review of the 9/11
Commission report. It compares with September 11th the surprise attack at
Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Tet Offensive in 1968, and the Yom Kippur War of
1973.45 Posner “suggests that [some] surprise attacks cannot reliably be pre-
vented” but that some can be prevented, deterred, or mitigated in their effects.
Figure 3 summarizes the common features Posner found in the four events he
reviewed and compares them with the Cole attack.
While little evidence suggests that the Cole attack was preventable, this possi-
bility should not be ruled out. As noted in figure 3, no warning signs were ob-
served, but that does not mean they were not present. Human-intelligence
resources were not in place to unearth traces of the attempted attack on The Sul-
livans, and apparently no countersurveillance assets were in place to observe any
“dry runs” the attackers may have made during succeeding fueling stops by
American warships. The guided-missile frigate USS Hawes (FFG 53) and the
guided-missile destroyers USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) and USS Barry (DDG
52) all refueled in Aden Harbor between The Sullivans and Cole.46 But as the
Crouch-Gehman Report holds, counterintelligence programs are “integral to
force protection.”47 Without assets ashore, there was a definite gap in
counterintelligence coverage however vigilant the visiting ships were in obser-
vation and diligent in reporting.
Lastly, Cole failed to make itself a “hard target.”The intent of the force-protection
measures directed for Cole was to provide greater security, of course, but also to
demonstrate “resolve” to potentially hostile elements watching the ship or moving
C A L L A W A Y 1 1 7
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in to attack. The primary failure of Cole, as noted by the Judge Advocate General
Manual investigation and endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations, was the fail-
ure to screen approaching boats, whether with the assistance of the host-nation mil-
itary, services contracted through the husbanding agent, or the ship’s own boats. As
previously mentioned, the JAGMAN investigation and the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions disagreed on the issue of whom to hold accountable for this failure.
It is nearly impossible to discern a single, definitive answer as to what made
Cole susceptible to a terrorist attack that day. There was organizational failure,
1 1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Strategic factors:
• The attacker was too weak to have a reasonable hope of success
conventionally.
° Al-Qa‘ida is a nonstate actor and lacks conventional forces.
• The victim’s perception of the enemy’s weakness contributed to his
vulnerability.
° A brief stop for fuel at a dolphin in daylight.
• The victim lacked understanding of capabilities and intentions.
° “A waterborne suicide attack had not been considered likely.”a
• The victim was in a state of denial regarding the forms of attack hardest to
defend against.
° “We failed to anticipate what appeared to be the improbable or
weakest link in the chain.”b
• Intelligence officers were reluctant to challenge superior’s opinion for
career reasons.
° An intelligence official resigned in protest the day after the attack.c
Tactical factors:
• The victim reasonably thought the principal danger was elsewhere or in
the future.
° Cole’s primary mission was in the Persian Gulf.
• The victim was lulled by false alarms or deliberate deceptions.
° Nonspecific warning information was available in numbing quantity.
• Warnings to local commanders lacked clarity and credibility.
° There was confusion about the applicable threat level in Yemen.d
Posner’s common feature missing from the Cole attack:
• Warning signs were interpreted based on the mirror-imaged assumption.
° There were no observed warning signs.
FIGURE 3
COMPARISON OF USS COLE ATTACK TO SELECTED SURPRISE ATTACKS
a. HASC, executive summary, p. ii.
b. HASC, p. 39, General Hugh Shelton testimony.
c. John Diamond, “Red Flags Raised before Cole Bombing Warning Lacked Specific Details, Pentagon Says,” Chicago Tribune, 26
October 2000.
d. JAGMAN investigation, p. 103. For more detail see also pp. 20–23.
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by which the ship was left without the appropriate support of higher headquar-
ters. There were also small but important procedural and tactical errors by the
commanding officer and his crew. Without a doubt, Snook’s “practical drift”
and Gehman’s “trivialization” also played some role. Finally, the commonalities
Posner finds among surprise attacks fit the Cole situation like a glove.
A SHIFT TO THE OFFENSIVE
In order to assess the military’s learning about force protection, this article has
examined the findings of the investigations conducted after the terrorist attacks
on the Beirut barracks in 1983, Khobar Towers in 1996, and Cole in 2000. Figure
4 updates the schematic of figure 1 to reflect the “learning curves” in command
and control, intelligence, and threat definition over the seventeen-year period
between the first attack studied and that on Cole.
Faced in 2000 with another failure in force protection, the military as an orga-
nization raised the priority of the terrorist threat. The Crouch-Gehman Report
recommended, as noted, that antiterrorism/force-protection efforts be given
equal weight with a unit’s primary mission. In other words, force-protection
training and equipment need to be on par with those devoted to traditional
Navy missions like antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and strike warfare.48 This
prioritization has proved necessary to provide a self-defense capability for Navy
units against the terrorist threat as they carry out missions around the globe.
The military today is organizationally aligned with the problem, and force pro-
tection is prioritized as a primary mission—lesson learned.
Intelligence critiques of the three attacks decry the lack of human intelli-
gence. More precisely, no available HUMINT assets were apparently tasked





















terrorism Accident War War
FIGURE 4
MILITARY LEARNING 1983/1996/2000 TERRORIST ATTACKS
a. AT/FP = antiterrorism/force protection.
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according to the potential threat. The practical effect of this “failure to antici-
pate” was a gap in collection and analysis. A less obvious lesson, specifically from
the Cole case, is the need for systematic counterintelligence at the unit level. Cur-
rently, unit-level training includes a robust countersurveillance capability, but
more work needs to be done to determine how that might be improved. An ef-
fective counterintelligence program at the unit level closely knitted to a local
human-intelligence capability focusing on the terrorist threat should be a goal
of the force-protection program. Whether this lesson was truly learned is diffi-
cult to assess and may not be known (and then only in the negative sense) at
the unclassified level unless there is another successful attack.
Finally, if the blood of the 277 service members killed in the three attacks
studied in this article did not drive home the true nature of the terrorist threat to
the armed forces, the attacks of 11 September 2001 surely did. The military’s or-
ganizational understanding of the threat matured, its force-protection efforts
redoubled, and its stance became proactive. The shift to the offensive marked by
Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM signaled an end to the re-
active posture of the pre–September 11th military.
Continued review of terrorist attacks against U.S. military forces may yield
further lessons that if learned may improve the current program of deterrence,
mitigation, and response. Force protection requires deeper investigation and re-
flection by commanders to ensure that the hard-won lessons of the last
twenty-five years remain fresh during the current wars and beyond.
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THROUGH A MIRROR DARKLY
The Face of Future War, 1871–2005
Richard J. Norton
Trying to predict the nature of future wars is nothing new. Given the stakes, it isnot surprising that efforts to pierce the barrier of warfare’s event horizon have
long occupied security professionals. Accordingly, attempts to identify future
enemies, theaters, tactics, and technologies have collectively represented an im-
portant component in strategic planning. Intelligence estimates, personality
profiles of potential enemy leaders, and war plans of every hue and dimension
provide tangible evidence of these efforts.
Nor has imagining the future of warfare been the exclusive domain of the
national-security professional. A large body of film and literature has been de-
voted to imagining the wars of the future.1 Some of these efforts, such as Robert
Heinlein’s Starship Troopers and its polar opposite,
Joseph Haldeman’s The Forever War, have been prize-
winning moneymakers. Interestingly, Haldeman
wrote his book as much to come to grips with his per-
sonal experience of combat as to achieve literary rec-
ognition and profit.
In contrast, official predictive writings of future
wars are usually classified and not written with an eye
to literary merit. Such scenarios of future conflict are
written by security professionals for security profes-
sionals, using extensive analyses of military hardware
and capabilities to craft their plans and predictions.
These works move along official chains of command
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and communication, and they rarely, if ever, attract public notice. The writings
of Dwight David Eisenhower or Maxwell Taylor while they were attached to the
Plans Division of the U.S. Army headquarters staff are two examples of such
work. Others are the memos and briefings prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Earl
“Pete” Ellis, U.S. Marine Corps. (Ellis, often called the “father of amphibious
warfare,” became convinced in the 1920s that a U.S.-Japanese war in the Pacific
was inevitable.) Disseminating and analyzing the works of such specialists have
been the tasks of historians, not contemporary civilian publishers.
At the other end of the literary spectrum are found the works of fiction, par-
ticularly science-fiction, writers. These writings tend to be unencumbered by
current technological constraints or serious military analysis. Here, the envi-
sioned future battle is often simply a vehicle in which to explore character devel-
opment and relationships or to recount adventures. The author is almost never a
security professional. H. G. Wells is perhaps the best known of this breed of writ-
ers, which also includes Jules Verne, Arthur Conan Doyle, and, more recently,
Orson Scott Card.
This article, however, deals with a narrow band of articles and books between
the official analyses of the security professional and the imagined futures of the
fiction writer. Each work that will be discussed here was penned by a security
professional, sometimes retired but often on active service when writing. All of
these authors benefited at first hand from contemporary military research and
understood the nature of combat of their day. Profit, although presumably wel-
comed, was not their motive for writing. Rather, these authors had messages
they desperately wanted to be heard and, officialdom having turned a deaf ear,
placed their tales before the general public.
To do so required a fair amount of courage and the assumption of potentially
significant risk, especially when the author was a serving military officer. Histor-
ically, military service cultures have been tight lipped about their work, particu-
larly when it comes to potential future combat. Since entering the military as
cadets or midshipmen, officers have been wrapped in intricate codes and cus-
toms of conduct. Common to all of these codes, both formal and informal, has
been a prohibition against speaking ill of one’s seniors or service. There are good
reasons for this behavior. In most democracies, serving officers are not expected
to take part in, much less initiate, public debates. Literary talent is not necessar-
ily seen as a desirable trait in an officer but rather as a source of distraction from
more important pursuits. There is also a sense that any writing that exposes a
particular military vulnerability increases the threat to the service not only from
potential enemies but also from domestic politicians and internal service rivals.
When these works touch on interservice feuds and arguments, the risk to
military authors seen to be taking sides grows larger yet again.
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Yet, write security professionals sometimes did. Since 1871 not a decade has
gone by that has not seen at least one major contribution to this subgenre of lit-
erature. Each of these efforts has used the literary device of a “future history,” or
what might be called “forward, looking back.”
As this article will show, these writers can be grouped in terms of their pur-
poses into three categories, which we may call “Cassandrans,” “Prometheans,”
and “Seers.” Each author picked up the pen with a different motivation and goal
in mind. In some cases elements of more than one category are present, but it re-
mains easy to identify the fundamental motivation of the author.
Cassandrans seek to sound the tocsin, to call attention to dangers and condi-
tions that if not addressed will harm or even destroy the state. For these writers,
setting the story in a future where calamity has already befallen the target audi-
ence is a means of driving the warning home.
In contrast, Prometheans are highly optimistic. Their writings are accounts of
victories. The key to victory is usually some new technology or strategy. The
guarantors of victory are the pioneers who, despite misgivings or apprehensions
among mainstream military thinkers, have forged the new tool and learned how
to use it. In the hands of Prometheans, the future is a land of validation and
proof of concept.
Both Prometheans and Cassandrans clearly have axes to grind. Seers, in con-
trast, take a more dispassionate position and simply attempt to predict the fu-
ture. Perhaps not surprisingly, the category of Seers tends to be the least
populated of the three. This article will provide a brief chronological survey of
major writings in this genre, from 1871 to 2005. In each instance the purpose
will be identified, information regarding the author provided, and category as-
signed. Next, the degree to which the authors were successful in their predictions
will be discussed.
THE BEGINNING
In 1871, despite all the cultural and bureaucratic obstacles to publishing a mili-
tary critique in the public domain, Colonel (later General) Sir George Tomkyns
Chesney’s The Battle of Dorking appeared in Blackwood’s Magazine, and a whole
subgenre of literature was launched. Chesney, a Royal Engineer, had watched as
the new German army, in particular its Prussian components, crushed France
the year before. In doing so, the Germans proved they had the model modern
army. It was well equipped and well supported. Huge reserves could be mo-
bilized into service and be expected to perform almost as well as the most
experienced regular units. Its artillery was first rate. The Great General
Staff performed planning and logistics miracles. In short, the German army was
everything the British army was not. The British army was tiny. It had next to no
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reserves, its administration was antiquated, and its logistics were archaic. Much
of its equipment was out of date. The army had never exercised a formation
larger than a corps. Discussion of reform in Her Majesty’s army had been build-
ing for more than a decade, but little had been accomplished. Chesney was
clearly on the side of the reformers, and so he wrote his story.
In Dorking, an old man tells his grandchild how, years before, the power and
majesty of the British Empire had been destroyed when a modern Prussian army
made its way across the English Channel and shattered its gallant but hopelessly
outclassed British counterpart.2 All the weaknesses identified by the reformers,
as well as others only hinted at, such as a plethora of septuagenarian generals,
were instrumental in Chesney’s account of the German capture of London, the
loss of Britain’s imperial possessions, the elimination of Queen Victoria’s politi-
cal power, and the relegation of the United Kingdom to the role of a third-rate
power on the world stage. Chesney’s Cassandran warning was manifest to every
reader: if serious military reform was not undertaken and the Germans ever got
across the channel, England was doomed.
Any modern author would be happy to have the reception Dorking found
among both the reading public and political elites. The book quickly went
through multiple editions, was translated into more than a half-dozen lan-
guages, and became the topic of parliamentary debates. These debates were of-
ten acrimonious. Some of Chesney’s critics presaged the chest-thumping
bravado of later “jingoes,” suggesting that while Teutonic science had indeed tri-
umphed over France, Britons were made of sterner stuff—should the kaiser’s
minions ever set foot on England’s soil, they would quickly be defeated. Others,
particularly representatives of the Royal Navy, took more defensible positions,
pointing out that Chesney’s whole premise—that the invaders find safe passage
to the shores of Dover—required the absence of the fleet. This, they argued,
strained credulity to the breaking point, for the Germans had no navy of which
to speak and the British would never leave home waters completely unguarded.3
It is difficult to judge accurately the impact Dorking had in advancing the mil-
itary reform movement. Its publication did coincide with one of the most signif-
icant periods of reform in the history of the British army and likely contributed
in some degree to the successes enjoyed by the proponents of reform. However,
it must also be admitted that compared to the armies of continental powers, the
British military establishment remained thereafter woefully disorganized and
conducted no large-scale exercises such as would be required to master the intri-
cacies of contemporary warfare.
Dorking was much more successful in spawning literary imitations. Suddenly
there was a major demand for “invasion stories.” Similar story lines, albeit with
different victims, appeared in numerous venues, some in the United States. The
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most common form of publication was initial serialization in a magazine or
newspaper, followed by issuance in book form if there was sufficient demand.
These tales, clearly profit motivated, became less and less realistic, however en-
tertaining. Chesney, nonetheless, had placed a new literary genre on the map.
Within a decade, writers associated with Great Britain’s naval establishment
were writing both Cassandran and Promethean stories for British public con-
sumption.4 It was the naval Prometheans who provided the most interesting
writing of this time.
In his short story In a Conning Tower: How I Took HMS Majestic into Action,
Hugh Arnold Oakley-Foster waxes eloquent concerning the advances that a cer-
tain new, and very costly, type of ship would bring to Britain’s navy. This story
came at a crucial junction of naval architecture. Advances in metallurgy, me-
chanics, engineering, propulsion, gunnery, and fire control now allowed the
construction of revolutionary warships in which systems could be centrally di-
rected from armored conning towers. Oakley-Foster’s story, in which a lone
British ironclad, superbly captained, restores English maritime dominance to
the Mediterranean, extols the virtues of these ships.5
It is not surprising that Oakley-Foster trumpeted the superiority of and the
need for the new ironclads. A successful diplomat and politician, he served not
only as private secretary to the Chief Secretary for Ireland but as a member of
Parliament. More important, Oakley-Foster was both secretary of the Admiralty
from 1900 to 1903 and secretary of war from 1903 to 1905.6 In a Conning Tower
was apparently well received, although it did not enjoy the success of Dorking.
Again, the impact of the work on national decision making is hard to judge, but
the Royal Navy did embrace ironclad technology with a will, as did every other
naval power.
One of the more interesting examples of a Seer’s writing appeared on the eve
of the First World War. In Captain C. E. Vickers’s The Trenches, a British army is
locked in a desperate struggle with a continental foe. Both armies are en-
trenched, but the British forces must leave the safety of their lines and charge the
enemy if success is to be achieved. In order to do so, however, the British must
first bring their trenches close enough to those of the enemy to ensure that
enough assault troops can reach the enemy positions to achieve victory. The di-
lemma is explained with apparent mathematical certainty: so many men can dig
so much trench in a given period, in which time the enemy will inflict so many
casualties.
Trenches reflected a growing awareness among security professionals that
modern weapons were giving a battlefield advantage to soldiers in fixed defen-
sive positions. This had been demonstrated during the U.S. Civil War, the second
Anglo-Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War. It was believed, nonetheless, that
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sufficiently motivated and professional troops could carry enemy trenches if
they could get close enough first, under protection, to avoid suffering debilitat-
ing casualties as they crossed “no-man’s-land.” This problem is solved in
Trenches through the arrival of what amounts to a deus ex machina. An Ameri-
can salesman—rough, uncouth, and interested only in the bottom line—ap-
pears in the nick of time with an armored and tracked tractor that can safely dig
trenches across a bullet-swept battlefield faster and more reliably than humans
with picks and shovels could ever hope to. In the novel, the machine does its job,
Britain’s troops are able to “jump off ” from close enough to their opponent’s
trench line, and victory is assured.
Trenches apparently failed to interest either the general public or British secu-
rity elites. Given the speed with which the First World War engulfed Europe, this
is surprising, considering how closely Trenches predicted both the stalemate of
trench warfare and the convergence of technologies that would eventually break
that stalemate. The growing power and reliability of the internal combustion en-
gine, Caterpillar tracks, and armor were what made Vickers’s trenching machine
successful. Had he equipped his machine with machine guns and cannons and
driven it over enemy lines, his book would have effectively predicted the creation
of the tank.
The two decades following the First World War were dominated by
Prometheans, although, as will be argued, one Seer deserves special mention.
Nascent technologies, particularly involving armored units and heavy bombers,
had produced adherents who were as much missionaries as analysts. Notable ex-
amples include the U.S. Army general Billy Mitchell and the British armor zeal-
ots J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart. The latter’s German counterpart
included German generals Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian. Mitchell’s fel-
low airpower enthusiasts included the “Mahan of the air,” General Giulio
Douhet of Italy.7
Opposing these champions of change, especially among the victorious Allies,
were the major military establishments. In the main, senior leaders were unwill-
ing to devote the required resources to fielding and validating the new units, tac-
tics, and doctrines of air and armored warfare. Organizational theory would
suggest that they were also reluctant to face the changes that would affect mili-
tary structures and cultures should the new technologies be successful. Political
support for such expenditures, again particularly in the West, was also lacking.
Given bureaucratic inertia and entrenched reluctance at senior levels to “see
the future,” it was perhaps inevitable that the Prometheans of air and armor
would take up the pen.8 Two notable results, of very different literary calibers,
were The Battle of Dora, by the Englishman H. E. Graham, and War in the Air,
by the German “Major Helders.”9 Dora extols the virtues of a British armored
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brigade called into action on the European continent on behalf of the League of
Nations in order to stop what is obviously German aggression. Dora argues not
only for the utility of armored cars and tanks but also for an independent role for
armored formations. Equipped with proper weapons and tactics, the armored
brigade wreaks havoc on the enemy, cutting inside the decision-making loops of
enemy commanders, panicking conscript soldiers, and channeling enemy forces
into “killing zones.”
War in the Air presents an even more ambitious scenario. Forced into war
with France, Britain’s “natural enemy,” England is saved from annihilation by
only three hundred heavy bombers. These “giants” paralyze the French with a
decapitating strike on Paris, destroy the inferior and fighter-heavy French air
force in aerial combat, and then, despite being used in the less than optimum
role of close air support, shatter a French invasion that has somehow managed to
come ashore in the south of England. The message of War in the Air is a simple
one: a state with a strategic bombing force need fear no rival, particularly if its
leaders are willing to use a preemptive strategy.
Both Graham’s and Helders’s works give what can only be described as terror
a central role in a successful war strategy. Graham’s tanks—invulnerable, rapid,
and deadly—drain the will from their victims and increase the number of civil-
ian refugees with which the invaders will have to contend. But this terror is small
beer compared to what Helders envisions. Helders’s airplanes drop gas, high ex-
plosive, and incendiaries with the express purpose of terrorizing civilian popu-
lations to the point where they will riot in order to force their governments to
sue for peace. The heavy bombers’ impact is as devastating psychologically as it is
militarily.
Graham clearly belonged to the school of Fuller and Liddell Hart. He was one
of the young officers of the interwar period who passionately believed in the
power of the tank and sought to force change upon an unresponsive military es-
tablishment. As such, he is an interesting author and a good exemplar of the
breed of security professionals who were willing to risk the wrath of their ser-
vices in order to serve what they perceived to be the greater good.
Helders, cut from the same proselytizing cloth as Graham, is even more inter-
esting from a personal point of view. “Major Helders” is a nom de plume for
General der Flieger (that is, of Aviation) Dr. Robert Knauss, a die-hard propo-
nent of the big bomber and one of the men who helped orchestrate Germany’s
secret rearmament during the period between the wars. Unlike Graham, Knauss
did not have to convince a government that it was time to increase the produc-
tion of military equipment. His fight was with other military missionaries who
were eager to secure what resources were available for armored formations, sub-
marines, or tactical aviation.
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Graham’s Dora failed to connect with the public, but Graham and like-minded
officers eventually were fairly successful in selling their “gift from the heavens.”10
Although the fight was always uphill and the gains never as wide or deep as the
armor missionaries wanted, Britain did come to embrace the idea of independ-
ent tank formations and increasingly exercised armor-specific formations on
the Salisbury Plain. These efforts gained a boost as cavalry units, smarting under
a universal realization of their obsolescence, seized upon armor as a way to re-
tain their importance, and their customs and traditions as well, by replacing
their flesh-and-blood mounts with mechanical ones.
Knauss’s work was far better received than that of Graham. War in the Air was
translated into several languages and conveyed well the idea of bombers always
“getting through.” It failed to produce results in Germany’s revitalized war ef-
forts, but that was largely due to the death (fittingly, in the crash of a Ju-89, the
prototype for Knauss’s “Giants”) of General Walter Wever, Knauss’s patron and
Germany’s leading advocate of the centrality of strategic bomber forces. While
both Graham and Knauss were focused on Europe, a Seer was busy writing
about what he believed would be the next Great War, a conflict between the na-
vies of Japan and the United States for control of the Pacific Ocean and the re-
sources of Asia. This was Hector C. Bywater, and his 1925 The Great Pacific War:
A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931–33 gathered a great deal of
attention indeed. Bywater was an intriguing individual. As a boy (he was born
near Portsmouth, England, a British subject) he was fascinated by naval matters,
and this interest never faded. At the age of nineteen he became a journalist for
the New York Herald, covering the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 from
Tokyo. He continued his interest in and reporting of naval matters. In the
years before the First World War he became an agent of MI5 (the British
counterintelligence and security service), with the pay of a lieutenant com-
mander, using his access as a journalist to spy for Britain. His portfolio eventu-
ally included both American and German naval activities.
Aided by his deep knowledge of naval matters, the disposition of U.S. and
Japanese forces, and the dictates of geography, Bywater pictured a war in which
the Japanese rapidly struck without warning, forcing the United States back
across the Pacific and leaving Japan safe behind concentric island rings of de-
fenses. The United States, far from accepting the initial losses or seeking an ar-
mistice, girded for battle, flexed its industrial muscle, made good its damage,
and came sweeping back, forsaking a direct route to Japan in favor of an
island-hopping strategy. Bywater gave pride of place to battleships, and his vi-
sion of the war’s climactic battles owed more to Mahan than Douhet, but he did
not discount the role of the aircraft, the submarine, or the amphibious invasion
in his envisioned war.11
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In contrast to many works in this genre, Bywater’s prose was slick and his
story well paced and enjoyable. The book, initially declined by publishers in the
United States as too provocative, appeared in Britain to rave reviews—one, in
the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, by Admiral William S. Sims, commander of
U.S. naval forces in Europe during World War I. Bywater then received what any
writer can only see as a gift from heaven. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, then the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, took him on in the pages of the Baltimore Sun,
claiming that such a war was not possible. Interest in the book duly skyrocketed;
more editions were printed, it was translated into several languages, including
Japanese, and naval officers from Washington to Tokyo analyzed the work in
depth.
Whether or not Bywater’s book directly impacted the actions of naval plan-
ners will likely never be known. What is known is that War Plan ORANGE was re-
vamped. An anticipated direct strike at the Japanese home islands was scrapped
and an island-hopping strategy substituted. When World War II eventually en-
gulfed the globe, both the Japanese and the United States would use strategies
very similar to those predicted by Bywater.
War accelerates all forms of change, and the Second World War was no excep-
tion. World War I had left security professionals at the doorway of mechanized
warfare; World War II ushered in the atomic age. It also provided Lieutenant
Colonel Robert B. Rigg ample opportunity to serve as a Promethean, delivering
nuclear fire.
Rigg had started his U.S. Army career as an officer in the cavalry, literally on
horseback. He transitioned to armor and also served as a military observer dur-
ing Mao Tse-tung’s victory over Chinese Nationalist forces. He then served in
the Army research and development branch, working for Lieutenant General
James Galvin, who had won fame in World War II as the Army’s youngest, and
one of its first, paratroop generals. In 1958 Rigg wrote War—1974, a future his-
tory of atomic war on the Eurasian continent.12 His book, while perhaps defi-
cient in literary style, concentrated on the technological advances and new
tactics such a war would bring. In Rigg’s Promethean vision, flying tanks, elec-
tronic sensors, missile-firing submarines, data networks, and vertical assault by
troop-carrying helicopters were all featured. He also foresaw eternally orbiting
atomic-powered aircraft, fuel supplies delivered by rocket to armored units in
the field, and single-man “flying disks” used as observation platforms. In Rigg’s
war, command and control are decentralized, units not supremely mobile are in-
cinerated in nuclear fire, and warfare consumes the human, fiscal, and material
resources of entire nations.
Rigg’s thinking reflected that of those in the Army who would eventually
transform its organization from that of the Second World War and the follow-on
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Constabulary in Europe and Germany to the “Pentomic Army,” designed to
fight and win on nuclear, as well as conventional, battlefields.13 This concept sur-
vived into the early 1960s.
Rigg’s book was published during a period of continuing interest in nuclear
weapons and the forces that would use them. Faint echoes of General der Flieger
Knauss could be heard as U.S. Air Force generals, notably Curtis LeMay, argued
that the combination of heavy bombers and nuclear bombs had rendered navies
and armies all but obsolete. Rigg was as every bit as enamored with technology
as LeMay, but his book clearly made the case for large, indeed very large, and ca-
pable ground forces.
Rigg’s book failed to catch fire with the American public, much less with a
broader global readership. It could be that his depiction of epic devastation and
apocalyptic destruction offered too little in the way of hope. Unlike those of-
fered by earlier Prometheans, Rigg’s gifts did not promise reduced casualties or
faster victory. Also, the end of the Eisenhower administration brought in the
strategy of “Flexible Response,” which argued that Rigg’s nightmare could be
avoided through the maintenance of conventional forces in Europe, a strong nu-
clear deterrent, and unconventional forces to handle contingency operations
that would be encountered on lower rungs of the escalatory ladder.
If Rigg was the Promethean voice of the first half of the Cold War, General Sir
John Hackett of the British army was the Cassandran emeritus of the second
half. Hackett, like Riggs, had extensive experience on which to base his predic-
tions, having served in the army for more than thirty years. During the Second
World War he fought in Syria and Italy and had commanded the 4th Parachute
Brigade during the Arnhem operation. After the war he continued to serve,
eventually commanding the British Army of the Rhine, NATO’s northern bul-
wark against a possible Soviet invasion. In 1978 Hackett wrote The Third World
War August 1985: A Future History, a future history of a cataclysmic Soviet-NATO
clash in Europe.14
Deeply etched throughout Hackett’s book is a warning—that if the West did
not increase defense budgets and field new and promising weapons systems,
Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces would be able to achieve a military victory in
Europe. NATO does win in Hackett’s account, but just barely, not decisively
enough to avoid a limited nuclear exchange.15 Hackett clearly believed that if
NATO truly wanted to avoid the horrors of a third world war, the way to do so was
to strengthen its collective defenses, not weaken them, as seemed all too likely.
Although dry in places and prone to lengthy examinations of command-and-
control issues, The Third World War was highly readable and possessed an air
of authenticity.
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At the time Hackett wrote The Third World War, many serious military ob-
servers and political analysts were beginning to be concerned about the
U.S.-NATO/Soviet–Warsaw Pact balance of forces. The Soviets were apparently
making large strides among a variety of postcolonial and anticolonial move-
ments. Russian advances in maritime platforms, armor, and, most especially,
nuclear forces were significant and showed no signs of slowing. In the Mediter-
ranean, Greco-Turk relations were growing increasingly strained, and the
southern flank of the NATO alliance seemed in danger of unraveling.16 Growing
calls for serious defense cuts in Britain’s defense budget, a growing reluctance
among European youth to follow the colors, and a manifest resistance to the
draft in the United States were all reasons to be concerned about the credibility
of the West’s conventional deterrent.
Again in contrast to Rigg, Hackett enjoyed tremendous success with his book;
eventually, more than three million copies were sold. The book was discussed
throughout the NATO alliance, and no critic was able to mount a legitimate at-
tack against Hackett’s credentials. Many of his recommendations were imple-
mented, particularly regarding research into and the eventual fielding of certain
types of weapons systems. While it would be substantially overstating Hackett’s
influence to credit him with these shifts in NATO defense spending, The Third
World War can be seen as a contributing factor to a growing willingness to put
more resources into conventional deterrent forces in Europe.
After the Cold War and the successful conclusion of the first Gulf War, the U.S.
military was able and willing to take on missions it had considered secondary to
combat operations. These included a variety of peace operations, disaster-relief
efforts, and counterdrug activities. Even more exotic tasks were undertaken, in-
cluding detailing military doctors to urban hospital emergency rooms, sending
military instructors to local classrooms, and (although this project was not car-
ried out) running “tough love” boot camps for troubled teenagers. At the same
time, the American public identified its military as an institution deserving the
highest confidence and trust, easily scoring better in public opinion polls than
Congress or the independent media. Military leaders, in particular General
Colin Powell, were seen by some as more desirable presidential candidates than
the men put forward by the major parties.
The combination of new missions and intense public support, among other
factors, led Major Charles A. Dunlap, an active-duty U.S. Air Force lawyer, to
write “The Coup of 2012,” first published in the Army War College’s journal Pa-
rameters in the winter of 1992.17 Dunlap presented his article in the form of an
address to future war college students, looking back at the past decades. This was
a classic use of future history.
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Dunlap’s argument is simple. Pressed by public demand to take on more un-
traditional missions, the U.S. military gradually becomes more and more in-
volved in areas that previously had been the sole domain of civil organizations.
Military discipline, planning, and resources typically produce successes that, in
turn, bring increasing demands for deeper participation in civil life. Inevitably, a
political crisis occurs, and a military leader assumes the reins of power. Unlike
Cincinnatus, he does not relinquish control, and a military dictatorship ensues.
The brief and well written “Coup” attracted immediate attention from a wide
variety of audiences. The article was quickly incorporated into war college and
other syllabi. It made the rounds of senior officers in the Pentagon and sparked a
lively debate about the nature and state of civil-military relations in the United
States. Dunlap’s career suffered no ill effects from his article; he is, as of this writ-
ing, a major general, serving as deputy judge advocate general of the Air Force.
The final example of this genre was published in 2005 in the pages of The At-
lantic. Richard A. Clarke, an expert in counterterrorism and a staff member of
both the Clinton and George W. Bush National Security Councils, had been a
major figure in post-9/11 investigations. In his article, Clarke projects the
United States ten years into the future, from which vantage point he explains
how the war on terror has been lost.18 Clarke is a Cassandran of the first water.
On every page he warns of the consequences of flawed policies, poor decisions,
and strategic mismanagement. Terrorists seize upon every opportunity; they—and
an ill-timed and mismanaged war with Iran—humble the United States.
Given Clarke’s credentials and the intense public interest in the war on terror,
it is surprising that “Ten Years Later” fizzled. The article generated a few letters to
the editor but has passed into obscurity. There are several likely explanations for
this lack of response. First, there have been no successful attacks inside the
United States since 11 September 2001;19 the United States has spent a great deal
of money and undergone substantial internal reorganization in order to im-
prove homeland security. Further, it is possible that Richard Clarke, a vocal and
highly visible opponent of the Bush administration, came across as too person-
ally vested in his story. Clarke clearly felt his advice had been ignored and his tal-
ents underutilized, and “Ten Years Later” reflects this resentment. Also, at the
time of publication Clarke made frequent appearances in a large variety of me-
dia venues; perhaps the public became surfeited with the former terrorism ex-
pert. For whatever reason, Clarke’s work did not evoke the intense interest that
the writings of Chesney, Bywater, Hackett, and Dunlap had.
GETTING THEIR WARS RIGHT
Clarke’s “Ten Years Later” serves as an apt literary bookend to Chesney’s
Dorking. Between these two works lie 124 years of this peculiar subgenre of
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predictive writing. The men selected for this article were all experienced profes-
sionals.20 They had access to official intelligence and what can be termed “inside
knowledge.” It is therefore reasonable to ask: Did they get it right? Which
group—Cassandrans, Prometheans, or Seers—was most likely to be accurate?
The answer is somewhat subjective and surprising. With the exception of
Bywater and, to a lesser extent, Vickers, none of the authors correctly predicted
future conflicts.21 The Germans did not invade England in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Great Britain fought no major naval duels in the Mediterranean in the
1890s. Great-power war, whether featuring armored units or air armadas, did
not engulf Europe in the 1920s. The world did not have to suffer global nuclear
war in the 1970s. The U.S. military has resisted any temptations to launch a coup
d’état, and, say what one will about the global war on terror, any claim of a strate-
gic American defeat at this point would be grossly exaggerated.
However, to dismiss these authors would be premature. A more nuanced look
shows that if one concentrates not on the predicted wars but instead on the tech-
nologies, the prophetic power of the Prometheans begins to look rather impres-
sive. For instance, Oakley-Foster’s ironclads were to fight (though not with
British crews) at the battles of the Yalu in 1894, of Santiago and Manila Bay in
1898, and Tsushima in 1905. Follow-on classes of battleships would retain al-
most all of the attributes that Oakley-Foster found so noteworthy. Armored bri-
gades, much less armored divisions, would do all that H. E. Graham thought
they would and more, particularly in the opening engagements of the Second
World War. Although the utility of armored formations was to wax and wane
over the years, the legacy of Stryker brigades in today’s U.S. Army can easily be
traced back to early tanks and armored vehicles so beloved by Graham. Gra-
ham’s tactics, especially when combined with tactical airpower, would become
the blitzkrieg, in battlefields from Poland to Egypt and Iraq.
General der Flieger Knauss would also have found justification in the emer-
gence of massive fleets of heavy bombers and of strategic bombing campaigns
designed to destroy the manufacturing capabilities of states and break the will of
nations.22 However, it was the Allies who would build the air armadas, not the
Germans. Also, the heavy bolt from the blue would prove less decisive than Gra-
ham’s armored fist as a war-winning weapon. Public will was to prove much
more resistant to being broken than anticipated, and bombing campaigns would
fail to deliver the knockout blow their proponents believed they would.
Knauss, Graham, and, to a lesser degree, Oakley-Foster have one thing in
common: they grossly underestimated the number of machines required to
achieve their envisioned victories. Before World War II was over, there would be
armored armies and corps. Knauss’s entire national force of three hundred
heavy bombers represents less than a third of the size of some of the air raids that
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would be mounted over the Third Reich. Efforts to build fleets of dreadnought
battleships may have helped trigger the First World War. In short, these
Prometheans tended to oversell the capabilities of their particular “gifts from
the gods.”
Of all the Prometheans, Lieutenant Colonel Rigg deserves the most credit for
getting equipment trajectories correct. At first glance, such pride of place seems
odd, especially in light of the rather fanciful illustrations of Rigg’s flying tanks
and “big-helmeted men” published as exemplars of the technology he touted.
However, when one considers the Russian Hind and U.S. Apache attack helicop-
ters, “flying tank” does not seem so outlandish after all. Furthermore, the net-
worked battlefield and soldiers, precision munitions, and warfare in the
electronic spectrum are all among Rigg’s successful predictions.
What, then, of the track record for the Cassandrans? The short answer is that
history did not bear out authors who raised the alarm and sounded the tocsin.
This, however, does not mean they were fundamentally wrong. For example, the
flaws in the British army identified by Chesney endured long after his death.
There is little doubt that had the German and British armies collided under the
circumstances he describes, the forces of the kaiser would have triumphed. As it
was, however, the Royal Navy kept potential continental enemies at bay, and a
British policy of avoiding European entanglements bought the time required
between 1871 and 1914 to modernize and gradually create a truly modern army.
The case for Hackett’s The Third World War is more difficult to make. There is
much less consensus on what would have been the results of a NATO/Warsaw
Pact clash; thankfully, history has ensured that it will remain a question without
an answer. Nor is it possible, by any means, to feel sanguine about such a con-
flict’s not escalating to a global nuclear exchange. What gave Hackett’s writing
such power was that his warning was seen at the time as timely and plausible.
Events have borne out Dunlap’s “Coup of 2012” even less. The U.S. military,
grounded from its creation in the notion of subordination to civil authorities,
has indeed become more involved in operations other than war. However, these
operations are nothing new; they have been part of the services’ mission set since
the Revolutionary War. There have been outspoken flag officers before, and
there undoubtedly will be again. In these cases, the American system has been
self-correcting. Dunlap’s piece was well timed and well written, and it reflected
responsible concern over the future employment of U.S. forces. But as a pre-
scient warning of impending danger, it has been shown to be excessive and
wrong.
At present, Richard Clarke’s writing seems in retrospect to have more in com-
mon with that of Dunlap than of Chesney. Terrorist actions against American
targets have occurred neither when nor how Clarke predicted they would. Yet it
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would be dangerous to dismiss Clarke’s writing altogether. There are still several
years to go before his ten-year leap into the future is truly history. Al-Qa‘ida re-
mains active, and its opposition to the United States is unabated. Despite the ab-
sence of a major attack in the United States since 2001, efforts to strengthen U.S.
defenses continue. Thus while it appears that Clarke may have overstated his
case, it is far too early to discard his warning.
This leaves the Seers—Bywater, with his The Great Pacific War, and Vickers,
with The Trenches. Although only running sixteen pages, Vickers’s work depicts
the classic World War I battlefield with a high degree of fidelity. In his vision,
machines, especially automatic weapons and modern artillery, force men to dig
for their survival and accept a subterranean existence as a military necessity.
This results in a nearly unbreakable battlefield status quo. In order to gain vic-
tory, a way must be found to close the range between the trench lines. On battle-
fields dominated by machines, only other machines can perform this feat.23
Vickers correctly identifies the characteristics necessary for the machine that is
needed: the vehicle must be armored, to survive on the fire-swept field; it must
be tracked, to navigate a blasted, torn, and potentially muddy terrain; and it
must be powered by an internal combustion engine, to be able to move the ar-
mor it carries and drive its tracks. Furthermore, it must be manned, because its
operations will require human intelligence to succeed.
Given how well Vickers developed this futuristic vehicle, it is surprising that
he missed a further, and last, essential characteristic and a more obvious strat-
egy: a gun that would have turned the tractor into a tank, and a strategy of as-
saulting head-on rather than advancing entrenchments. It might be that as an
engineer he was naturally inclined to think about fortifications and entrench-
ments. Still, as a foreshadowing of the reality of the First World War, The
Trenches comes very close indeed.
Finally, we have Bywater and The Great Pacific War, and it deserves special at-
tention. Although his timeline was off by a decade, Bywater correctly anticipated
the strategic course of World War II in the Pacific. In his book the war is initiated
by a bold and undeclared Japanese strike.24 Bywater’s Japanese invasion of the
Philippines is all but identical to the actual operation later conducted by the Jap-
anese. Bywater anticipates a gallant defense of one of the U.S.-held islands
(Guam in his case, versus history’s Wake). The United States is forced to adopt an
island-hopping strategy, and in the end American industry, once placed on a war
footing, overwhelms its Japanese counterpart. Aircraft and submarines play im-
portant roles in the war, even if the main naval battles in Bywater are Mahanian
in nature. Taken all together, the effect is remarkable.
How did Bywater get his war so right? First, he understood the tyranny of ge-
ography. A Pacific war would place the Japanese in a strong strategic defensive
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position, especially if they could quickly seize, fortify, and operate from distant
island chains. Bywater also understood local hydrographic conditions; a study of
the Philippines reveals only a few places suitable for large amphibious opera-
tions. Bywater also recognized that an island-hopping campaign, not a direct as-
sault, offered the best chance to defeat a Japanese opponent. Bywater further saw
how quickly the industrial potential of the United States could be harnessed and
how quickly Japanese efforts to maintain parity would be overcome. Thus a large
part of the credit for Bywater’s prescience can be attributed to his experience
with naval matters and his perception of the future battlefield.
There is as well a more personal, but yet still possible, reason for Bywater’s ac-
curacy. As has been mentioned, American naval planners, following the publica-
tion of Bywater’s book, did modify War Plan ORANGE. Among other things, they
increased the protection afforded the Panama Canal and adopted an island-
hopping strategy in case of war with Japan. In the same period, the Japanese
naval attaché to Great Britain, Captain Isoroku Yamamoto, spent an entire eve-
ning discussing the book with Bywater (over a bottle of scotch). In 1941,
Admiral Yamamoto would, as commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, ef-
fectively run the Japanese navy. It was he who had the idea of an initial strike
against the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. Is it possible that Bywater’s book,
grounded in geographic reality and studied by both future combatants, became
in this respect a self-fulfilling prophecy? Unfortunately, Bywater’s life has
spawned something of a cottage industry of conspiracy theories, so it is difficult
to pursue this line of inquiry much farther.25
What, then, are some general conclusions that can be derived from this subgenre
of literature? First, while this eccentric subgenre of literature is small in size,
there is no reason to believe it is extinct. Given the historical track record, a ma-
jor addition to the volume of work can be expected at least once a decade. Each
will have a reasonable chance of success and may even become the “talk of the
(policy) town.”
Second, categorizing the authors of such works as Prometheans, Cassan-
drans, and Seers is a viable approach. The material highlighted here as well as ad-
ditional works in this genre all fit within these categories. In addition, the
categories clearly capture the general thrust of the various writings.
Third, Seers, Prometheans, and Cassandrans all reflect the security angsts of
their times. However, no one in any of these groups has been able truly to shatter
the event horizon, in that contemporary political alignments, weapons systems,
and other realities have prevented the accurate envisioning of a distant future.
Thus the farther the event horizon, the less likely the author is to be correct.
1 3 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Winter 2009\NWCR Winter 09\NWCR W09.vp
Thursday, December 18, 2008 11:14:51 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
144
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 1, Art. 23
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss1/23
Fourth, some fairly reliable “weighting” patterns emerge that make this
methodology useful to the security analyst—in fact to anyone with an interest in
future military planning, strategy, or forces:
• The Seers are more likely to be correct than either the Cassandrans or the
Prometheans.
• The Prometheans are likely to identify important emerging weapons
systems, tactics, and technologies correctly but are likely to overstate their
value.
• Cassandrans are highly likely to be wrong, and future examples of this
genre should be taken with a very large grain of salt. But it is this very lack
of success that makes the Cassandrans’ writings so interesting.
Although this article has confined itself to writings by past security profes-
sionals, the value of a more comprehensive awareness among today’s security
professionals of the larger field of predictive military literature should not be
immediately discounted; Arthur Conan Doyle’s short story “Danger,” for in-
stance, ranks as one of the more accurate Promethean accounts. It may well be,
in fact, that writers without the cultural blinders and organizational baggage
typical of military and political experts will be able to sense more accurately the
shape of the future. In an era in which even the most traditional security profes-
sional acknowledges the impact of asymmetric forces, such insights may be
more useful than ever.
N O T E S
This article would never have been written
were it not that several years ago I designed
and cotaught an elective course of study enti-
tled “Future Wars” at the Naval War College.
My partner in that effort was Lieutenant Col-
onel Patrick Donahoe, U.S. Army, a remark-
able soldier and scholar.
1. I am indebted to the pioneering work of Pro-
fessor I. F. Clarke, former professor of Eng-
lish studies at the University of Strathclyde.
Professor Clarke has produced several books
on the subject of literary efforts to predict
conflict, including Voices Prophesying War:
Future Wars 1763–3749, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1992), and The Tale of
the Next Great War 1871–1914: Fictions of Fu-
ture Warfare and Battles Still-To-Come (Syra-
cuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1996).
Looking at some of the same works as this ar-
ticle, Dr. Clarke is more concerned with the
broader field of apocalyptic literature and
does not confine his studies to material cre-
ated by security professionals only.
2. While Chesney scrupulously avoids identify-
ing the Germans as such, his description of
troop types, equipment, and tactics leaves no
doubt as to the nationality of the invaders.
3. Chesney dealt with the pesky problem of
British maritime superiority by inventing a
crisis in the Mediterranean Sea that draws off
sufficient naval assets to allow the enemy to
land his invading army intact.
4. An excellent example of a naval Cassandran
account is Capt. S. Eardley-Wilmot’s The
Next Naval War (London: Edward Stanford,
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1894). Eardley-Wilmot tells the tale of a
French victory, primarily through the use of
subterfuge, mines, and torpedoes, over the
Royal Navy. Four editions of the book were
eventually published.
5. Like many of these writings, In a Conning
Tower also, almost inadvertently, enters the
realm of social engineering. Oakley-Foster’s
piece reduces the crew of the ironclad to near
automatons, performing individual functions
with machinelike reliability and being re-
placed when damaged or destroyed. The only
personality that matters, the only human
whose feelings may be taken into account, is
the captain, whose experience, courage, and
decision-making capacity constitute the
brains and spirit of the ship.
6. Clarke, Tale of the Next Great War, p. 377.
7. Douhet’s Il dominio dell’aria (Command of
the Air) was originally published in 1921.
8. Interestingly, while the airpower Prometheans
acknowledged the growing role of armor on
the battlefield and the armor Prometheans
did likewise for the growing power of the air-
craft, each saw the other as either a support-
ing or ancillary force. Thus, proponents of
blitzkrieg tended to avoid popular fiction as a
means of advancing their arguments.
9. H. E. Graham, The Battle of Dora (London:
William Clowes and Sons, 1931); and Major
Helders [Robert Knauss], The War in the Air
1936 (London: John Hamilton, 1932).
10. Graham’s work was in all likelihood doomed
from the start. The Battle of Dora is one of the
worst-written pieces in the entire genre.
Characters are barely one-dimensional, the
humor is forced, the writing uninspired.
While a careful reading does produce useful
bits of information and nuggets of insight,
the book is hard sledding. Mercifully, it is
rather short, running to only seventy-five
pages.
11. All of these elements of naval combat were
the subject of debate at the time. Entrenched
naval leaders believed that the submarine and
aircraft were predominantly scouting vehicles
and that the Gallipoli campaign of the First
World War had proved the limitations of sea-
borne invasion forces.
12. Robert R. Rigg, War—1974 (Harrisburg, Pa.:
Military Service, 1958).
13. General Gavin, Rigg’s superior, was not
among these. “Pentomic” referred to the new
organizational pattern—five rifle companies
in a “battle group,” five battle groups in a di-
vision, etc.
14. General Sir John Hackett, The Third World
War August 1985: A Future History (New
York: Macmillan, 1978).
15. From a literary point of view, the limited nu-
clear portion of Hackett’s war, essentially a
Russian-initiated trade of Birmingham for
Minsk, represents one of the most artificial
and forced portions of the book.
16. James Brown, “Challenges and Uncertainty:
NATO’s Southern Flank,” Air University Re-
view (May–June 1980), available at www
.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/.
17. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “The Coup of 2012,”
Parameters (Winter 1992–93), pp. 2–20.
18. Richard A. Clarke, “Ten Years Later,” Atlantic
295, no. 1 (January–February 2005), pp.
61–77.
19. This is most certainly not to imply that such
an attack is now impossible.
20. This genre has been exclusively populated to
date by male authors.
21. In fairness, the jury could said to be still out
in the case of Richard Clarke’s “Ten Years
Later,” although his future time has so far
proved inaccurate.
22. Considering that he survived the war and
spent some time in a French prisoner-of-war
camp, it is possible General Knauss’s self-
justification might also have had a somewhat
rueful component.
23. In his own way Vickers acknowledges the role
that U.S. manufacturing capabilities will play
in future wars, if not perhaps in the First
World War.
24. Hector C. Bywater, The Great Pacific War: A
History of the American-Japanese Campaign of
1931–33 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1925;
repr. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), p. 22 (of
1925 ed.).
25. See William H. Honan, Bywater: The Man
Who Invented the Pacific War (London: Mac-
donald, 1990).
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REVIEW ESSAY
THE ESSENTIAL AFRICA READER
Stephen A. Emerson
Morris, Donald R. The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and
Fall of the Zulu Nation. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1965. 650pp. $25.15
Moorehead, Alan. The White Nile. New York: Harper and
Row, 1960. 448pp. $14.95
Pakenham, Thomas. The Scramble for Africa: White Man’s
Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876–1912. New
York: Random House, 1994. 738pp. $23.95
Hochschild, Adam. King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed,
Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa. Boston: Mariner’s
Books, 1998. 400pp. $15
Shaxson, Nicholas. Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of Af-
rican Oil. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 288pp.
$18.95
Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962.
New York: Macmillan, 2006. 624pp. $19.95
Mandela, Nelson. Long Walk to Freedom. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1994. 558pp. $19.85
Nugent, Paul. Africa since Independence: A Comparative
History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 624pp. $75
Schraeder, Peter. African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in
Transformation. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth/Thomas
Learning, 2004. 378pp. $41.95
Chan, Stephen. Grasping Africa: A Tale of Tragedy and
Achievement. London: I. B. Tauris, 2007. 224pp. $32
Ayittey, George. Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Af-
rica’s Future. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 512pp.
$19.95
Dr. Stephen A. Emerson is an African-affairs specialist
with over twenty-five years of experience working on
African political and security issues. He currently
teaches security, strategy, and forces (SSF) and strategy
and theater security (STS) at the Naval War College.
Prior to joining the NWC faculty, Emerson worked for
the U.S. Department of Defense as a political-military
analyst for southern Africa, and was Chair of Security
Studies at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. His
professional interests include southern African studies,
conflict and political instability, and American foreign
and security policy in the developing world. Emerson is
the author of numerous studies as well as governmental
and academic articles on African politics, U.S.-African
policy, and intelligence issues. He holds a PhD in politi-
cal science and comparative politics, and an MA in in-
ternational relations from the University of Florida.
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Events in Africa, from the killing fields of eastern Congo and Darfur to the re-
mote reaches of the Niger Delta and the slums of Nairobi, are increasingly cap-
turing the limelight. Africa matters now more than ever to the United States.
Given this new reality, escalating American involvement on the continent will
undoubtedly be a defining hallmark in future decades for both the United States
and African countries. Whether or not this engagement is ultimately successful,
however, will largely depend on how well the United States understands the con-
tinent and its people.
To that end, I am frequently asked to recommend the one magical book that
“explains Africa.” Since no such book exists, the next best thing is to provide a
short list of essential works addressing key trends and themes that have helped
shape the continent of today.1 The challenge here is to identify books that pro-
vide a balanced picture of Africa’s triumphs and tragedies; highlight the conti-
nent’s diversity, while recognizing common interests and challenges; and
capture the heart and soul of the land, its people, and the African spirit––that
unique and often unfathomable resilience and optimism that has shown itself in
the face of enormous adversity. That is the quest I have undertaken here.
There are a number of excellent, meticulous studies of African history.2 The
Washing of the Spears, by Donald R. Morris, looks at the rise to prominence of the
Zulu kingdom in the early nineteenth century and its inevitable confrontation in
southern Africa with imperial Britain. It is a must-read for many reasons. That a
seemingly “primitive” people could defeat on the field of battle at Isandhlwana in
1879 the most powerful and professional military of its day speaks to the resource-
fulness and innovativeness that would come to define African resistance to Euro-
pean colonialism. Just as important, Zulu nation-building, beginning in 1817, set
in motion a series of incidents (the mfecane, or crushing) that has been called “one
of the great formative events in African history.”3 The mfecane would dramatically
transform the demographic, political, and social terrains of southern and eastern
Africa and have repercussions that still linger nearly two hundred years later.
Another classic, Alan Moorehead’s The White Nile, examines early Euro-
pean fascination with the “dark continent” in the run-up to the scramble for
Africa through the eyes of such famous explorers as Richard Burton, John
Hanning Speke, and Samuel Baker. It also contrasts the motivations of the hu-
manist David Livingstone with those of the American adventurer Henry Mor-
ton Stanley. Ostensibly an account of the exploration of the Nile, it is much
more, providing as it does the rich historical context of many of today’s press-
ing and intertwined challenges in Sudan, Chad, Egypt, and Uganda. Reading
the chapters on Charles Gordon, the rise of Mahdism, the Muslim revolt, and
the reconquest of Sudan in 1898 will reveal a direct, bright line to the current
issues of Islamic extremism, the southern Sudan question, and Darfur.
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Thomas Pakenham’s The Scramble for Africa retraces the “great game” in Af-
rica in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the continent be-
came––and not for the last time––a venue for great-power competition and
conflict. The potent imperial cocktail of “God, glory, and gold” fueled a colonial
onslaught that would bring the nations of Europe to the brink of war on more
than one occasion and reshape Africa forever. Pakenham’s behind-the-scenes
look at the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 examines the personal and
geopolitical factors driving the partition of the continent. The result of these
machinations would be an enduring legacy of ill-conceived colonial borders and
artificial African states that still exist today.
No one benefited more from the Berlin Conference than Belgium’s King
Leopold II. Adam Hochschild’s vividly descriptive King Leopold’s Ghost recounts
Leopold’s ruthless quest from 1885 to 1908 to exploit the riches of the Congo.
The result, according to the novelist Joseph Conrad, was “the vilest scramble for
loot that ever disfigured the history of the human conscience” (p. 4). Leopold
became a very rich man (with a fortune of, conservatively, $1.1 billion in today’s
dollars), but at enormous human cost—about half the territory’s population
was killed or died as a result of starvation, exposure, or disease during his rape of
the Congo. Independence from Belgium in 1960 brought little relief. The
Congo’s colonial masters were simply replaced by a succession of African
kleptocrats who (often with Western support) continued to plunder the country
and produce massive human suffering. The horror continues. The smoldering
ten-year-old conflict for power and control of natural resources in the eastern
Congo has left up to five million people dead in what has become Africa’s forgot-
ten war.
Unfortunately, the Congo is not alone. The global rush to tap Africa’s re-
sources, which increasingly fuel the economies of the world, has been a critical
source of conflict and instability across the continent. The ivory, gold, slaves,
and rubber of old have been replaced with cobalt, coltan, diamonds, timber, and,
most of all, oil. Oil, Africa’s blessing and curse, has become an American addic-
tion: African oil imports to the United States now top 20 percent, surpassing
Middle Eastern imports in 2007. Nicholas Shaxson’s Poisoned Wells: The Dirty
Politics of African Oil is an unflattering inside look at the impact of oil as a di-
vider of African society.4 Using a journalistic style, Shaxson takes the reader on a
remarkable journey from the wood-paneled boardrooms of Houston, London,
Paris, and Geneva to the sweltering heat of the Gulf of Guinea. Along the way
one encounters a vast array of corrupt Western and African officials, manipula-
tive businessmen and politicians, and the economics of dirty money. What is as-
tounding is not that the oil business in Africa is, and has long been, an insider’s
game, shrouded in secrecy, fueled by personal ambitions, and riddled with
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corruption, but the sheer magnitude of the corruption and the cost to African
societies. By some estimates Nigeria has lost through corruption and misman-
agement over half the $600 billion it has earned since it first started pumping oil
in 1956, and for all the nation’s wealth the average citizen survives on less than a
dollar a day.5 Rather than the exception, this seems to be the rule. Nigeria and
other major oil producers Angola and Sudan rank in the bottom fifth of the UN
Development Index.
Although first published over thirty years ago, Alistair Horne’s A Savage War
of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962 remains a must-read on multiple levels for those
grappling with today’s security challenges in Africa. It provides, first and fore-
most, an insightful analysis of the bloody Algerian anticolonial struggle that was
to become the prototype for wars of liberation in Africa. The conflict took over a
million lives, permanently displaced another million, and shook the French
Republic to its core. The book remains relevant today because of its implications
for the current war on terror. It is highly popular in official Washington circles,
although many misguided inferences appear to have been drawn from it, includ-
ing the rationalization that ends justify the means. In the revised 1996 edition,
Horne perceptively links the war and its aftermath to the rise of Algerian inter-
national jihadists, by demonstrating the globalized nature of domestic and
international security challenges.
If Horne’s work is a tale of woe and gloom for the future of independent Africa,
Nelson Mandela’s autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom, provides rays of inspira-
tion and hope for what Africa could be. Begun clandestinely in 1974 while
Mandela was imprisoned on Robben Island (the apartheid regime’s Alcatraz for
hard-core political prisoners), the book paints a detailed picture of his life and the
events that would transform him into South Africa’s first majority-rule president
in 1994. From his birth in rural Transkei in 1918, of royal Xhosa lineage, and
through a typical African childhood on the veldt, one accompanies Mandela on
his journey of political awakening in the South Africa of the 1940s and 1950s.
Through this introspective portrait, the reader gains a greater appreciation of the
values and events that shaped his life and personal philosophy. In his deeply held
respect for rural traditions and customs, his sense of duty and loyalty, and his
growing frustration with a political system that denied fundamental rights to the
majority of its citizens, one sees a man transformed into a powerful political figure
and inspirational leader in the fight against apartheid. The reader is also intro-
duced to the statesman who, as president, was committed to reconciliation and
looking to the future: “I would not mince words about the horrors of apartheid,
but I said, over and over, that we should forget the past and concentrate on build-
ing a better future for all” (p. 535).
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Taken together, Paul Nugent’s Africa since Independence: A Comparative His-
tory and Peter Schraeder’s African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transforma-
tion represent a sweeping yet thoughtful look at the key factors underpinning
the political, social, and economic development of modern Africa. Moreover, al-
though taking very different epistemological approaches to the task, both do
highly effective jobs, building solid historical contexts for their critical explora-
tions of the challenges facing Africa today. Whether in Nugent’s critical analysis
of democratic trends or Schraeder’s examination of the role of ethnicity and
class, the reader sees that history, culture, and societal context matter. (One
wishes that many of those reporting on the 2007 postelection violence in Kenya
had taken the time to read Schraeder’s analysis of ethnicity and class in Africa.)
So, what is to be done? Stephen Chan’s readable yet profound Grasping Africa:
A Tale of Tragedy and Achievement does a powerful job of portraying the human
side of African problems and offers a bottom-up approach to improving the
condition of Africa. That approach envisions “more than distribution tables and
aid requirements. It is about something very great in the face of tragedy” (p. xi).
To Chan and many others, addressing the continent’s problems, which are fun-
damentally rooted in the lack of economic development and individual empow-
erment, requires solutions that speak to improving the condition of ordinary
Africans. Although espousing largely an African-centric approach, Chan be-
lieves the world can help give Africa a fighting chance by lifting restrictive and
detrimental trade policies.
Reaching largely the same conclusion, the distinguished if controversial Gha-
naian economist George Ayittey in Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa’s
Future meticulously walks the reader through the numbers and leadership fail-
ures that underlie the continent’s malaise. For Ayittey the remedy is simple—it is
the little guy. It is to be found in African indigenous economic institutions that
have long existed: “All that is required is to take what is there, build or improve
upon the existing institutions, and unleash the creative and entrepreneurial en-
ergies of the African people” (p. 398). Ayittey, however, readily acknowledges
that even this straightforward task will be difficult to accomplish without signif-
icant reforms in the international system and the donor community. Also, he
warns, entrenched domestic interests of the “hippo generation” of old-line Afri-
can leaders will be resistant to change.
Taken together, this collection of books paints a stark portrait of a continent
that has suffered much, not only at the hands of outsiders but of its own doing as
well. The Africa of today, for better or worse, is a manifestation of this historical
legacy, but its future certainly is not bound by it. While these books tell a tale of
violence, despair, and man’s inhumanity to man, they also show resilience and
persistence in the face of often insurmountable odds. They show an Africa
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increasingly willing to accept responsibility for its future while acknowledging
the need for a helping hand and understanding from the rest of the world. A new
generation of African leaders and average citizens is fighting to achieve life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness. Perhaps we as Americans have more in
common with our African brethren than we realize after all.
N O T E S
1. My self-imposed parameters for selecting
these “essential works” were: nonfiction only
(while acknowledging that many excellent
works of fiction address important African is-
sues and themes), no textbook-style books
(as a group they provide a continental per-
spective), enduring themes and major trends,
relevance to today, and a maximum of ten
books. Although the bulk of these criteria is
admittedly subjective, I believe they provided
effective guidance in the selection process.
Only on the last point did I fail—there are
eleven books on the list.
2. See, for example, Basil Davidson, A History of
Africa, rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1974);
John Reader, Africa: A Biography of the Conti-
nent (New York: Knopf, 1988); or the multi-
volume work A. E. Afigbo et al., The Making
of Modern Africa (New York: Longman,
1986) as historical reference works.
3. In the words of famed southern African his-
torian J. D. Omer-Cooper, as cited in T. R. H.
Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History
(Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1977), p.
10.
4. See also John Ghazvinian, Untapped: The
Scramble for Africa’s Oil (Orlando, Fla.: Har-
court, 2007), reviewed in Naval War College
Review 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), pp. 142–43,
for a similar analysis.
5. “Documenting the Paradox of Oil, Poverty in
Nigeria,” Weekend Edition Sunday, NPR, 6
July 2008. See also www.publishwhatyoupay
.org for a look at efforts to promote transpar-
ency in the oil sector.
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BOOK REVIEWS
WHAT IS THE KEY TO VICTORY?
Desch, Michael C. Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism. Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2008. 232pp. $45
The notion that “democracies don’t
fight one another” is well known, but
recently some scholars have made a
stronger claim—that when democracies
do fight wars, their battlefield effective-
ness is far greater than that of nonde-
mocracies with comparable technology
and training.
Michael Desch challenges the supposed
military prowess of democracies in his
book Power and Military Effectiveness:
The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphal-
ism. Desch, a political scientist, holds
the Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelli-
gence and National Security Decision-
Making at Texas A&M University and is
an authority on civil-military relations.
His past work argues that it is strategic
interests, not regime types, that deter-
mine a nation’s security policy. His lat-
est book extends that theme by
delivering a convincing rebuttal to what
he calls the “democratic triumphalists.”
The case of the “triumphalists” rests
upon statistical analyses showing that
democracies have been more likely to
win wars than other political systems
over the last two hundred years. Desch
challenges these studies head on,
arguing that in most cases the democra-
cies in question would have been ex-
pected to win in any case, due to
traditional military advantages (the
United States in the 1991 Gulf war) or
to motivation, national survival being
on the line (Israel in 1973), and that in
other cases there may have been errors
and uncertainties in the data sets them-
selves. To prove his point, Desch offers
four case studies: the Russo-Polish War
(1919–20), the battle for France (1940),
the Falklands War (1982), and Israel’s
wars from 1948 to 1982. These case
studies trace the details of governmen-
tal decision making and the military
operations of each conflict, showing
that the factors identified by the
triumphalists were not the key drivers
of battlefield outcomes.
The combination of quantitative analy-
sis and case studies is notable. Few au-
thors are comfortable working in both
methods, but Desch demonstrates both
methodological sophistication and a
command of military history. However,
one might ask for a more thorough ex-
ploration of a few issues. One example
is how quick Desch is to dismiss the
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possibility that democracies grow faster
economically than other regimes and
thus accumulate more resources in the
long run. Such questions are minor,
though, and the overall case is quite
persuasive.
This book is a must for scholars of mili-
tary effectiveness or civil-military rela-
tions. The statistical sections will satisfy
researchers; they might be a bit difficult
for general readers, but overall the work
should interest a broad audience of na-
tional security professionals. Desch’s
writing is excellent throughout, with
lively case studies and clear explana-
tions of his theories and results.
One hopes that policy makers will read
this book. As Desch notes, democratic
triumphalism has become popular in
Washington. The mistaken belief that
democracy itself is a “force multiplier”
could lead officials to underestimate the
risks of U.S. interventions or to encour-
age unduly weak but democratic U.S.
allies. Desch offers a warning that it is
superior strategy, resources, and skill,
not the magic bullet of democracy, that
remain the keys to victory.
DAVID BURBACH
Naval War College
Doyle, Michael. Striking First: Preemption and
Prevention in International Conflict. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008. 200pp. $24.95
Even before the United States and its al-
lies embarked on war in Iraq in 2003,
the question of whether it is acceptable
to strike enemies without clear provo-
cation was an increasingly vexing one to
policy makers, academics, and legal ex-
perts. “Preemptive war” (attacking an
enemy who is clearly about to strike
you first) has always been an acceptable
response to a dire and clear threat. But
“preventive war” (striking a potential
enemy while circumstances are favor-
able to the attacker, or striking in early
anticipation of a possible, or even only
theoretical, threat) has traditionally
been regarded in the international
community as not only unwise but
immoral.
In this slim, tightly reasoned volume,
one of America’s foremost foreign-
policy thinkers tackles the problem of
preventive war and reaches surprising
conclusions. While rejecting the
so-called Bush Doctrine, which puta-
tively grants to the United States almost
unlimited permission to attack almost
any threat in any form, Doyle delivers a
clear warning that the previous rules of
war do not apply in the twenty-first
century. Doyle struggles (as have other
scholars in many nations over the past
decade) to find criteria that would al-
low preventive attacks in an interna-
tionally acceptable framework. He
settles on four criteria: lethality, likeli-
hood, legitimacy, and legality.
The book is actually a collection of es-
says by four other scholars, who supply
a foreword and criticism of Doyle’s
chapters, to which Doyle responds in a
conclusion. The debate format is lively
and makes this work a particularly use-
ful tool for introducing students at ad-
vanced levels to the subject.
Although Doyle’s prose is direct and
clear, in places he makes overly struc-
tured arguments, and his attempt to set
his four criteria into a matrix produces
something more like a rigid template.
Doyle certainly recognizes that the per-
ception of a threat, versus the actual
threat, is often idiosyncratic and af-
fected by a slew of factors, but his
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criteria are more likely to make sense
after the fact than at the outset of ac-
tion. The moral questions he raises are,
and should be, crucial to policy makers,
but his framework is more suitable as
an after-action analysis than as a guide
to preventive attack.
That said, Striking First is an excellent,
thought-provoking, and highly readable
volume, indispensable for both special-
ists and interested general readers. No
future discussions of this problem (and




Mahnken, Thomas G., and Joseph A. Maiolo, eds.
Strategic Studies: A Reader. New York: Routledge,
2008. 464pp. $49.95
Tom Mahnken and Joseph Maiolo will
not be unfamiliar to readers of the Na-
val War College Review or to students of
strategy and policy. Mahnken, a former
professor at the Naval War College, is
currently visiting fellow and professo-
rial lecturer in the Strategic Studies Pro-
gram at the Johns Hopkins University
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced In-
ternational Studies; Maiolo is a senior
lecturer in war studies at King’s College
London. Seeking to enhance the teach-
ing of this important subject, Mahnken
and Maiolo have put together a collec-
tion of previously published essays on
the theory and practice of strategic
studies.
This collection is wide ranging, both
topically and chronologically. It begins
by examining the uses of strategic the-
ory, with essays by Bernard Brodie,
Lawrence Freedman, and William C.
Fuller, Jr. The second section examines
the “classics,” with selections from Sun
Tzu, Basil Liddell Hart, and Thomas
Schelling. A look at conventional war-
fare on land, sea, and air is found in the
third section, in articles by Richard
Overy, Brian Holden Reid (on J. F. C.
Fuller), and Daniel Byman and Mat-
thew Waxman on airpower in Kosovo,
along with a selection of Julian
Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy. Nuclear strategy is not ne-
glected, with a selection from Bernard
Brodie’s The Absolute Weapon and Al-
bert Wohlstetter’s famous article “Deli-
cate Balance of Terror.” The fifth, and
by far the largest, section is on irregular
warfare and small wars. The essays here
are both new and old classics: T. E.
Lawrence, Mao Tse-tung, David Galula,
David Kilcullen, Andrew Mack (on big
nations losing small wars), and Peter
Neumann and M. L. R. Smith (on stra-
tegic terrorism). To conclude, there are
essays by Andrew Krepinevich, Michael
Evans, Colin Gray, Adam Roberts, and
Hew Strachan (all since 2003), which
engage the future of conflict and of
strategy making.
One should not quibble too much with
the editors’ selections (or omissions);
Mahnken and Maiolo acknowledge
from the outset that space prevented
them from including all they wished.
Still, some readers may question the de-
scription of strategy that Mahnken and
Maiolo offer in their introduction. By
strategy they largely mean military,
rather than national or grand, strategy,
but they do not specify. In a collection
such as this, a more precise explanation
of strategy at the beginning would have
been helpful for framing the collection’s
essays. Nonetheless, this text will be ex-
tremely useful as a starting point for
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professional military education on this





Stavridis, James. Destroyer Captain: Lessons of a
First Command. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2008. 224pp. $22.95
The politically correct aspiration for all
surface warfare officers is to attain to
command at sea. Realistically, these of-
ficers cannot begin to comprehend all
its ramifications, but they viscerally
know it is the Holy Grail. Reading Ad-
miral Jim Stavridis’s Destroyer Captain
is about as close as these officers will
come to enjoying the ride until they ac-
tually receive their orders to command.
It is our great fortune that then-
commander Stavridis scrupulously kept
a journal during his days aboard USS
Barry (DDG 52) (1993–95) and has of-
fered to share his experiences with us.
James Stavridis is prolific on this sub-
ject, having written extensively on life at
sea for the naval professional. Such ear-
lier works as Watch Officer’s Guide (edi-
tor, 1999) and Command at Sea (with
William Mack, 1999) now serve as text-
books. Destroyer Captain, however, is
designed to be a good read for anyone
fascinated with what life is like behind
the doors of the captain’s cabin. Fortu-
nately, Stavridis is a writer who is not
only good with the small details of daily
life but shares a sense of history and
awe of the sea. Simply, he is in love with
command at sea, and you feel it
throughout the entire book.
Stavridis does not purport to tell new
destroyer skippers that there is one cor-
rect way to succeed at their job, but he
has tried to keep to the basics. The
“ends” are mandated: the ship should
be ready for war. The “means” is where
a captain’s personality turns seemingly
identical structures into radically differ-
ent habitats. Stavridis adheres to sim-
plicity. Serve good food. Walk around.
Have a plan. Smile.
Stavridis, currently the regional com-
batant commander of Southern Com-
mand, was the second skipper of Barry.
His predecessor, today Admiral Gary
Roughead, is the Chief of Naval
Operations.
A particularly poignant piece is his ac-
count of the tragic death of Admiral Jay
Prout, a friend and mentor and always
an ebullient companion. Prout had a
trademark of passing to friends en route
to command a paperback about the ex-
ploits of a Royal Navy destroyer skipper
who had three ships shot out from un-
der him during the Second World War.
He called that book motivation for a
successful command. We can place De-
stroyer Captain on the same list.
TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College
Cliff, Roger, et al. Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chi-
nese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications
for the United States. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,
2007. 154pp. $27.50
This study has already attracted wide-
spread attention from the policy com-
munity and media, for good reason.
The U.S. military appears poised to face
challenges to its ability to maintain ac-
cess to a variety of regional littoral
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areas, such as in the Persian Gulf. It is
time for American planners to view the
rising antiaccess challenge as part of a
global problem that may require signifi-
cant restructuring of U.S. platforms,
deployment, diplomacy, and even, in a
worst case, strategy and tactics.
The authors have produced the first
major study that evaluates comprehen-
sively the specific antiaccess methods
being discussed by Chinese military
strategists. They bring to bear a wide
variety of relevant doctrinal and ana-
lytic materials (many of which they
themselves have translated) and explain
clearly their relative authority. The au-
thors’ conclusion is sobering: in the un-
fortunate event of a Taiwan Strait
conflict, China’s military may consider
launching a rapid surprise attack. Such
a first strike could damage and render
ineffective a wide variety of U.S. mili-
tary platforms (aircraft carrier strike
groups—which are described as having
special vulnerabilities—and assets at re-
gional bases). This could deny U.S.
forces effective “access” to sea and air
space to China’s east, leaving Taiwan
vulnerable to military coercion and
testing American resolve. The authors
term this growing zone “the Dragon’s
Lair.” While the United States would
retain significant military forces regard-
less of the outcome of such a conflict,
China might be able to achieve specific
military and political objectives at
America’s expense.
An enduring challenge for analyses of
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is
distinguishing between aspirations and
capabilities. The authors do their best
to differentiate between the two, and
they deserve great credit for addressing
seriously a set of issues on which there
has been insufficient open analysis.
While the continued lack of transpar-
ency makes it difficult to determine the
PLA’s precise capabilities, long-
established technical expertise and fo-
cus on the development of such weap-
ons as missiles and related technologies
suggest considerable potential on
China’s part. The authors offer, in light
of their findings, a wide variety of spe-
cific policy recommendations, which
should be considered carefully. How-
ever, the expense, difficulties (largely
because of inherent physics-based limi-
tations), and side effects potentially as-
sociated with some of them—and
indeed the ruinous nature of any
U.S.-China conflict—make it vital to
consider the larger strategic context as
well.
Conflict over Taiwan is the only readily
imaginable scenario in which the
United States and China could have a
kinetic military exchange today. This
unfortunate contingency, already only a
remote one, has been rendered more so
by the March 2008 Taiwan election and
President Ma Ying-jeou’s constructive
approach to cross-strait relations. Con-
tinued U.S. presence and influence in
strategic regions of East Asia, which
Beijing has not challenged directly in
public, will remain an important sub-
ject for American policy makers, as well
as for bilateral and multilateral discus-
sion. Even as the two nations cooperate,
there will undoubtedly be areas of con-
tention. But there is no reason at this
point to fear that war is imminent, and
every reason to believe that each side’s
coercive capabilities can deter the out-
come that each most fears.
ANDREW ERICKSON
Naval War College
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Cole, Bernard D. Sea Lanes and Pipelines: Energy
Security in Asia. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood,
2008. 280pp. $75
This book, written by a retired Navy
captain and professor of international
history at the National War College,
provides an up-to-date summary of the
movement of energy resources in and
around Asia, of the concurrent buildup
of naval power in the region to protect
that movement, and of strategies em-
ployed by Asian nations to ensure the
safe and secure transport of energy
resources.
Bernard Cole is well versed on the sub-
ject, drawing upon his thirty-year naval
career, all served in the Pacific, and his
obvious focus and research on naval
and energy issues in Asia. His extensive
notes and bibliography constitute al-
most a fourth of the book, showing the
breadth and width of Cole’s research
and sources.
While the title implies a focus on both
sea-lanes and pipelines, actually more
time and space are allocated to mari-
time issues. Cole explains in his intro-
duction that “no form of transporting
oil is more important than the sea” and
that “the role of naval force on the seas
provides the primary vehicle from
which the question of the military secu-
rity of Asia’s energy supplies is viewed.”
Conceding that energy security cannot
be addressed individually for each na-
tion, Cole recognizes globalization as a
fact of life and thus holds that the trans-
port of energy via sea-lanes, “the com-
mons,” must be addressed from a
regional perspective—in this case, that
of Asia. The book is divided into chap-
ters specifically by issues, and within
each chapter Cole examines each issue
on a country-by-country basis.
Cole builds issue upon issue, to include
the geography of the region and the re-
sultant physical problem of the secure
sea lines of communication; the energy
sources within Asia; and the problems
of transporting energy to and from
there. He ends with a look at multilater-
alism and various international organi-
zations that may influence maritime is-
sues in Asia, as well as a profile of
individual countries and their antici-
pated changes vis-à-vis energy security
and freedom of the seas.
The previously mentioned “up-to-date
summary” lends a time-sensitive nature
to the book. Cole takes the time to ex-
plain the necessary background and his-
tory, but he is quite aware that the value
of current data is subject to atrophy as
time passes. An update will certainly be
warranted in a couple of years if this
book is to remain relevant.
JAMES P. LEWIS
Naval War College
Lawrence, Quil. Invisible Nation: How the Kurds’
Quest for Statehood Is Shaping Iraq and the Middle
East. New York: Walker, 2008. 288pp. $25.95
Marcus, Aliza. Blood and Belief: The PKK and the
Kurdish Fight for Independence. New York: New
York Univ. Press, 2007. 368pp. $35
While the establishment of the nation-
state as the preeminent system for polit-
ical and social integration has led to the
benefit of many social groups, it has led
to the disaffection of others. The Kurds,
who for centuries have acted as political
pawns and mercenaries, have arguably
benefited the least. Even now, with a
population estimated at twenty-eight
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million, the Kurds remain divided
among four separate countries—north-
ern Iraq, northeastern Syria, southeast
Turkey, and western Iran.
Literature on the Kurds is extensive,
and, as suggested from the publication
of the books reviewed here, it is likely to
grow. What that means in terms of
greater visibility for the Kurds or the
enhancement of their rights remains to
be seen. If the pen is indeed mightier
than the sword, Kurdophiles will wel-
come any expansion of their docu-
mented trials and tribulations, which
date back to the early 1800s.
Invisible Nation focuses on the Kurds’
experience in Iraq, with particular at-
tention to their plight under Saddam
Hussein and to their role in construct-
ing a democratic Iraq, post–Saddam
and the Baathists. The implicit question
is whether Kurdistan is, or will ever be,
an independent country, de facto or de
jure. Lawrence’s chronology of events
touches upon various aspects of the
problem, such as the long-standing
party factionalism among Iraqi Kurds
(Talabani’s PUK versus Barzani’s KDP)
and a wide array of cabals and conspira-
cies with Iraq’s other social groups
(Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Assyrians,
Turkomans) and neighbors. Following
a brief introduction to Kurdish history,
Lawrence moves quickly to the middle
of the twentieth century, where the
reader learns details of the Kurdish
struggle for self-determination, whether
as part of an independent Kurdistan or
an autonomous region within Iraq.
Lawrence is an excellent writer, but his
depiction of events seems at times anec-
dotal, based on his trips to Kurdistan as
a reporter and on his sampling of infor-
mants. Contributing to that feel is what
appears to be arbitrary footnoting of
sources and declarations. Yet the book
flows nicely and offers insight from di-
verse elements of Kurdish society.
Blood and Belief is a different kind of
book altogether. It too follows a chro-
nological approach, but its time span is
shorter and its topic—the creation and
evolution of the PKK (Kurdish Work-
ers’ Party)—is much narrower. More a
social movement than a political party,
the PKK was established to bring recog-
nition, if not outright independence, to
Kurds living in Turkey. While the PKK
grew out of Kurdish nationalism, how-
ever, its roots were in leftist revolution-
ary traditions.
Marcus begins with the 1978 gathering
in southeast Turkey where the PKK was
founded and then tracks its develop-
ment, principally through the personal
history of its longtime leader Abdullah
Ocalan. That might seem strange, but it
is difficult to separate the party from its
leader, since Ocalan has led the party
and has been its driving force from the
start. Yet as Marcus frequently points
out, Ocalan’s position as leader has
come at a high cost, because of his con-
solidation of power both within the
PKK and against competing parties.
Marcus’s story leads to the conclusion
that Ocalan’s need for absolute control
produced not only several purges but
poor and inflexible strategies. Too often
suggestions for making the PKK more
effective were dealt with by Ocalan as
threats to his leadership and authority.
Using data from “close to 100” inter-
viewees, Marcus explains how the PKK
evolved until Ocalan’s capture in 1999.
The intrigue behind that event is by it-
self worth the price of the book. The
depth of Marcus’s reporting on the
PKK’s early years is unfortunately offset
by the brevity of her coverage of events
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since Ocalan’s arrest. Although she does
include a convenient time line, an index
of the principal players and informants
would have been a valuable aid to the
reader.
Blood and Belief will be of interest not
only to scholars of Kurdish and Turkish
history but to anyone interested in the
development of political movements
and parties and in how power is consol-
idated. Invisible Nation offers an excel-
lent, readable overview of the Kurdish
experience in Iraq, especially since the
Gulf war of 1991. These books docu-
ment two different approaches taken by
a social group long oppressed. Both
raise questions about the cost and feasi-
bility of self-determination, given the
growing permeability of national
boundaries. Another issue is the viabil-
ity of using terrorism as a way to get
recognition or press for one’s rights,
however legitimate they may seem. A
lesson for national leaders is that the
more you deny the identity of a social
group (for years the government of
Turkey claimed there were no Kurds,
only mountain Turks) and its right to
self-expression, the more you sow the
seeds for insurrection and rebellion.
Despite their geopolitical separation,
which contributes to the tendency to
collude with or against each other, the
future for the Kurds seems brighter
than ever. Marcus shows that they can
organize themselves effectively, while
Lawrence suggests that with autonomy
and better economic times, historical
animosities can be set aside. Both au-




Ebadi, Shirin. Iran Awakening: One Woman’s
Journey to Reclaim Her Life and Country. New
York: Random House, 2007. 256pp. $14.95
Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within
Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W. W.
Norton, 2007. 240pp. $14.95
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran
has posed a serious dilemma for re-
gional and global peace and security.
Today, Iran is more perplexing and om-
inous than ever, thanks to President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s threatening
rants and Iran’s supposed nuclear
ambitions.
Two books about Iran and Shiism are
must reads to understand better the
current dilemma in the Middle East and
its ramifications for global security. No-
bel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi’s
autobiography Iran Awakening and Vali
Nasr’s The Shia Revival provide unique
insights and analyses of the power-
hungry clerics ruling Iran and of the
Sunni-versus-Shia paradigm.
Shirin Ebadi’s personal story about her
upbringing in Iran, first under Shah
Pahlavi and then under the Islamic Rev-
olution that brought Ayatollah
Khomeini to power, is captivating. Each
chapter contains shocking develop-
ments, but nothing grabs the reader
more than the prologue, in which she
describes her surreal discovery that she
is next on the revolutionary clerics’ hit
list. The Shia revolutionary paradigm
that evolved in Khomeini’s Iran proved
as repressive and brutal as the shah’s
reign. Particularly bewildering was the
Shia messianic belief in the return of
the Mahdi—the “hidden imam”—
whose arrival would be preceded by the
apocalypse. Equally provocative is the
nearly hypnotic religious fervor with
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which the Shia sought martyrdom, es-
pecially when they fought Saddam
Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War
(1980–88). The scale of destruction and
loss of human life was staggering, yet
Iranians volunteered to fill the front
lines in droves. Shirin Ebadi vividly de-
scribes these strange, violent events, as
well as the ideological earthquakes in
Iran and the state of fear that pervaded
the very air people breathed.
As a human-rights lawyer, Shirin Ebadi
has taken on cases that were extremely
perilous to her and her colleagues. She
has particularly involved herself in cases
of gross violations against women and
children. Both men and women, young
and old, underwent torture, disap-
peared, or languished in Iranian pris-
ons. Extrajudicial executions and
assassinations were not uncommon. In
2003 Shirin Ebadi was awarded the No-
bel Peace Prize. In chapter 12 she de-
scribes her strange elation in being
chosen, and how her fellow Iranians re-
acted—the authorities were unhappy,
but the people, especially the women,
were ecstatic. Today, Shirin Ebadi con-
tinues to work as a human-rights law-
yer in Iran, despite continuous threats
to her life.
Vali Nasr’s book illustrates the patterns
of conflicts between Shias and Sunnis
throughout Islamic history. In The Shia
Revival he explains how he believes
these patterns will continue to shape re-
gional politics in the Middle East and
South Asia. It is a book to which U.S.
policy makers, military, and intelligence
groups should pay close attention. Nasr
has the ability to do something that
probably no other “analyst” has
done—to explain the mind-set of the
Sunni and Shia leaders and their follow-
ers, and why they have such deeply
emotive sentiments about themselves
and resentments toward each other.
These sentiments and resentments,
Nasr is convinced, are affecting politics
in post-Saddam Iraq and have ramifica-
tions for regional and global security.
The book’s subtitle states his theory
that it is the many conflicts within Is-
lam that will shape the future. All we
need to do is look at what is happening
in Iraq, and other parts of the Islamic
world, to see that this is true.
The Sunni-Shia rivalry is as old as Islam
itself. Today, for military and security
strategy purposes, it is especially impor-
tant to understand the political,
sociocultural, religious, historical, and
even economic variables affecting the
Sunnis and Shias. For example, the
Shias tipped the balance of power when
they ruled the Islamic empire during
the Fatimid dynasty. However, the
Fatimids were not successful in expel-
ling the crusaders from Jerusalem. The
Sunnis stepped in and victoriously
fought the crusaders, eventually tipping
the balance of power back into their
hands.
The Sunnis and Shias fear that the same
power struggle will take place today in
Iraq. This time, it is the Americans who
invaded Iraq, providing the opportu-
nity for the Sunnis and Shias to play the
power game once again. In the long
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Crile, George. Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraor-
dinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress
and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our
Times. New York: Grove, 2004. 560pp. $14.95
A longtime best seller in its tenth print-
ing, this important book received a
boost in December 2007 when the pop-
ular movie of the same name brought
this story—CIA’s secret proxy war in
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union—
to the big screen. Crile’s painstaking ac-
count of the complex chain of events
and of the powerful personalities that
produced the most successful covert
war in U.S. history is the result of ex-
tensive research, countless interviews,
travel, and personal interaction with
most of the key characters in this real-
life drama. Over a period of fifteen
years of research and reporting, George
Crile traveled repeatedly to Afghani-
stan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, Kuwait, and Israel and throughout
the United States to interview the many
who played prominently in bringing
about the Afghan mujahideen victory
over the Soviet Union’s Red Army in
early 1989.
Reading more like a good spy novel
than the historical and factual piece of
reporting that it is, the book takes the
reader through the fascinating story of
how the CIA gained support and
achieved victory due, in large measure,
to the backing and behind-the-scenes
political and relationship maneuverings
of Texas congressman Charlie Wilson
and CIA operative Gust Avrakotos. The
extensive cast of characters includes
many other prominent figures in the
U.S. government; Texas society; and the
governments and intelligence services
of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
Israel. The author’s source notes at the
end of the book give a sense of the
grand scope of this story, which is still
playing out today.
Crile’s career, spanning thirty years
with CBS, most notably as a producer
for 60 Minutes and 60 Minutes II, posi-
tioned him to be a part of this epic as it
unfolded. A two-time winner of the Ed-
gar R. Murrow Award for broadcast
journalism, he shows his penchant for
bringing a complex story to the reader
in an evocative, entertaining, and com-
pelling way.
For students of national-security deci-
sion making, foreign policy, U.S. and
international politics, and the processes
that ultimately result in decisive action,
this book provides an insight into how
things really transpired during the Rea-
gan administration’s support of the
Afghan freedom fighters. The author’s
epilogue, a valuable resource for the
student interested in the history and ef-
fects of this period, examines the long-
term unintended consequences of both
U.S. support and periods of nonsupport
over four presidential administrations.
Some of these consequences include the
current negative opinion of the United
States in the Muslim world, the rise of
radical Islam, the attacks of September
11, 2001, and our ongoing conflicts in
both Afghanistan and Iraq.
George Crile passed away in 2006. Al-
though he did not live to see his story
come to life as a full-length motion pic-
ture, he would probably have been
pleased to see the renewed interest and
intellectual curiosity that the film has
brought to his important chronicle of a
pivotal time in our history. There are
countless lessons and insights here for
national security professionals and
those interested in the messy processes
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Dugard, Martin. The Training Ground: Grant,
Lee, Sherman, and Davis in the Mexican War,
1846–1848. New York: Little, Brown, 2008.
446pp. $29.99
The English novelist C. S. Forester once
observed, concerning soldiers in war,
that it was a “coincidence that when
destiny had so much to do she should
find tools of such high quality ready to
hand.” This comment aptly describes
the human story line woven throughout
The Training Ground, Martin Dugard’s
spirited and nearly blow-by-blow ac-
count of the major battles of the Mexi-
can War. Dugard, author of The Last
Voyage of Columbus (2005), has written
a robust narrative of this conflict de-
scribing President James K. Polk’s am-
bition to expand the territory of the
United States. Reaching beyond the for-
mal history, Dugard uses the strong
personalities, individual battlefield ac-
complishments, and close relationships
among a small group of professional
soldiers who actually fought the war to
bring his story to life.
These soldiers, West Point graduates
and well-drilled junior officers in a
meager U.S. Army, were the human
tools “ready to hand” in 1846. Ulysses
S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, William
Sherman, Jefferson Davis, Thomas J.
“Stonewall” Jackson, and others with
names remembered today were first ex-
posed to the hardships and brutality of
warfare in the conflict with Mexico.
The experience gained in combat tac-
tics, engineering, and logistics by this
“brotherhood” hardened its veterans
and taught them to lead, lessons that
would be evident during the much
more horrific bloodshed that was to
take place in the U.S. Civil War.
Dugard relates numerous stories of
these young officers and their friend-
ships: of Lee assisted by a young George
McClellan and supported by Jackson’s
mobile gun batteries; “Sam” Grant and
Davis charging together into battle;
“Pete” (actually James) Longstreet serv-
ing as best man at Grant’s postwar wed-
ding; the calmness of Grant and his
keen battlefield observation under fire;
the savagery of Jackson’s energy; the
frustration of Sherman while posted in
California; and the courageous, almost
supernatural, professionalism of Lee.
In the end, Mexico City and Mexico
were conquered, and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed in July
1848, ended the war. Mexico lost vast
portions of its northern states, includ-
ing California, while the still-young
United States nearly doubled in size.
The spare and honest Grant wrote of
his experiences in Mexico, “I would like
to see a truthful history written. Such a
history will do full credit to the cour-
age, endurance, and soldierly ability of
the American citizen, no matter what
section of the country he hailed from,
or in what ranks he fought.” As
Dugard’s brisk and engrossing story
forecasts, the competence of this small
brotherhood would be put to the fullest
test during the long and bitter conflict
between the states. This later war was
fought with great determination and vi-
olence by the men whom destiny had
trained on the same ground—the West
Point veterans of the Mexican War.
WILLIAM CALHOUN
Naval War College
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
Navy Professional Reading Program
In October 2006, on the occasion of the 231st anniversary of the U.S. Navy, theservice gave itself a birthday present, in the form of the Navy Professional Read-
ing Program (NPRP). This multifaceted program replaced what had commonly
been known as the “Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Reading List” and the
“Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Reading List.” The CNO did not want a
reading list, he wanted a reading program—the difference being a Navy commit-
ment to making the books readily available in shipboard, squadron, and base li-
braries, as opposed to simply identifying them for consideration. Ultimately,
over sixty-five thousand books were purchased and distributed to nine hundred
activities throughout the Navy.
The present CNO, Admiral Gary Roughead, has noted, “Reading, discussing,
and understanding the concepts found in these books will improve our ability to
think critically and fight smarter. They give us a much greater appreciation of
the world and its diverse cultures, a better understanding of our naval heritage,
and a clearer sense of what it means to be a sailor. Reading makes us better
leaders.”
The identification of books of interest to U.S. Navy mariners can be traced back
to the 1820s, when Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard ordered that every ship
be provided with thirty-seven books on subjects ranging from mathematics to
philosophy. The complete library for the modern Reading Program consists of
sixty books, arranged by subject matter and stratified by the experience levels of
readers. The subject-matter categories were selected to match the skills and abili-
ties that sailors must master to serve effectively in the twenty-first-century Navy:
critical thinking, joint and combined warfare, regional and cultural awareness,
leadership, naval and military heritage, and management and strategic planning.
The NPRP offers suggestions as to books that should be read based upon a
sailor’s experience level. The titles are divided into five collections, each collec-
tion consisting of twelve books. The collections are:
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• Junior Enlisted, suggested for seamen recruits through third-class petty
officers
• Leading Petty Officer, suggested for second- and first-class petty officers
• Division Leaders, suggested for chief petty officers and officers in the
grades of ensign through lieutenant
• Department/Command Leaders, suggested for senior and master chief
petty officers and lieutenant commanders and commanders
• Senior Leaders, suggested for command master chiefs, captains, and flag
officers.
Every book has value, and sailors are encouraged to read any book that interests
them. Reading at a pace of only two books per year will complete a whole collec-
tion in six years, at which point sailors should be preparing for promotion and
can commence reading the next full collection. Completion of all the books in a
given collection is a measurable goal, achievable with reasonable effort. NPRP is
a voluntary program, and no one will be penalized for nonparticipation. Sailors
who do take advantage of the NPRP, however, will benefit from increased knowl-
edge, greater understanding of issues important to Navy leaders, and a general
enrichment of their lives as professionals and as citizens. More information on
the program can be found at www.navyreading.navy.mil.
The books in the initial NPRP were recommended by a Navy Professional
Reading Program Advisory Group; for every title approved by CNO, a half-
dozen others were considered. The Advisory Group continually evaluates new
books for inclusion in the program. The group’s philosophy is to maintain as
much stability in the list as possible (in order to enable readers to read systemati-
cally a specific series of books), yet to embrace the degree of incremental change
necessary to reflect the thinking embodied in new works.
The first revision to the program since its inception, “Navy Reading 2.0,” was
implemented in October 2008. In it the classic novel about personal relation-
ships in colonial India, A Passage to India, by E. M. Forster, was replaced by The
Elephant and the Dragon, by Robyn Meredith, about the economic and political
growth of India and China. Leadership, by Rudy Giuliani, a book about political
and business leadership, was replaced by Aircraft Carriers at War, in which a for-
mer Chief of Naval Operations, James Holloway, examines over four decades of
Navy leadership in war and peace. Recognizing Islam, by Michael Gilsenan, the
program’s second title on the subject of Islam, was replaced by Forgotten Conti-
nent, by Michael Reid, focusing on Latin America. Not a Good Day to Die, by
Sean Naylor, which reports on Operation ANACONDA, was replaced by Marcus
Luttrell’s Lone Survivor, an inspirational book about teamwork and dedication
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within a SEAL team in Afghanistan. Finally, a classic novel about seamen in the
age of sail, Herman Melville’s White Jacket, was replaced by Ian Toll’s Six Frigates,
an award-winning book on the founding of the U.S. Navy.
These changes make the NPRP even more relevant, and should further in-
crease participation in a program that helps create twenty-first-century lead-
ers—one book at a time!
JOHN E. JACKSON
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